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Abstract
UNTHINKING FAITH AND FNLTGHTENM FNT
:
HEGEL AND THE IMPASSE OF MODERNITY*
( February 1986)
Jane Elizabeth Bennett, E.A., Siena College
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professors Jean Bethke Elshtain,
Jerome King and George Kateb
Guided by Hegel's understanding in the Phenom eno logy
o f Sp i r i t of the encounter between two paradTgmatic modfes
of modern thought, Faith and Enlightenment, the disserta-
tion first explores the boundaries of contemporary debates
surrounding the natural environment and the- theory of the
state. It then argues that the orientations to nature and
freedom embodied in these debates are flawed--they derive
from either an exaggerated faith in human mastery or from
an exaggerated faith in the extent to which the world is in
ontological harmony with humans. Drawing critically upon
the work of Michel Foucault and Charles Taylor, the
dissertation concludes with the attempt to articulate a
"fractious holist" orientation to nature and freedom that
seeks to escape these flaws.
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CHAPTER I
EXILE AND HOMECOMING
The intellectual motif of the 19th century has been
described as "exile and homecoming," 1 that is, the sense
that the self is e x i s t en t i a 1 1 y estranged and the quest to
unite the self with the larger cultural and natural worlds.
A re-union was deemed necessary, a new and humanly imposed
order was sought to replace the decaying synthesis effected
by religion and tradition. Thus, the motif of exile and
homecoming can also be expressed as the problem of the
relation of self, nature and order.
Because this motif is emblazoned in Hegel's thought
and because I believe its significance extends beyond the
19th century European experience*? I was drawn to Hegel's
attempt to confront and resolve homesickness. Alienation
is for Hegel a positive good, necessary to the development
of the reflective, s e 1 f- d e f i n i n g modern subject. And only
this self-conscious being will be able to recognize £ej_st
and thus transcend alienation.
I do not endorse Hegel's solution to alienation. But
his portrayal of modes of thought -- Faith and
Enlightenment -- as variations on the theme of exile and
homecoming is a rich source of insight into the nature of
contemporary political debates.
1
Chapter II, "The Dialectic of Faith and Enlighten-
ment," begins the exploration of this insight by sum-
marizing the classical dialogue between Faith and
Enlightenment in the Ph en om e no lo g_y__o £_Sp_i r i t . Faith and
Enlightenment are modes of thought which can neither accept
nor dispense with each other. Faith seeks a world filled
with divinity; Enlightenment seeks freedom in a disen-
chanted world. Enlightenment demands knowledge certain of
itself, lacking the resources to achieve it; it views
reason as a tool for ordering the world and rendering it
predictable, understating the world's resistance to its
order; and it understands nature to be a deposit of
resources for use, underplaying human implication in a
world larger than itself. Faith, the defensive voice in
this dialectic, strives to appreciate the mysteries
surrounding human knowing, sacrificing the contribution
self-consciousness makes to freedom; it resists the spread
of instrumental rationality, underestimating the necessity
of technology and administration; and it seeks respect for
nature, exaggerating its beneficence.
According to Hegel, the Faith and Enlightenment
attempts to reconcile self and world are both faulty.
While the flaws of each are readily exposed by the other,
neither offers an affirmative position free of theoretical
and practical difficulties. Because the two engender each
other — each formed in contrast to its perceived opponent
3— neither is able to transcend itself. Hegel insists that
debates conforming to the Faith-Enlightenment dynamic will
arrive at an impasse, until they accept the dialectical
resolution of this impasse inscribed in Hegel's own theory.
Chapter IT highlights several characteristics of
modern discourse: its desire to overcome alienation, its
recognition of political impact of theories of language and
knowledge; its ambivalent stance toward rationality and
utilitarianism; its preoccupation with order; and the
inevitability of protest against this preoccupation.
Euilding upon Hegel's understanding of the encounter
between Faith and Enlightenment, the study then moves, in
Chapters III and IV, to an exploration of contemporary
attempts to relate self, nature and order. It identifies
characteristic formulations of this relation and
characteristic flaws in them.
One set of formulations, inspired by Enlightenment,
emphasizes the human creation of order; re-union or
homecoming requires a strenuous exertion of rational will.
Another set, the heirs of Faith, emphasizes the order
already within nature; re-union requires an attunement of
human will to natural structure. I argue that the first
overestimates the pjw»r jf human reason and will; the
second, the beneficience of the extant natural order.
Moreover, both ov ere st ima t ions result in an inability to
acknowledge that within the self and ^hat within nature
that declines to attend the reunion, i.e., "otherness." To
rail against that which escapes unification with ever more
insistent attempts at humanization (as Enlightenment does)
has been ecologically and psychologically dangerous. But
the r e- con s t i t u t i on of this resistance as a mysterious part
of a world designed in our best interests (as in Faith) is
increasingly hard to believe, running too much against the
grain of contemporary experience.
The aim of Chapters III and IV is not to prove that
contemporary discourse must be enclosed within the
Faith-Enlightenment problematic — for Faith-Enlightenment
is only one of many interpretive frameworks. Rather, my
intention is to reveal dimensions of contemporary debates
normally unthematized when these parameters are ignored.
Chapter III, "Environmental Management and Natural
Holism," applies the Fa i t h -En 1 i g h t e nm e n t dynamic to the
environmental debate. Contemporary orientations to nature
fall rather neatly into two groups: environmental
management, with its enlightenment faith in human technique
an d-con f idence that nature can be humanized; and natural
holism, with its emphasis on the i n t e r c o n n ec te d n e s s of self
and nature .
Environmental management, as exemplified by environ-
mental economists Allen Kneese and Charles Schultze, envi-
ronmental lawyer Christopher Stone, and environmental eth-
icist John Passmore, gives primacy to human reason and
5will. Natural holism, as exemplified by natural philoso-
phers Erazim Kohak and John Compton, gives special status
to nature, conceiving it as a moral guide for human
conduct.
Environmental management and natural holism are
opponents intimately involved with each other, and this
intimacy confines them to a debate between an instrumental
and a teleological view of nature. According to natural
holism, environmental management is incapable of realizing
environmental quality, for its Promethean orientation to
nature is at base destructive. According to environmental
management, natural holism is Utopian, for it evades the
necessity for a Promethean orientation by fantasizing about
the extent to which self and nature can be reconciled.
Although the charges each makes against the other are
on target, neither solution is satisfactory. Chapter III
thus establishes an agenda to be pursued in Chapter V: the
development of an orientation to nature more tenable than
natural holism and less destructive than environmental
m an ag ement
.
The organization of Chapter IV, "The Juridical State,
the Consensual State, the Attuned State," is more complex,
for Enlightenment theories of the state present both, an
individualist and a collectivist face. I examine three
contemporary theorists of the state -- Theodore Lowi,
Jurgen Habermas, and Charles Taylor — by focusing on their
conceptions of freedom. Lowi and Habermas, disagreeing on
much, nonetheless share the Enlightenment inheritance and
conceive political freedom as rational mastery of the
natural and social world; Taylor protests against these two
faces of Enlightenment, claiming that freedom requires
respect for the "natural bent" of the self and the world.
Lowi and Habermas advocate a powerful state with an
increasing realm of responsibility while Taylor argues for
a more decentralized steady-state.
The focus of the Habermasian attack on Lowi's ideal
state is that its commitment to a basically capitalist
economy undermines its commitment to democracy. Habermas's
ideal is a consensual state where rational norms rather
than unreflective tradition or corporate imperatives govern
social life. From the perspective of Taylor, however,
Habermas shares with Lowi an exaggerated confidence in the
ability of human reason to order individuals, collectiv-
ities, or nature. This ov er con f id ence leads them, even
against their will, to define their targets more and more
in terms of use-value and to enlarge the scope of social
rationalization. Taylor seeks an attuned state with a
diminished need to administer citizens and social life.
His ideal, then, is a state where social institutions
acknowledge the limits of the world they inhabit. Such
acknowledgement reduces the extent to which natural limits
function as obstacles to human will.
7Chapter IV concludes with a critique of the orienta-
tion to nature implicit in Taylor's ideal. Taylor assumes
too great a degree of attunement between humans and the
natural world. His theory, insightful in its critique of
these two modernized theories of the enlightened state,
ends by recapitulating defects in the Faith view of the
wo r Id
.
One of the aims of Chapter IV, then, is to elucidate
the connection between orientations to nature and
conceptions of freedom. Because nature must to some degree
be experienced as outer, as a barrier to will, as setting
boundary conditions for action, an orientation to nature
enables some conceptions of freedom and disables others --
helping to decide, for example, whether freedom is
understood as requiring transcendence of boundaries or
acceptance of them. The orientation to nature also has
implications for the treatment of troublesome or resistant
elements of the population. Because nature is, in a sense,
the paradigm "other," an approach to nature helps to
constitute the range of ethical or not-so-ethical
orientations to human "others."
This study allows Hegel to set the agenda for the
examination of contemporary political debates (Chapters III
and IV), but it is not itself Hegelian. Hegel's
philosophical solution to alienation, the ontology of
Geist, is untenable. Moreover, the Phenomenology
8encourages the contemporary reader in this conclusion. By
relentlessly exposing the complexities, anomalies, and
flaws in every extant theory of self, morality, freedom, or
nature, it teaches us to be skeptical of any theory that
purports to be complete, consistent, and unified. Hegelian
philosophy embodies the flaws of Faith and Enlightenment it
so carefully identifies, but its attempt to provide the
definitive solution to homesickness is so subtle and
complex that its very failure recommends a more tentative
political and theoretical stance.
Chapter V, "Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment," seeks
such a stance, one that places its faith neither in human
mastery nor in a world predisposed to harmonize with human
needs. It seeks a political theory, or better, a
philosophical anthropology, that acknowledges dissonance
'
-V.
between humans and the world while appreciating our
interdependence with it. Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel
Foucault inspire this attempt, although they are not the
authors of it.
This philosophical anthropology of "fractious holism"
strives to acknowledge the integrity of intractable
elements of the self, of non-humans, and of places not
ordered according to principles of human design. More
importantly, it seeks to accept this resistance to human
ordering without grounding acceptance in a belief in the
ontological concord jf humans and nature.
9Fractious holism makes the point that the world is
best understood as neither intersubjectively constituted
nor objectively given. The investigation of contemporary
attempts to feel at home in the world has shown that while
the world is to some extent a human construction, the
result of the imposition of human form or order, it also
escapes subjective and intersubjective control. In seeking
to articulate the nature of this world, fractious holism
continues the Faith and Enlightenment quest to return from
exile — but it acknowledges that there can be no fully
satisfying homecoming and that the quest itself is not
without imposing effects.
1 o
ENDNOTES
See George Steiner, Antigones (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1984), Chapter One.
CFAPTFP II
THE DIALECTIC OF FAITH AND ENLIGHTENMENT
Wjia. t _i_s
_
E nlight e nm e n t ?
Enlightenment was the de-mystification of a world of
robust faith, a world filled with divine signs, intrinsic
meaning, and intelligible order. Enlightenment transformed
n a t ur e- a s-God ' s text into nature as a set of
rational izable
,
mechanical, potentially useful parts. In
the face of the rigid religious structure that grew up
around the beautifully enchanted world, Enlightenment
asserted a political freedom and self-determination where
God has retreated to a more distant location in the cosmos;
in the face of unreflective allegiance to tradition, it
asserted the integrity and power of reflective and
reflexive reason; in the face of a view of knowledge as
mysterious hints from God, it pursued a transparent science
of certainty; in the face of a sacra.lized nature, it
asserted a potentially predictable, controllable fund of
natural "resources."
According to Hegel, the self-consciousness within this
new human self-assertion was infectious: the protest
against Enlightenment could not retreat (or could retreat
11
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only upon pain of nostalgia) to its earlier robust and
unreflective form, but it could find another (albeit more
defensive) voice. Modern faith could protest against the
reduction of human reason to instrumental rationality; it
could criticize Enlightenment's pursuit of a transparent
knowledge by showing knowledge to be historically situated
and limited by the finitude of the human mind; it could
show how Enlightenment's utilitarianism leads to the
treatment of humans as means and thereby undermines the
desire to install new dignity and respect for humans; it
could stand as a witness to the human submersion in and
dependence upon nature and insist that nature's inherent
order be respected even if it is no longer possible to read
it as a text.
Fnl ightenment
,
then, defines itself by reference to
its adversary; its self-image is that of destroyer of myths
and archaic social institutions. Its critique of the
robust faith applies as well to the modern version of faith
-- for Enlightenment exposes, in the cold light of reason,
the foundation of the new faith's moral claims to be the
same old religion or teleology that was the source of the
moral power of the robust faith. Faith too defines itself
by reference to its adversary and it too has success in its
critique, however. It persistently exposes the narrowness,
overconfidence, and contradictions within Enlightenment's
exaltation of the rational, autonomous human being.
1?
The structure of my exploration of the dynamic between
Enlightenment and Faith is as follows:
First, T provide a characterization of the
pr e-Enl ightenment
,
robust, version of Faith, for the Faith
( glauben ) Hegel describes in the Ph e nom eno 1 og y__^_SpJ_rU.
has already been infiltrated by Enlightenment categories.
This characterization of Robust Faith, along with the
characterizations of all "modes of consciousness," is of an
ideal type. There are many historical examples of the
orientation I call Robust Faith, but because it is intended
as a set of contrasts to modern orientations to self,
world, nature, it is difficult and beside the point to give
it a precise historical location. Roughly, it corresponds
to post-Christian but pr e-Enl ightenment times, although for
the Hegel of the Ph ilosophy of H is tory , who is thinking
more in terms of changes in religious consciousness, the
Reformation rather than the Enlightenment marks the demise
of Robust Faith. The point of my elaboration of Robust
Faith is not that it exhausts pre-Enl ightenment or
pr e-R e fo rm a t i o n orientations (neither are "modern faith" or
"Enlightenment" monolithic categories'), but that it cannot
be our orientation. T try to capture the sense of a
significant version of a non-modern ontology.
The account of Robust Faith ends with a description of
the transition to modern Faith. Here I draw upon the work
of Hans Blumenberg. We then arrive at the Faith of the
1 4
Phenomenology, a modern Faith that confronts and is
confronted by Enlightenment. This Faith, still resonant
with the enchanted world, is both the target of
Enlightenment's critique and a critique of Enlightenment,
the now dominant mode. The modern age appears as the
continuation of the mutually engendering debate between
Faith and Enlightenment.
Robust Faith
Faith in its prime embodies an enchanted view of the
world. 1 Nature is filled with mystery and meaning and
every item within it is interconnected with every other.
The world is a vast web whose threads are those of
resemblance. This similitude of each with all is an
ontological likeness due to the divine source of all things
created, but it is also a literal connection among things.
There are links of physical proximity (e.g., moss on trees,
ticks on dogs); links of the identity, analogousness , or
complementarity of function or form ("Just as man's
intellect is an imperfect reflection of God's wisdom, so
his two eyes, with their limited brightness, are a
reflection of the vast illumination spread across the sky
by sun and moon..."); and links of natural affinity (e.g.,
plants toward the sun) or repulsion (e.g., fire toward
water) .
15
Knowledge is organized around the principle of
resemblance, but it would be misleading to think of
resemblance as the epistemology of Robust Faith.
Resemblance is not a conceptual scheme employed to
investigate a physical world; it is a property inherent in
nature. Nature speaks and says that it coheres through
relations of resemblance. Every rock, every plant reveals
part of its meaning, tells what it is_, and what it is is
its purpose and place within the order of creation.
There exists a sympathy between aconite and our
eyes. This unexpected affinity would remain in
obscurity if there were not some signature on
the plant, some mark, some word, as it were,
telling us that it is good for diseases of the
eye. This sign is easily legible in its seeds:
they are tiny dark globes set in white skinlike
coverings whose appearance is much like tha^t of
eyelids covering an eye/
Knowledge here is knowledge of divine intention as it
is embodied in the natural world. In this sense, knowledge
in general is knowledge of God. Mature speaks, but by
necessity something is lost in the translation; nature
cannot pronounce an unambiguous directive. God provides
only hints, or rather, his intentions must appear to
mortals as cryptic clues. This opaqueness is not only a
result of the limits of human reason; it is also bound up
with the temporality and finitude of material things.
Nature, therefore, whispers, but the whisper only
concentrates our attention, draws our ears even closer,
enhances the appeal of that which speaks.
16
Knowledge must have an element of mystery, for were it
unambiguous, man would have no role to play. More
precisely, man would cease to be man and instead become
God, because in an enchanted world the only being with
access to unambiguous knowledge is God. Man, like every
part of creation, is a integral part of the ordered
universe, a universe that includes the "objects" of human
knowledge. Man is related to these objects precisely in
his office as interpreter of them. The relation between
man and the world -- i.e., knowledge -- consists then in
interpretation; interpretation makes audible the world's
voice
.
Moreover, the veiled messages in nature are
susceptible to a range of interpretations. The truth is
gleaned only through multiple, partial attempts and even
the final compilation of interpretations can only
approximate truth. The range is not infinite, however, for
the messages are grounded and the interpretations bounded
by real divine intentions — even while this ground and
these limits are not fully transparent to us.
Writings and speech in the enchanted world are as any
other naturally appearing thing. Language does not
function as a medium privileged by its proximity to nan;
language has not yet become -- as it will in modernity -- a
vastly richer and deeper source of truth than a neutral
natural environment. Language, like nature, is simply
17
another site where resemblances connect earthly existence
to the divine cosmos. Ancient texts, contemporary
writings, theological treatises, ravings of the mad, art,
music, and miracle plays were all subject to constant and
relentless commentary, for overlapping interpretations were
required to reveal the oracle within texts. All varieties
of commentaries were encouraged: those which elaborated
shape, structure, mythical history, medicinal application,
smell, likenesses to other things, potential, tendencies,
accidental or necessary events associated with the thing,
etc. More importantly, "none of these forms of discourse
is required to justify its claim to be expressing a truth
before it is interpreted; all that is required of it is the
U
possibility of talking about it." The oracular nature of
the text is not a specific divine command to be translated
into human practice. Language does not here "represent"
some real content in the world, but rather
...words group syllables together and syllables
letters, because there are virtues placed in
individual letters that draw them towards each
other or keep them apart, exactly as the marks
found in^nature also repel or attract one
another
.
It is the secret wo r ki n g s of these movements, more than a
designative message (human or divine), that commentaries
tirelessly seek.
Historians have had a difficulty explaining the
coexistence, in the late Medieval period, of magic or
1 8
divination (used to cull meaning from nature) and scholarly
erudition (used to examine the re-discovered Greek and
Roman texts). The former is often viewed as an element of
superstition incongruous with the theoretical strides made
in the field of textual exegesis. But these two forms are
more than complementary. As integral parts of the
epistemic configuration of Pobust Faith, divination and
textual commentary are the methods appropriate to the
production of the incomplete knowledge that is in turn
appropriate to a world filled everywhere with divine hints
of meaning. The model for reading nature is the same as
that for reading texts. "God is revealed in Scripture; his
works are also visible in the world. ..The book of nature
becomes a commentary, further substantiation of the truth
of the revealed word .
Just as a poet conveys a message through the medium of
words (a medium that precludes the possibility of a
transparent transmission) and just as it is the reader's
job to participate in reconstructing that message, the
author of the world speaks through signs inscribed in the
world and it is the human role to interpret those signs.
It now becomes clear how the ouestion of truth presented
itself. For those of the enchanted world, it is useless to
demand the title to authority of interpretations of natural
signs or of texts, for God was the guarantor of their
truth. Both commentary and division possess
19
...an ageless affinity with the things that it
unveils
... The truth of all these marks
whether they are woven into nature itself or
whether they exist in lines on parchment and inlibraries is everywhere the same: coeval
with the institution of God.
Underlying all human attempts at deciphering is a more
primal discourse, the divine text of origin, the macrocosm.
Things hide themselves in nature and in the word but
then offer themselves up for interpretation. The world is
recalcitrant but not silent. From the time when the order
of things that "bear witness" to some trend or to some
origin "without its being possible to indicate causes and
g
effects." Here is knowing where relationships are loose
but secure, both flexible and strong; where the threads
that link are more along the order of family resemblances
than efficient causes.
Let us review the elements which constitute the world
of Faith in its robust phase.
(1 ) Holism : There is a deep sense that the universe
is ordered or designed in a coherent and purposeful way.
Each part of that whole is interconnected to every other
through relations of resemblance. The earthly world is a
microcosm, a category which
...provides all investigations with an
assurance that everything will find its mirror
and its macrocosm ic justification on another
and larger scale; it affirms, inversely, that
the visible order of the highest spheres will
be fou^d reflected in the darkest depths of the
earth .
20
(2) Incompl eteness
: All knowledge is of relations
relations between persons and their world and among things
that co-exist in the world. Those relations have a
necessary element of opacity; knowledge can be certain or
rather, secure, without having to be complete, i.e.
opacity and mystery need not be purged.
(3) Interpretation : All knowledge is therefore
interpretation. Although the world of Robust Faith is a
microcosm, the human relation to the world is not
completely given, is not rigidly fixed — it is the place
of the self to participate in forming that relation through
interpretation
.
This characterization of Pobust Faith emphasizes what
was unique about its ontology; it draws a sharp contrast
between modern understandings about the self, knowledge,
and nature and those of the enchanted view of the world.
Eut now it is appropriate to amend this first
characterization. The ontology of Robust Faith attempted
to create an integrated world where the fit between humans
and their natural environment was neat. This attempt to be
at home in the world (behind which stood the divine
homemaker) was to a large degree successful, but only a
romantic could say it was a complete success.
The different beings of the cosmos did for the most
part intertwine through resemblances to form a coherent
whole, but the cosmos always remained a puzzle with a few
21
pieces still missing. For example, language approached
God's intentions but was in essence a defiled version of
them. In general, all the signs in the text/nature were
imperfect, indicators and resemblances could never fully
overcome the distance between self and other, between human
and thing, between body and soul.
From outside the ontological horizon of Robust Faith,
this distance reflects the resistance of the world to a
creationist mold. A creationist ontology first posits
telos and divine intentionality in nature and then
"discovers" them in "signs." A creationist ontology
underwrites (i.e., sets one's name to a policy of insurance
for the purpose of becoming answerable to a designated loss
or damage) the world of Robust Faith.
From inside the ontological horizon of Robust Faith,
however, the imperfections in the schema of world-as-text
are simply the necessary limits appropriate to material or
mortal being; they are worrisome flaws within a basically
sound structure. But inside this worry al ienation found a
place to grow. Pobust Faith is complex: it expresses a
tranquil and orderly world content to explain anomalies as
divine mysteries, but upon closer inspection it also
reveals an uneasiness regarding the depth of that
tranquility. The question "From whence comes the modern
world of alienation?" can thus be given a preliminary
answer: the seeds of the characteristically modern
22
experience of estrangement were sown in the enchanted world
of Robust Faith. This is the world from which the self is
estr ang ed
.
H ege l and Robus t Faith
This insight brings us to a further concern: what is
the relationship between Hegel's view of the world of
Robust Faith as dark and alienated and my account of the
happy and beautiful era of Robust Faith? Is it compatible
with the Hegelian Fa i th-F.n 1 ig htenm ent dialectic to say that
Robust Faith is the predecessor to the modern Faith of the
Ph enom e n ol og y? Yes, for although Hegel's lectures on the
philosophy of history seem to provide an interpretation of
the enchanted world at odds with the one developed here,
the incongruity is only apparent. This claim relies on two
contentions :
(1) that alienation existed withi n the attempt to
secure an integrated world of resemblances. T have under-
played this element in order to draw the sharpest contrast
between Robust Faith and the modern world; it is there
nonetheless. I have suggested the outlines of such an
argument above.
(?) that Hegel was drawn to accentuate the unhappy and
irrational character of Robust Faith because of the
teleological nature of his philosophy. We turn now to this
second contention.
23
The Philosophy of Histor y provides Hegel's developed
interpretation of Medieval Faith as well as an explicit
contrast between the religious orientation of the world of
Catholicism and the Faith of Enlightenment. The contrasts
he chooses to make, along with the character of his
interpretation as a whole, are tied to his fundamental
"principle of division" for historical periodization: the
relation between Church and State. The categories that
flow out of this principle are "Christendom" (patristic
times - 800 A . D . ) , "Feudalism" (800 - 1500), and
"Reformation" (1500 - 1800). In Christendom the
Church/State split is as yet undifferentiated; Feudalism is
the development of the antithesis between the theocracy of
the Church and the monarch of the State; with the
Reformation the critical moves toward the harmonization of
religion and reason are begun. This triadic scheme is also
characterized in terms of the Trinity:
The Kingdom of the Father [Christendom] is the
consolidated, undistinguished mass, presenting
a self-repeating cycle. ..the Kingdom of the Son
[Feudalism] is the manifestation of God merely
in a relation to secular existence — shining
upon it as upon an alien object. The Kingdom
of Spirit [Reformation] is the harmonizing of
the antithesis.
The Reformation is an unequivocal good for Hegel;
nothing of value is lost in the transition from a world
opulent and bloated with miracles and magic to the
reasonable world of Luther. Pr e-r e f o rm ? t i on religious
consciousness is "the long, eventful and terrible night,"
necessary because its irrationality is the precondition for
a re-formation.
Let us take a step back and look at Robust Faith --
for Hegel the periods of Christendom and Feudalism. For
Hegel they were radically incomplete, mere moments of a
yet-to-be-realized synthesis. This incompleteness stems
from the fact that consciousness was able to make certain
categorical distinctions but unable to conceptualize the
rel atio n between opposing categories. This can be seen
most clearly in the lack of integration between the
Medieval notions of the sacred and the secular. The
central project of the Medieval Age was, according to
Hegel, the attempt to overcome this lack.
A major part of that attempt was the Church. The
Church was both to embody religious beliefs and insights
and to be an agent of political, economic and social
control. Hegel will show, however, that the Church fails
to effect a true reconciliation between sacred and secular
and instead only contaminates each realm with the worst
aspects of the other. For example, the Church corrupts,
through the sale of indulgences and ecclesiastical office,
its authentic spiritual insights with the secular hunger
for power and wealth, at the same time that it introduces
fear and superstition into everyday material existence.
The only institution capable of achieving the precarious,
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complex, and differentiated unity of sacred and secular (or
of faith and reason) is the State, in Hegel's special use
of the term. But because the Medieval Pge invested its
reconciliatory hopes in the Church
. "we see everywhere
vice, utter absence of respect for conscience,
shamelessness
,
and a distracted state of things, of which
the entire history of the period is the picture in
detail." 11
Spiritual concerns and the ethical prescriptions that
follow from them have no comfortable place within available
forms of political and economic organization. In the
Medieval Age, says Hegel, religious life is estranged from
secular life. The Church here failed because its guiding
principles — chastity, poverty, and obedience --
contravene those crucial to social and economic life.
Marriage, necessary as the foundation of secular social
interactions, was deemed inferior to celibacy; "pauperism,
laziness, inactivity, was regarded as nobler" than activity
1 2
where "the workman has to perform for his subsistence";
slavery as blind obedience to Church doctrine, replaces
freedom or "obed ience . . .to the Moral and Rat ion al . . . to laws
1 7
which I recognize as just", a freedom integral to the
good political state.
Moreover, in the absence of this freedom, the self
cannot be integrated: reason is opposed to belief. Reason
here means the self-conscious consideration (endorsement,
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rejection or reformulation) of the standards governing a
way of life. Robust Faith, says Hegel, does not subject
its principles to critical reflection but accepts them as
given by the Church hierarchy. The development of
reflective conscience is, therefore, stunted by the
overwhelming presence of the Church as institutional
conscience. Norms and principles become commands and
dogma. Robust Faith is deficient for Hegel because of its
ex ternal character: its relation to the divine relies on
pronouncements of Church councils, on intermediates called
?aints or clergy, and upon formalistic rituals. "[Mian, as
such, is declared incapable of recognizing the Divine and
1 t|
approaching thereto."
In sum, the pr e-R e fo rm a t i o n attempt to reconcile the
sacred and the secular -- an attempt that culminates in the
establishment of an authoritative religious institution —
only fosters alienation at the level of the self.
Alienation consists in this, that men. ..accept
their identification with external social
reality... but they experience this social
reality as other, they do not feel b <e i s i c h i n
it. ..This sense that the substance of their
lives lies beyond them is the essence of
alienation.
For Hegel, alienation is exacerbated in the modern age,
although it has been present in all periods of history.
Alienation is necessary to develop human subjectivity: the
individual must first separate himself from his natural
surroundings and then create a new relation to the larger
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whole that replaces the immediacy of a submersive
identification that belonged, for example, to the ancient
Greeks. This new relation must be one where there is both
identification with the whole and the self-conscious assent
of the individual. Alienation enables the individual to
move from a natural being to a reflective, cultivated
being. By bringing out the alienation within Robust Faith,
Hegel shows us the sometimes latent but always present
underside of the happy enchanted world. Later, in the
transition to the Modern Age, this split between self and
world widens radically.
Although the Church failed to reconcile sacred and
secular, it was able somewhat to unify the sphere of the
sacred. For Hegel, the insights of Faith cannot exist
without institutional embodiment; even a flawed embodiment
is superior to a privatized religion. .fl n institution is
needed to replace personal and therefore arbitrary will
with abstract, general laws. The Church was at least a
partial success at this; there existed no comparable
sec ul ar institution to enforce universality. Monarchy,
especially the reign of Charlemagne, was the last attempt
to rationalize and unify the political realm. Hegel speaks
disparagingly of the successor of monarchy, feudalism:
Ho authority of Law and Pight is valid any
longer; nothing but chance power — the crude
caprice of particularity as opposed to
universally valid Right...
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All right vanished before individual Might- for
equality of Rights and rational legislation
where the interests of the political Totality,
of the Sta^g. are kept in view, had no
ex i stence
.
One further point must be made regarding the outcome
of the struggle of the Church to present divinity "as not
in any sense an other-world existence, but as in unity with
Human Nature in the Present and Actual." 17 Here we
approach Hegel's interpretation of the natural environment
of Robust Faith. Robust Faith became preoccupied with this
question: T_n_ wh at wa y is the sacred made "present" and
"actual," i.e., sensual? The doctrine of the Trinity (and
its practical expression in the Eucharist) was the
officially prescribed answer to this question, "but when it
is once granted that God exists in external phenomenal
presence, this external manifestation immediately becomes
infinitely varied; for the need of this presence is
1 8infinite." The point here is that once Robust Faith was
committed to the view that the Spiritual has a sensual
expression, it became difficult to c onfine the instances of
this expression to those authorized by the Church. Why,
for example, did the spiritual mingle in the material only
in the Fucharist 9 V?s it not possible that God provided
instances of this co-mingling within our selves or within
nature? For Hegel, it was a kind of excessive enthusiasm
for realizing the unity of human and divine that allowed
nature to become filled with miracles.
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The Church, partially because of the decentralized
character of pre-modern times, was unable to homogenize all
versions of its doctrines and was therefore unsuccessful in
establishing the hegemony of theological explanation of the
unity of human and divine, i.e., the doctrine of the
Trinity. Ordinary religious consciousness had tenuous ties
to this official doctrine and instead improvised its own:
Thus innumerable instances will occur. ..in
which Christ has appeared to one and another,
in various places. ..In all pi aces ... there will
occur manifestations of the He av en 1 y . . - a nd the
Divine will be realized in miracles ...
Unable to restrain or channel this zealousness for unity on
the part of the believers, the Church eventually
incorporated this enchanted view of nature into its own
canon .
This is, for Hegel, an unfortunate turn of events.
Tn the period in question the Church presents
the aspect of a world of miracle; ...natural
existence has utterly lost its stability and
certainty: rather, absolute certainty has
turned against it, and the Divine is not
conceived of... under conditions of universality
as the law and nature of Spirit, but reveals
itself in isolated and detached phenomena, in
which the rational form of existence is utterly
pervert ed
.
Hegel makes it clear that it is only from "our," i.e., the
Hegelian, point of view that the irrationality of Robust
Faith is so lamentable: the faithful participants of the
Medieval Age experience "a state of satisfaction and
enjoyment." 21 For Hegel, Faith is always held accountable
to the standard of absolute knowledge, that is, the model
of transparent, conceptual knowledge. The complex process
by which consciousness is supposed to achieve this
knowledge is the Pher^enolo&y_ of Spirit and Geist is the
Hegelian term for the authentic reconciliation of matter
and spirit.
The Medieval Age is irrational and Robust Faith is
superstitious to the extent that this model for knowledge
is tenable. Some have argued that it is not:
Hegel has a notion of conceptual thought as
self-transparent which we find hard to share
today. Much of contemporary philosophy has
been concerned wit* showing how the clarity of
our most explicit conceptual formulations
reposes on a background of which we are not
fully aware and which we can perhaps never
exhaustively explore. Much that is implicit,
for instance, in the very system of concepts or
classifications that we use to formulate our
clearest thought remains unstated and possibly
unstatable .
Once we become aware of the historicity of knowledge
and begin to doubt the existence of absolute knowledge,
once we no longer believe that the mystery expressed
through religion can be raised to the level where its
speculative content is fully uncovered, Hegel's discussions
of Faith can be seen in a new light. Faith is no longer
merely an insightful though naive precursor to absolute
knowledge; it becomes a repository of historical evidence
through which to question the possibility of transparent
knowledge. Robust Faith becomes not the undisciplined,
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soon-to-be-incorporated/superseded attempt to realize
Geist, but a sign of the irreducible element of opacity in
the world. On this reading, a reading which is consistent
with the analysis of the Robust Faith as predecessor to
modern Faith and Enlightenment, Faith can be shown to
symbolize and convey our dark sense of that unstated or
unstatable background necessary to the explicit
formulations available to us. And the persistence of
Faith-like expressions across epochs reinforces the
judgment that a transparent knowing is a chimeral pursuit.
We see now why Hegel's account of Robust Faith, an
account that always focuses on its "progressive" insights,
is dominated by the discussion of the Church and its formal
doctrines. Although Hegel understands that there was a
time when nature was filled with divine signs, he dismisses
this belief as "a credulity of the most absurd and childish
2 3character." The moments of truth in Robust Faith, to the
extent that they existed, were embodied in the C h u r ch , not
in a view of nature as enchanted. This choice of emphasis
in turn leads Hegel to see the self of Robust Faith as
anything but robust: the self is either an over zealous
producer of silliness or an unthinking slave to dogma. But
if we peel away the view of the Medieval Age as a necessary
but deficient stage in the progress of absolute knowledge,
we are opened up to the interpretation that the self that
had a lived experience of a miraculous natural text was an
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active, creative self - a self that allowed for ambiguous
relations within its knowledge.
The Hegelian desire for unambiguous knowledge, its
pursuit of a thoroughly intelligible nature, i_s
Enlightenment's pursuit of scientific certainty. Thus,
there is a sense in which Hegel's very characterization of
Robust Faith is always already in Enlightenment terms. Yet
Hegel, as we shall see later, provides a powerful critique
of Enlightenment. Although ambiguity or mystery can in no
way be construed as a moment of truth in Faith for Hegel,
but is instead its de fect
,
the subtlety of Hegel's analysis
of Faith and Enlightenment itself provides considerations
capable of converting the putative defect into an important
insight .
The interpretation of Faith as robust, therefore, lies
within Hegel's texts; it seems to be there in spite of his
2 Uphilosophical crusade for clarity. Glimmerings of it are
present in his critique of Enlightenment and in his
qualified defense of Faith. I have given a generous
reading of Hegel's own account of Faith and then
supplemented it with an ideal-type account of Robust Faith,
for Hegel is too anxious to t r an sc end / pr e s e r v e Fait^ into
the higher rationality of a philosophy made possible by
Enlightenment. To reject the view of history as the
movement of increasing rationality requires more openness
to the question of Faith's tenability or truth.
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The Transitio n from R o b u _sWaU^^H^rnj-^j t h
Hegel's account of the age of Robust Faith provides a
coherent account of the religious, political and economic
conditions of the period. Put his treatment of the shift
from the Medieval to the Modern Age is less satisfying. It
seems as though it is the Reformation that ushers in
modernity, and it is the Reformation that sets the stage
for Enlightenment, but how did Robust Faith become so weak
and vulnerable to the Reformation and Enlightenment
attacks? The abuses of the Church alone cannot account for
its demise.
To answer this question it is necessary to make one
more stop before encountering the Faith of the
Phenomenolo gy . Hans Blumenberg in The L egitim acy o f the
Mo d er n Age offers an account of the transition from the
late Medieval period to the early modern period that can be
interpreted as an explanation of how Robust Faith loses
sway and assumes a more modern, defensive stance. The
affinity between Plumenberg and Hegel can be seen
especially when one interprets the Phenom eno logy as a
series of historical analyses, analyses that seem to
capture the core of a way of life — its sometimes smooth,
sometimes troubled internal transformations, and its
relations with opposing ways of life. Hegel gives us a
case history of a mode of consciousness and in so doing can
illuminate the latest expression of that mode. Blumenberg,
too, has a sense of the way historical modes of life
articulate and perfect themselves, realize internal
tensions and then re-form. Blumenberg's account of
Medieval ontology enables us to understand Hegel's account
of Faith more fully.
Tn short, Blumenberg's thesis is this:
Robust Faith's preoccupation with divine will and its
attempt to preserve the omnipotence of that will, lead to
the doctrine of the absolute and therefore possibly
arbitrary character of that will. This "theological
absolutism" opened the space for a radically different
orientation to the world. Tt was no longer reasonable to
suppose that the signs of divine will are legibly inscribed
in nature. If God can create in ways not penetrable by
human reason, then the world available to reason may be one
of contingency, perhaps even sheer arbitrariness. The
world as text thus disintegrates and the world slowly takes
the plastic form of the mathematizable.
Tn my exploration of this Blumenberg thesis, I will
address two questions:
(1) How did theological absolutism arise?
(2) What were the consequences of theological
absolutism?
According to Blumenberg, an important Medieval concern
was the attempt to overcome gnosticism. Gnosticism of the
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early Christian era had addressed the problem of evil by
positing two gods: a benevolent creator and a demiurge
responsible for suffering, deception and evil.
To retrieve the world as the creation from the
negative role assigned to it by the doctrine ofits demiurgic origin, and to salvage the
dignity of the ancient cosmos for its role in
the Christian system, was the central effort
all the way fr^ Augustine to the height of
Sc hoi a s t ic i sm
.
Augustine's efforts to preserve the power of the
unified Christian god were definitive for all later
attempts. He repudiates the existence of a demiurge and
thereby heals the gnostic dualism by making humanity
responsible for evil. The source of evil stems from the
presence of sin, sin that God allows in order that the
human be a free, willing and reasoning being. This
formulation has the potential to unburden God and thereby
restore him to benevolence, omnipotence and omniscience,
but only if some human sin can be identified that is great
enough to absorb the wickedness of the demiurge. Augustine
could find no actual and individual sin that could bear
this weight and this, says Elumenberg, leads him to posit
"the uniquely great original guilt of mankind and.. .its
mythical inheritance."
Eventually in the development of Christianity, this
primordial guilt, because it is not the direct
responsibility of an individual but a congenital flaw of
humanity, finds its possibility of absolution primarily in
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an act of divine grace and only marginally, if at all,
through good works. God can choose, therefore, to absolve
some and not others. This selective absolution must in
fact be the case, as we see that the world is not rid of
the consequences of that guilt. A chosen few are saved;
the majority remain blameworthy and their taint explains
the persistence of evil. The implication of Augustine's
original formulation is the emergence of a "hidden God"
with "inconceivable absolute sovereignty." 2 ^
Throughout the Middle Ages this Augustinian theme of
the primacy of divine will was pursued in many ways. One
significant example is the theological absolutism of
Medieval nominalism where the world was "the pure
performance of reified omnipotence ... a demonstration of the
unlimited sovereignty of a will to which no questions can
ifbe addressed..." God is n om i n al i s t i c : we can know the
bare fact of his creation, but can know no more about him
or the mysterious, gratuitous nature of his creation. Th
e
intent here was to shore up God, to underscore His power,
to preserve the enchanted world by making the individual
feel all the more awed by it. Put although nominalism
sought to bring man "to the point of inevitable resignation
and thus of submission to faith. ..the imminent dynamics of
29
the situation led to the contrary result." theological
absolutism was the final rally of Robust Faith in its
attempt to preserve the title to hegemony, but it also
weakened Faith in its struggle with Fn 1 ightenm ent
.
U7
asserts itself in the face of the dominating force of
Enlightenment. One consequence of this confrontation is
that modern Faith no longer has the degree of
self-confidence appropriate to the hegemonic position of
Robust Faith. While it still attempts to preserve the
unique insights into the human condition expressed in
Robust Faith, modern Faith is the mode of religious
expression best suited to coexist with a world where
secular reason, s e 1 f- c o n sc io us n e s s and modern science are
comingtothefore. *
For Hegel there are both internal and external sources
of this loss of confidence, this mutation in Faith. Like
Plumenberg after him, Hegel shows how Faith -- of its own
accord and through the course of the logical development of
its thought — comes to confront limits in its own
understandings. Faith, like all Hegelian modes of
consciousness before absolute knowing, is drawn to issues
and conclusions that it is unable to incorporate into the
context of its way of life. This is one important impetus
for the dialectical movement of history. Put Faith is not
alone in the modern age; alongside it has grown a way of
life that poses what can be legitimately termed an external
challenge: Enlightenment. This internal realization of
tensions and this external critique combine in the
Ph enom enol og y : En 1 i g h t e nm en t criticizes Faith by
unter-posing the clear, reflective scientific ideals ofCO
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Enlightenment to the p ic t ur e- t ho ug h t of Faith, and this
counter-posing is at the same time a public articulation of
weaknesses that already haunt Faith itself.
Two examples will illustrate this:
(1) Faith asserts the existence of an ever-present yet
not wholly comprehensible unity of the supe r sen suo us and
sensuous realms. This unity is expressed in the Eucharist:
Absolute Being is present in the tangible bread and wine.
This unity is both a symbolic one and an actual one --
indeed the sacrament is as well a celebration of the
identity of symbol and fact. Pict ur e- tho ught s also have
this characteristic: the knowledge gained through
picture-thoughts lacks a dichotomous distinction between
ideational representation and actual presence (the for-us
and the in-itself). v
(2) Faith believes in the unity of human history and
the atemporal order of the universe. History reflects not
only the course of human events but also the rationality of
the divine Spirit. Faith does not dissociate the life of a
mortal, Jesus, from His divinity and the timelessness of
his wo rd s .
In both cases, Fn 1 ightenment steadfastly charges that
Faith has confused two logically distinct categories -- the
material and the spiritual -- and demands a more precise
theoretical articulation of their relation. Enlightenment
probl emati zes and dissociates the simple unities of Faith
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and Faith cannot reply, for its affirmations, by
definition, are not suscept ible to the sort of
justification Fnlightenment demands. Fnlightenment
condemns Faith's stance as irrational
.
The crux of Fnlightenm en t
'
s critique is that Faith
results not in the r econc il iation of matter and spirit (or
of body and soul) but in a repudiation of the sensible
world. For Enlightenment, the confidence of Faith relies
on a deliberate naivete, a stubborn refusal to perceive
evidence disruptive of its worldview.
Just as it sees Faith in general to be a tissue
of superstitions, prejudices, and errors, so it
further sees the consciousness of this content
organized into a realm of error in which false
insight, common to the mass of peop^, is
immediate, naive, and unr e f 1 ec t i v e
.
The price Faith must pay, then, for its "solution" to the
homelessness felt by post-Robust consciousness, is the
denial of the historicity of Jesus and the materiality of
bread and the affirmation of only a vacuous and mysterious
"spirituality." Faith's retreat to the world beyond is an
expression of its pathetic inability to come to terms with
human embodiment (and mortality) and to acknowledge a
measure of human responsibility for personal, social and
political conditions.
Faith might respond of these charges in a variety of
wa ys :
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(1) It might reply with a shrug of indifference,
content to live out its understandings in blissful
ignorance of any narrowly theoretical critique
Enlightenment may provide.
(2) It might attempt a deconstructive reply: it could
refute the charge of u nr e f 1 ec t i v en e s s by showing how no
position can achieve full clarity of expression. Further,
it could expose the naivete of Enl ightenment regarding the
falsifications necessarily within any position that claims
to have achieved full articulation.
(3) It might reply that Enlightenment's critique is
based on a fundamental misunderstanding of Faith. This is
the reply that Hegel himself presents to us in the text:
"Enlightenment distorts all the moments jof Faith, changing
them into something different from what they are in it
[Faith]." In its frenzy to free society from the
i r r a t ion al i sm of religion and tradition, Enlightenment
misses the crucial core of Faith: Faith sets aside the
particularity of the individual in order to assert the
ontological interpenetr ation of humans, things and God.
To faith, its absolute Being, while it is
possessed of intrinsic b eing for the believer,
is also at the same time not like an alien
thing which is just fo und in him, no one
knowing how and whence it came. On the
contrary, the faith of the believer consists
just in his f inding himself as this particular
personal consciousness in the absolute Being
and his obedience and service consist in
producing, through his own ^a c t iv ity , that Being
as his own absolute Being.
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Enlightenment was right, says Hegel, to bring out the
hidden element of sensuousness and historical contingency
in Faith's beliefs and practices, but wrong to view those
beliefs as nothing but the reification of historically
produced norms and to interpret those rituals as nothing
but the celebration of earthly goods. Fn 1 ig htenm ent
"regards the object of the believer's veneration as stone
and wood, or else as something finite and anthropomor-
46pnic." Faith may have only an uncanny hunch that the
human condition involves a spirituality and that individ-
uals are inherently bound up with a larger social, natural
and even universal whole, but Enlightenment mistakenly
attributes the murky and sometimes tradition-bound charac-
ter of Faith to the utter falsity of its insights. It can
do so because its own inability to realize its own aspira-
tions through the vehicle of abstract reason has not yet
become apparent to it.
Although Faith at one time or another has responded in
each of these three ways, the overall tendency of its
replies has been something else: Faith attempts to
"rationalize" itself along the Enlightment model of reason
and in so doing depreciates its own insights. The key
question here is this: Why does Faith respond in
Enlightenment terms? How is it drawn into a game designed
by and for Enlightenment? In order to understand the
seduction of Faith, more needs to be said about the modus
operandi of the Fn 1 i g h t e nm en t critique of Faith.
52
It is not. true that the perspectives of theoretical
reason, embodiment and hi stor ic al it y are simply absent from
Faith and that Enlightenment arrogantly imposes its own
standards upon Faith. Faith already contains these, but
they exist as implicit moments of its understandings and
practices. What is absent in Faith is the
conceptualization of these moments as discrete, dichotomous
cat egor ies
.
For Enlightenment does not emply principles
peculiar to itself in its attack on Faith, but
principles which are implicit in Faith itself.
Enlightenment merely presents Faith with its
own thoughts which Faith unconsciously lets
fall apart. ..it merely reminds Faith when one
of its own modes is present to it, of the
others which it also has, but which it^lways
forgets when the other one is present.
Enlightenment
upsets the housekeeping of Spirit in the
household of Faith by bringing into that
household the tools and utensils of t his world,
a world which Fpirit cannot deny is its own,
because its consciousness likewise belongs to
i t .
£s the discussion of picture-thougrt s and the examples
of the Eucharist and the role of Jesus have shown, Faith
posits large, diffuse categories. But these categories are
not without their specificity; they are concerned to show
how religious insights are situated within a finite
historical context. For example, the doctrine of the
Trinity is a theoretically sophisticated theological
argument that acknowledges embodiment in its preoccupation
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with the mortality/death of Jesus and contains a historical
dimension in that the unity of the Trinity is realized when
the savior is born. Faith, in its doctrine of the Trinity,
thus subscribes to the standards for which Enlightenment
holds it responsible.
And the type of understanding expressed in the Trinity
is also relevant to no n- t h eol og ic al areas. The example I
will explore here is Faith's view of nature. Faith
recognizes that embodiment requires that humans use and
transform nature, that we relate to nature in part from the
point of view of technical effectiveness. After all, the
similitude Robust Faith saw between the aconite seed and a
human eye was partly for the sake of improving human
vision. But Faith also has insight_into the way nature
jkm """*""*provides the conditions of possibility for our existence
and it acknowledges that we express our sense of this most
intimate relation to nature through symbolic or religious
means. These two sorts of understanding — of the
"instrumental" and the "expressive" moments in our relation
to nature — are intermingled in Faith: hence the Robust
Faith notion of nature as imbued with telos and spirit.
The very terms "instrumental" and "expressive" are not
fully appropriate to a discussion of Faith, for they embody
a distinction best suited to Enlightenment sensibility.
Faith resists the dichotomy between instrumental and
expressive as well as the split between animate and
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inanimate being, and this resistance is both its weakness
and its strength. The strength ought to be obvious by now,
though Hegel himself only saw it imperfectly: Faith gives
us a glimpse into another world, a pre-modern world where,
for example, the relation to nature may not result in the
masterful attitude of modern science and technology. Tt
also glimpses the way in which the Fn 1 ightenm en t project of
freedom, rationality and control underplays limitations
inherent in its project. Faith's resistance to dichotomies
is weakness because it prevents Faith from achieving a
level of clarity of expression, a clarity that is the key
to the achievement of a high level of theoretical
sophistication. Faith's simple and harmonious holism also
makes it vulnerable to the charge that its insights cannot
have practical or political application.
These are the weaknesses to which Enl ig h-t enm en t makes
appeals. Enlightenment charges that Faith's unities can
hold together only if left unexamined, that once the
individual parts of these unities are isolated and exposed
to the light of critical reason they are seen to be a
hodgepodge of obscure insights and confused ideas, not
coherent wholes. Because Hegel understands the way this
weakness of Faith is tied to its strengths, he is critical
of Enlightenment's wholesale condemnation of Faith. Yet
Hegel shares Enlightenment's visionary commitment to the
precise concepts that result from a systematic,
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self-reflective e pi s t em ol ogy . Enl ig h t e nm en t strives to
make its philosophical categories as well as its social
practices fully susceptible to rational analysis and
pursues a theoretical articulation of those categories and
practices that is clear and precise and sophisticated
enough to capture their complexities. Hegel calls this the
development of self-consciousness
.
Although Fnl ightenment gives primacy to this pursuit,
the potential for sel f- con sc io usn ess is given in all modes
of consciousness, says Hegel. Faith "has within it the
moment of r e f 1 ec t i o n- i n to- se 1 f , or of s e 1 f- co n sc io usn e s s
,
separated from its naivete, in the shape of an insight
HQ
which remains independently in the background..." Thus,
Hegel describes the Enlightenment critique of Faith as one
whereby Enlightenment discloses to Faith the presence of
its own latent, underdeveloped powers of self-
consciousness. Enlightenment draws on this inner affinity
of Faith for Enlightenment and exposes an aspect of the
self of Faith of which Faith was only darkly aware. Faith
is impressed by the disclosure as it recognizes itself in
the critique; the legitimacy in Faith's own eyes of its
pi c tur e- tho ug ht knowing is weakened.
Enlightenment, then, holds an irresistible
authority over Faith because, in the believer's
own consciousness, are found the very moments
which Fn 1 ightenm en t has established as valid.
Examining the effect of this authority more
closely, its behavior toward Faith seems to rend
asunder the b ea ut i f ul unity of trust and
immediate certa inty , to pollute its sj) i r i tual
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consciousness with mean thoughts of sensuous
reality, to destroy the soul which is composed
and s ecu r e in its submission, by the vanity
of
. . . sel f-will and self-fulfillment. But as a
matter of fact, the result of the Enlightenment
is rather to do away with the thoughtless
. .
.
separation which is presented in Faith. The
believing consciousness weighs and measures by a
twofold standard; it has two sorts of eyes, two
sorts of ears, speaks with two voices, has
duplicated all ideas without comparing the
two-fold me an i ngs
. . . The Enlightenment
illuminates... Tthe] heavenly world with ideas
belonging to the world of sense, and points out
this finitude which Fait^cannot deny because it
is self-consciousness...
We see now why none of the above mentioned responses
to the Enlightenment critique is readily available to
Faith. Faith's own capacities for theoretical reflection
are aroused by Enlightenment, thus indifference toward
Enlightenment's critique is impossible once Faith
recognizes itself therein.. .For both Faith and
Enlightenment subscribe" to the criterion of articulation
for knowledge. As well, Faith's self-consciousness is not
yet developed enough for it to offer either the
d econ str uc t iv e or Hegelian replies.
Enlightenment charges Faith with a stubborn refusal to
perceive evidence disruptive of its world view. Now we can
see why modern Faith is so stubborn. Its t e n ac io us n e s s is
a defensive technique. The enchanted view of the world is
merely vestigal; it has to assert itself much harder.
Faith is properly insistent in some ways — it does see
that Enlightenment's conceptual confidence stems from a
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systematic oversimplification of reality. Faith
flaw and itself acknowledges the complexity of realit
sees this
y even
while it is unable to articulate this richer understanding.
Because of the latent affinities between Faith and
Enlightenment, the distinction between an "internal" and an
"external" critique becomes blurred. On the one hand,
Enlightenment acts upon Faith as would a sel f- c r i t i que :
Enl ightenment
...is comparable to a silent expansion or...
diffusion, say, of a perfume in the unresisting
atmosphere. Tt is a penetrating infection which
does not make itself noticeable beforehand as
something opposed to the indifferent element into
which it insinuates itself, and therefore cannot
be warded off.
On the other hand, Enlightenment, since it is not identical
to Faith, mounts an independent challenge to it.
Enlightenment is also "a d ev el o ped
,
^s e 1 f- d i f f e r en t i a t i ng
movement which... must appear on the scene as a sheer uproar
5 2
and a violent struggle with its antithesis."
T he H egemony of Enlightenment and the Persis ten c e of Faith
The result of a struggle between Faith and
Enlightenment is that Enlightenment establishes itself as
the dominant mode of consciousness. Faith "has been
expelled from its kingdom," says Hegel, and is a "yearning
...which mourns over the loss of its spiritual world."
Faith, however, still "lurks in the background"' to haunt
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Enlightenment. Although modern Faith will have a
multiplicity of guises and although it will lose the
unified appearance enabled by a historical position of
hegemony, the insights of Faith endure. They endure both
in positions that are recognizable as direct heirs of
Robust Faith and as they are incorporated into
Enlightenment itself. The infection spreads in two
directions: Faith infiltrates Enlightenment while
Enlightenment internalizes elements of Faith.
" Fnl ightenment is caught up in the same.
. .confl ict
that it formerly experienced in connection with faith,"
only now "it contains within itself the principle it is
5 H
a t t ac k i ng . . . a nd the other party is forgotten." Faith is
"forgotten," however, only in the sense that its key
insights -- holism, essential incompleteness of
Enlightenment knowledge, and interpretation as the role of
humanity -- now reside i_n c og n i to inside Enlightenment.
Faith no longer is the spirit of the age but neither is it
absent from the emerging historical self-understanding.
Enlightenment incorporates and re-appropriates moments
of Faith but this r e- a ppr o pr i a t i o n is as much a
transformation of those moments as it is a preservation of
them. Faith's concern with a realm of non-human reality,
with the enduring essence of Eeing, was focused around a
specific divine person, God. Enlightenment follows Faith
in this focus as it, too, attempts to conceive Eeing in
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theological terms. The difference in the effect on the
role of God of these two approaches to the "same" issue is,
however, profound.
Faith, through its p i c t ur e- t h o ug h t understandings and
practices, was able to integrate God and earthly existence
and to found workable epi st em ol og i c al and technical
principles upon God. As long as this integration was
successful, the world of Faith could include a reality
irreducible to human intentions, creation or by- pr od uc t i on
.
Enlightenment, on the other hand, was from the start unable
to sustain that integration. This was due to both the type
of theoretical treatment it gave the concept "God" and its
exposure of the flaws inherent in Faith's perspective.
Thus Enlightenment diminishes the efficacy of God. This
means not only that the theological world-view was given
another, perhaps fatal, blow, but also that it becomes
increasingly difficult for Fn 1 ig h t e nm e n t to consider the
existence of any n o n-h urn a n being
.
Enlightenment internalizes Faith through two distinct
but connected moves: Deism and Materialism. Deism affirms
the existence of absolute Being but insists upon purifying
the notion of this being through philosophical analysis.
The attempt here is to take the mysterious God of Faith and
to de-mystify him. Deism aims to transform Faith's loose
picture- thoughts , to distill them, to have them congeal
into clear concepts. Enlightenment arrives at Deism in
roughly the following way:
60
The essence of the concept God is the otherness of his
nature when compared human nature -- his super sen suousn ess
,
infinity, immortality. Because this is so, there is
practically nothing we can know or say about him, for any
knowledge claim or descriptive assertion would entail the
attribution of perceptible, sensible, determinate, i.e.,
human, characteristics to him. No predicates can be
assigned to God, hence knowledge of him is limited at the
extreme: one can only know that he is, not how or why or
in wh a t way.
Deism does not deny Faith's God; rather Deism, in its
refusal to defile God with predicates, sees itself as
according God his proper respect.
To let nothing of that sort [of particularity and
limitation] appertain to absolute Being. ..is the
prudent behavior of Rea son . . . wh ich knows how to
put itself and its finite riches in their proper
place, and how^o deal with the Absolute in a
worthy manner."
The result, however, of this respectful purification
of God is his eventual de-throning: "absolute Being
5 6becomes. ..a vacuum." Hegel shows how a God about which
one can know nothing in particular cannot loom large in
consciousness or in human affairs. Indeed, this God cannot
continue to be understood as ex i st i ng in any real sense.
Materialism, the other side of Enlightenment, takes the
step from e pi s t em ol og ic a 1 skepticism to atheism and
completes the Deist d e- mys t i f i c a t i o n process. Why hold on
6 1
to the now merely formal profession of God's existence?
Materialism denies God, disregards the possibility of a
supersensuous or spiritual realm and instead turns its
attention toward finite reality. Here it is useful to note
that Elumenberg's account of the way theological absolutism
brings forth its own counter-world of modern atomism is in
many ways parallel to Hegel's description of the mutual
engendering of Deism and Materialism. Py disenchanting the
world and reducing it to contingency, Medieval nominalism
made Deism possible. There are, of course, differences.
The God of nominalism was intended to be an awesome,
powerful being whereas Deism from the start conceived of a
cool, efficient but distant God.
Hegel shows how Materialism and Deism suffer from the
same defect: The o n to 1 og ic al 1 y privileged realm, whether
that of spirit or matter, is conceived too abstractly.
This charge of abstractness means that neither notion is
intelligible, for neither can be embodied in words,
theories or practices. Ry definition, "absolute Being" and
"pure matter" are opposed to any such embodiment.
...it is important to bear in mind that p ure
m atter is merely what is left over when we
a bstr act from seeing, feeling, tasting, etc.
...what is seen, felt tasted is not matter , but
colour, a stone, a salt, etc. Matter ^ rather a
pure abs tr
_3 c__t _io n ..." a pure in -itsel f . "
Like Deism's God, Materialism's matter is a vacuum,
non-being. Hegel will conclude that, as a whole,
Enl ightenment is
a
6?
...undiluted platitude
, and the con fessio n ofplatitude; because it consists in kno wi ng~no t h i ngof absolute Being or, what amounts to the samething, in knowing this quite flat tr ui sm
. . . tha
t
it is only a bsolute Being; and, on the otherhand, in knowing only what is finite and...
thinking that this knowledge of the finite'as
true is the highest knowledge attainable. 58
But while Materialism sees readily the emptiness of
Deism's conception of the divine realm and thus aims to
deny that residual God, it is blind to the essentia]
abstractness of its reality, a reality that is limited to
the realm of finite, sensible beings. Rather, Materialism
conceives itself as having no choice, as having the only
understanding possible once Faith's struggle to experience
the world as a mysterious unity of spirit and matter is for
the most part taken over by, and to that extent rendered
innocuous through, Deism.
As was said above, what counts for Enlightenment is
not s u per s en s uo u sn e s s but finite reality. But what is the
precise character of this turning toward finite reality or
of the claim about its significance? t s the claim of
Enlightenment that matter is all we can know? Or is the
claim that matter is all there i_s? Hegel seems to suggest
that it is both. The Enlightenment theory that knowledge
is determined by sense data -- that only with regard to
things of sense can knowledge claims be articulated, or
predicates be assigned -- Hegel calls sense-certainty. The
ontological claim of Enlightenment that finite being has
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its ground in a substratum called "matter" Hegel calls
philosophical materialism. The figure of consciousness
called Enlightenment is this conjoining of se n se- c er t a i n t
y
5 9and materialism. Reality is now exhausted by things
which immediately and indifferently confront human senses.
"Enlightenment.
.
.isolates the actual world as...r sheer]
determinateness [and].
. .unmoved finitude." 60
The emergence of s e n se- c er t a i n t y brings to light
another instance of the Enlightenment's opposition to the
imprecision of pi c t ur e- tho ug ht s . Sense-certainty as a
theory of knowledge presupposes a sharp split between that
which is the cause of sense data (objects) and that which
receives and interprets the data (subjects').
"Consciousness .. .here. . .is .. .a knowledge of what is p ur el
y
n egative o f i t se 1 f , or of t_h i_n g_s o_f sens e ..." Th e
in ter pene tr a t io n of the human, the natural-physical and the
divine that was the essence of the enchanted world is, in
the early stages of the Faith-Enlightenment dynamic,
refined/reduced into two distinct realms: the
h er e-o n-e ar t h and the t h er e-be yo nd . Mow, Enlightenment
further pur i f i e s/ 1 im i t s reality by dismissing everything
that transcends h urn an essence and h urn an representation.
Finite reality is now exhaustively made up of two types o r
beings and a new dichotomy crystallizes: s ub j ec t/ ob j ec t
.
We must note that for Hegel it is not so much that
Deism is replaced by Materialism, as it is the case the
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they function together to crystallize subject and object.
The character of Enlightenment is not so neat as the
discussion above, for the sake of clarity, tends to make it
appear: Enlightenment never succeeds completely in the
n eg atio n of everything non-human. Every figure of
consciousness is always in a struggle with competing modes
of being. The relationships between Robust Faith, modern
Faith, Deism, Materialism, and later utilitarianism and
will, do not constitute a linear progression. Father, the
model is one of parry and thrust, of advance and retreat,
of variable degrees and kinds of success in a fight for
predominance. This is not to say that it is impossible to
discern any historical trend. Tt is possible: Faith
eventually loses sway to Enlightenment. Yet elements
generally understood" as distinctive of Enlightenment, e.g.,
the s ubj ec t/ obj ec t dichotomy or, in the discussion to
follow, utility, are produced only against the backdrop of
persistent no n -Enl ig h t e nm en t modes.
Ut ility, Re ason a_nd Will
The principle of utility is the outcome of
Enlightenment's attempt to answer the question of the
sta tu s of finite reality, now conceived as "object."
6 ?
Utility becomes "the predicate of all real being." What
is the relationship between finite reality and human being?
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What ought to be the human posture toward finite reality?
A standard of usefulness emerges that provides the
conceptual link between subject and object it is
necessary to seek a new link once the old relation of
permeation begins to recede. Enlightenment's consideration
of the status of finite reality proceeds simultaneously in
two directions, both influenced still by a concern with
ab so 1 ut e Be ing .
(1) The moment of atheism latent within Deism comes
to the fore wherein absolute Being is exposed as an empty
abstraction. Finite reality can have no meaningful
relation to this void and must therefore be conceived as
pure be ing- in- it s elf . Finite reality is s el f-con ta in ed
,
i ndepend ent of God and determined by in tern al laws.
(2) The moment of the believing consciousness latent
within Deism comes to the fore and finite reality can be
conceived only in comparison to an eternal spiritual realm.
Here finite reality is defic ient , h urn bl ed , and ind eb ted to
absolute Being, although in an un s pec i f i abl e way because
God is himself un spec i fi abl e . Finite reality is thus
b eing- for- another .
Enlightenment as a whole understands finite reality as
having then a dual nature and concludes that
...everything is thus as much something i n-i t s el
f
as it is fo r- an- othe r ; in other words, everything
is use f ul . Everything is at the mercy of
everything else, now lets itself be used by
others. ..and now stands. ..on its hind legs, is
for itself, and uses the other in its turn.
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The unique thing about finite reality is that it is what i t
is only insofar as it is instrumental or for someth ing
else. Tts essence is its usefulness; its end is to be a
means .
What is useful, is something with an enduring
being in i t s el f . . . [ b u t ] this be i n g- i n- i t s el f is
at the same time only a pure moment; hence it is
absolutely for an other
, but equally, is for an
'other' merely what it is in itself.
We saw above how Enlightenment turns its attention
toward finite beings, toward "things" that have both a
moment of autonomy and a moment of heteronomy. These
insights then suggest a new set of troubling questions for
Enlightenment: Things are for-an-other , but wh ich other?
Insofar as a thing is "in-itself," it is "other" or alien,
but to what or to whom is it other? The original impetus
for uncov er ing/ prod uc ing the dual nature of finite reality
was the comparison with God: God was the reference point,
the other of the for-an-other, that upon which all being
was dependent. Yet a point of reference, in order that it
provide an o rienta tion to temporal acts and beliefs, must
have a fixedn ess , a s ol id ity , and the capacity to be
clearly identified by those in search of orientation. T
t
becomes apparent that while the exalted but attr ibuteness
God has residual presence in early modern life (enough to
spark the initial consideration of the status of material
being), it no longer has the strength to be its reference
po int .
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The God of the Robust Faith had been the center and
ground of all experience: it was the still fertile
creator, the site of efficacious in t en t ion al i t y , the locus
of subjectivity. But as Enlightenment unfolds the human
self emerges as the only being eligible for the position of
reference point. There is thus increasing pressure to view
humans as subject, as having a deep, complex inner or
mental life, a psychology, a reflexive se 1 f- co n sc io usn e s s
.
The principle of u t il ity is the accomplice to this shift in
ontological emphasis; it is the formalization of the view
that reality is constituted by its references to human
subjects. "Finite reality can therefore, properly
6^
speaking, be taken just as one needs."
Yet Enl ightenmenl- inevitably if paradoxically uncovers
ambivalence in the status of humans. On the one hand , the
human is lord, the sovereign subject: as "one who has come
from the hand of God" (to take his place, that is),
"
e
v er yt h i ng exists for his pleasure and delight and. ..he
walks the earth as in a garden planted for him."^ The
non-human elements of the natural world become objects
implicated in a system of known or soon to be discovered
laws, objects docilely awaiting manipulation in the service
of h urn an desire.
Thus Experimental Science became the science of
the World. ..It seemed to man as if God had but
just created the moon and stars, plants and
animals, as if the laws of the universe were
established for the first time, for only then did
they feel a real interest in the universe, when
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they recognized their own Reason in the Reason
which pervades it.
The world is a garden made for humans -- the creationist
ontology, the remnant of the enchanted world of Faith, is
still within Fnlightenment and here shores up the sovereign
subjectivity of the self. On the other hand , the human is
the enslaved object: the human, too, fits within the
category of finite reality through its embodiment. Thus
the principle of utility contains within it the possibility
of treating humans as mere means.
This ambivalence, this realization that humans are, at
one and the same time, subject and object, has 1- h e
potential to muddy the self-assured waters of
Enlightenment. Enlightenment is in a position to question
its pursuit of ever-increasing conceptual clarity, a
pursuit which motivated its desire to disentangle self,
thing and God. The subject/object "refinement" could be
shown to be not only a clarification but also a mystifying
oversimplification if Enlightenment would apply its method
to the point of its origin — to the human self. It is
also possible now for Enlightenment to confront the
pernicious or at least problematic moral and political
consequences of utilitarianism. Hyppolite specifies some
of these consequences:
In reducing everything speculative to the human,
it seems that the Enlightenment reaches a world
of no depth, a world in which things are only
what they are immediately, and a world in which
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individuals are. ..linked to. each other only by
considerations of interest. 0
Enlightenment does not, however, take advantage of this
opportunity to deepen its insight; it covers up its
methodological and moral weaknesses as soon as it raises
the possibility of their discussion. It will be Faith, the
mode of consciousness still lurking in the background, that
will periodically emerge to make the point about the limits
or underside of utilitarianism.
Enlightenment sidesteps these issues by placing its
faith in reason and will. Peason here refers to a natural
capacity for principled thinking; it refers also to the
ability to justify those principles (to provide "reasons")
by reference to their human ccr. sequences and/or by
reference to other principles deemed fundamental to human
existence. Peason is always paired with will for
Enlightenment. Peason is the universal human potential to
discern, devise and judge moral principles, will is the
decision to invoke reason and to carry out principled
action. For example, although Enlightenment admits that
utility "can go beyond itself and destroy itself" (where
the destruction refers both tc the exploitation of nature
and the perversion of the essence of man by reducing him to
his use-value), man is the "T v ing that is c onscious of this
relation"^ of utility. Thus, according to Enlightenment,
consciousness equips man with r-eflective powers that can
limit the overextension of utility.
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We see that the view of God as designer is not dead
yet for Enlightenment, for the basis of its assertion that
utility will not destroy man or nature is another assertion
that man is designed such that he contains a natural
barrier to immoderation. "Reason is for him a useful
instrument for keeping this excess within bounds, or rather
for preserving himself when he oversteps his limit..."
Reason is also called upon to ensure that utility will be
channelled in socially beneficial ways: "Just as
everything is useful to man, so man is useful too, and his
vocation is to make himself a member of the groups, of use
70for the common good..."
Enlightenment has now turned its attention exclusively
toward human reason/will and although the concern with the
self has always informed Enlightenment understandings,
Hegel now, in his discussion of the French revolution and
Rousseau's general will, thematizes this concern and
dramatizes its effects.
Despite Enlightenment's conclusion that finite reality
is wh a t it is only insofar as it is instrumental, its early
formulation of the principle of utility still presupposed
the in-itself or autonomous moment of the object. The dual
nature of finite reality remained dual even as the "other"
of the for-an-other was given primacy. Utility attempted
to reconcile subject and object by making the latter
subordinate to the former, but it was incapable, in both
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intention and effect, of subsumin g reality into subjective
consciousness. "Utility is s till a predicate of the
7 1object..." The thing continued to have the appearance of
objectivity and of opposition to self-consciousness. Put
new developments, tied up with the newly emerging view of
freedom as will, now allow Enlightenment to bring
utilitarianism to its logical conclusion -- the "withdrawal
of the form of objectivity of the Useful." 72 Enlightenment
re-thinks the nature of finite reality and d el eg i tim i ze
s
the in-itself moment by saying that the self of the
in-its-self is not a true and valid self for another
[human] self." Thus the very conception of what it means
to be "in-itself" has changed. The primac y of th e human
s elf and its subjectivity go h and i n hand wi th the loss of
t he obj ec t as an independen t c enter of resistance. The
human subject has become the model to which anything that
claims " i n- i t s el f-hood" has to conform. Clearly, natural
objects do not conform to this model. Human consciousness
"lets nothing break loose to become a free object standing
7 3
ov er ag a in s t i t . "
What is the new status of "things"? The primary unit
of reality to which one must relate is no longer "objects"
but "notions"; our concept s of objects. " Th e individual
consciousness conceives the object as having no other
essence than sel f- con sc iousn ess itself or as being
absolutely Notion." 7
'4 Objects are second-order beings, the
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products of the particular mental category that organized
and created an identity for an originally chaotic cluster
of elements. Tn Hegel's introductory discussion of
Enlightenment he foreshadows the effect of the
transcending/preserving of utility: Enlightenment "seeks
to abolish every kind of independence other than that of
self-consciousness, whether it be the independence of what
is actual, or of what possesses intrinsic being..." 75
Enlightenment's focus on the mental constructs of
reality, combined with its faith in a self-limiting and
self-generated reason, expose how Enlightenment privileges
subjectivity. Enlightenment has a clear rationalist
strand. But we saw earlier that Enlightenment is also
committed to a sense-certainty epistemology and a
materialism, both of which have as their necessary
precondition the existence of finite "things" on tol og ic all
y
strong enough to ground knowledge. Within the
Enlightenment decision to give primacy to finite material
reality is contained the view that things -- rocks, rivers,
stars, tables, animals, plants — have an existence prior
to the human conceptualization and categorization of them.
Otherwise objects could not perform their role as the
stimulus of knowledge, i.e., there would be nothing out
there that shouts to the senses. Enlightenment here
privileges the object and has a clear empiricist strand.
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Enlightenment, then, seems to be the paradoxical
convergence of a type of empiricism (where things-in-
themselves ground perception-as-knowl edge) and a version of
rationalism (where objects are products of consciousness
and the mind is the ground of knowledge). The paradox
disappears however, when we focus on the s ub j ec t/ obj ec
t
dichotomy shared by empiricism and rationalism. Empiricism
and rationalism engender each other; they both presuppose
that the most basic way of being in the world is knowing.
In both cases reality is exhausted by what lends itself to
clear representation -- representation in human perception
or in human thought. An experimental science that
manipulates physical objects and a logical analysis that
manipulates concepts together presuppose a view of self as
subject and a view of nature as a depository of objects
lacking in the will, intelligence and p ur po se f ul ne s
s
necessary for subjectivity.
In the move to lower the status of objects,
Enlightenment continues to respond to alienation, i.e., it
continues its attempt to experience the world as a unified
whole, where every element is a work of art designed to fit
neatly with every other element. The "experimental
science" of Enlightenment is motivated by the desire to
believe that relations among inanimate objects contain a
pattern, a rationality intelligible to humans. And
Enlightenment philosophy is motivated by the desire to
7<4
believe that things or processes or experiences lend
themselves to the form of "notion." "A practical interest
makes use of, consumes the objects offered to it; a
theoretical interest calmly contemplates them, assured that
in themselves they present no alien element," because "for
the ... Ego .. .that which is diverse from itself, sensual or
7 f\
s p ir i t ual , . . . pr e sent s an object of dread..." The overall
aim of Enlightenment is to secure external reality, to seek
the "unity of Thought with its Object" and this
"penetration of the Ego into and beyond other forms of
77be i ng . . .d ir ec tl y involves the harmonization of Being..."
Notwithstanding his commitment to the philosophy of
absolute Spirit, Hegel understands that the harmoni zat ion
of Being is a tricky business, for he says that
Enlightenment's project requires "ch allenging the external
world to exhibit the same Reason which Subject TEgo]
„7 8
po s se s ses . "
fi b s ol u t e Freedom
Thinking itself successful, through science and
philosophy, in escaping the constraints of objects,
Enlightenment experiences and seeks to prolong an euphoric
sense of freedom: "the world is for it simply its own
will..." 79 Freedom of the will -- freedom is derived from
and properly belongs to the human will alone. This is
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because, as we have seen, neither objects nor God any
longer have central existential roles. Human freedom is
understood not as an inferior replica of divine omnipotence
nor as necessitating participation in a constant struggle
to control objects inherently resistant to control. Thus
the will is free only when all impediments to its pure
exercise are removed. God had receded, objects have been
unnerved, only the particularity of an act of will stands
in the way of the purity of will and thus of the
absoluteness of freedom. Enlightenment "must know what the
Will is in itself. ..The Will is Free only when it does not-
will anything alien, extrinsic, foreign to itself..., but
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wills itself alone -- wills the Will." This task, the
task of the French Revolution, requires that will be
universalized, not limited by the contingency and finitude
of any i nd iv id ual will. Thus there appears in history
Rousseau's notion of the general will.
For Hegel the emergence of talk of a "general will"
exemplifies the Enlightenment process of subsuming reality
into u n iver sal concepts. What it means for reality to
become "notion" is that all particulars, e.g., all
individual persons or acts or desires, are
d e- par t ic ul ar i zed and absorbed into a general abstract
category. In the case of the reality of individual will,
the notion of the general will is the medium of absorption.
The general will is universal; it is a category accessible
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to, applicable for, and inclusive of a subject inherently
universal
.
The un iversal ization of will involves the
harmonization of individual wills into one will. This
means that freedom requires that there be no social
differentiation of roles, functions, ideas --
...all social groups or c 1 a s se s . . . i n to which the
whole is articulated are abolished; the
individual consciousness that belonged to any
such sphere and willed and fulfilled itself in
it, has put aside its limitation; its purpose is
the general purpose, its language; universal law,
its work the universal work.
The primary political conflict and the significant
theoretical tension now to be reckoned with is that between
the individual and the community. Th e debate, perhaps now
an impasse, between the two continues today -- forms of
individualism vs. forms of collectivism. Enlightenment is
forced, or rather has forced itself, into the position of
viewing the world in exaggerated oppositional terms. Tt
sees only two forces in a struggle: "It divides itself
into extremes equally abstract, into a simple, inflexible,
cold universality, and into the discrete, absolute hard
rigidity and self-willed atomism of actual self-
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consciousness." This tension is a subset of the subject/
object dichotomy that preoccupied Enlightenment
utilitarians. Eoth persist despite the confidence that the
resisting object has been absorbed into the subject and the
individual has been absorbed into the general will.
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Hegel shows us why the mopping up project fails. Here
is the problem with the pursuit of absolute freedom:
How does Will assume a definite form? For in
willing itself, it is nothing but an identical
reference to itself; but, in point of fact, it
wills something specific: there are_ , wa know,distinct and special Duties and Rights. 3
Before the universal can perform a deed it must
concentrate itself into the One of individuality
and put at the head an individual self-
con sc iousness
... But thereby all other individuals
are ex cl ud ed
. . .
so that the deed would not be a
deed of the act ual universal self-
consciousness.
Eecause any action whatsoever of an individual is guilty of
being non-general and thus arbitrary and counter to the
universal needs of humankind, any and every particular
action is suspect. The result of absolute freedom is and
only can be negative: The terror of the guillotine, the
denial of civil liberties, the violence of revolution.
Universal will can only act, in a way parallel with the
Enlightenment negation of Faith, to destroy that which is
established. When it tries to build or to express
affirmatively the universal will, it finds that it can only
issue in particular actions. Action imp l ies particular
action. Yet advocates of the general will cannot help but
note the absence of the general will; social "Life still
contains factions, strife, differences. They then locate
responsibility in the secret wills of evil individuals
seeking to undermine the community. Absolute freedom
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becomes absolute terror, as the leaders of the general will
seek out and destroy suspect individuals.
Enlightenment completes itself in disarray and
decomposition. On one side, its definition of the world
through the notion of utility threatens to convert the self
into a means and undercut its ideal of freedom; on the
other side, its attempt to realize a pure will threatens to
engulf the particular self in an abstract universal which
can only act to deny and destroy, never to build and
affirm. Although Enlightenment, contrary to its belief,
has not eradicated Faith, it has exposed serious flaws in
it. Despite these flaws, Faith has shown how neither can
Enlightenment sustain its views of knowledge, science or
freedom. In their attempt to fulfill their ideals,
Enlightenment and Faith require each other.
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C H A P T F R HI
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND NATURAL HOLISM
Introductio n
Hegel anticipated that the dialectic of Faith and
Enlightenment would come to a close as modernity was
realized. Put if, as we claim, the Hegelian solution that
was to transcend the dialectic, the ontology of Geist,
failed, and if, as we also claim, Hegel's account of the
dilemma is accurate, we should expect to find its mani-
festations in the contemporary political world. In this
chapter, I explore those manifestations as they occur in
the attempt to rectify the damage done to the natural
environment. I concentrate on the presuppositions made
about nature in alternative environmental orientations to
see whether the understandings of nature required by
contemporary versions of Faith and Enlightenment can be
sustained today.
The thesis is that the two paradigmatic contemporary
orientations to nature function together, each providing a
insightful critique of the other, yet neither able to
transcend the critique of itself. Moreover, it is the
ability of each to uncover defects in the programs of the
other that helps to foster that uncritical view of each
toward itself.
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One modern orientation to nature gives primacy to
economic utility. Both the (lamentable but unavoidable)
destruction of natural sites and their preservation are
defended on this ground. Marshes are drained and developed
in order to increase the value of real estate and the
supply of desirable housing; retail businesses are encour-
aged to form a mall on farm land for the sake of the tax
base of declining rural areas. Yet the condemnation of
residential and commercial development is couched as well
in terms of financial losses to the recreation or tourist
industry (rather than, for example, in terms of acknow-
ledging the integrity of beings different from ourselves or
for places not ordered according to principles of human
design). This chapter explores the implications of this
view of nature as standing in reserve for human use for
conceptions of knowledge, self and reason.
There is also a strand in modern thinking, however,
that finds this view inadequate and it is an important
philosophical task to draw out and articulate this holistic
perspective. There is something troubling, for example,
about stripmining even if the land is "successfully
reclaimed." And it is difficult to explain, in terms of
economic, productive, or even aesthetic utility alone, the
sense that there is something wrong about the needless
destruction of an old tree, even were the axeman the last
and soon-to-die human. This chapter explores the
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epistemological and experiential bases of this sense of the
inadequacy of an instrumental orientation to nature.
These two types of orientations, those relating to
nature primarily through utilitarian categories
(environmental management) and those relating primarily
through moral categories (natural holism), form the
dominant paradigms for env ironm ental i sm today.
Management, Technique and Control
From the perspective of environmental management, the
instrumental use and mastery of nature are irreducible
elements in the human relation to nature; environmental
awareness allows us to compensate for the side-effects of
this necessary orientation. Environmental management
assumes that the environmental problem, once properly
defined as "pollution," or "overpopulation," or
"conservation," or "societal values," finds its solution in
better human planning, organization and technical control.
In its most fundamental sense, technique refers to any
human contrivance designed to further human aims:
enlightened solutions to the environmental problem revolve
around the attempt to devise new techniques to mitigate
adverse technological effects on the environment. Examples
of these techniques cut across professions and academic
disciplines: tax incentives for pollution reduction, legal
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procedures for acknowledging environmental rights,
engineering plans for pollution control devices,
analytic-philosophical arguments for an environmental
ethic, and bureaucratic regulations of industry.
The theme that runs throughout environmental
management is the requirement that human-made order be
imposed upon the self, upon society, upon nature:
(1) The self is not a natural harmony of interests and
needs; it needs discipline that simultaneously fosters that
which is uniquely human and suppresses that which is
uncultivated and animalistic within humans. Spiritual
insight must be replaced by scientific knowledge. Because
of the need for discipline, elements of the self, its
attitudes and emotions, become targets of the techniques of
personnel departments, advertisers, the military, consumer
advocates, religious groups, environmentalists.
(2) Society is not grounded in a secure tradition; it
needs to be conventionalized. The reification that is
tradition falsely insinuates a unity of individual and
collectivity, whereas convention is human contrivance
self-conscious of its non-natural, controversial and
controvertible form. Traditions and customs must be
replaced by self-conscious norms and rational policies. A
conventionalized social order is an entity amenable to the
application of techniques of administrative
rationali zation
.
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(3) Nature is not enchanted with the echoes of
resemblances, the physical world is not intentionally and
divinely ordered; it needs to be humanized. The
self-operating order of nature in the wild must be replaced
by environmentally managed sites. And the assumption is
that nature's resistance to the human arrangement of it can
in general be overcome. We already form nature through our
sciences that enable domestication of plants and animals
and cultivation of soils -- in short, through good
"resource management." Nature, divested of superstition,
is a potentially useful environment where atoms, electrical
attractions/repulsions, chemical interactions, and plant
and animal biologies wait, standing ready to be harnessed.
T will here explore two versions of the attempt to
apply technique to environmental side- effects:
environmental economics and environmental ethics. Our
concern is not with the details of any particular economic
or ethical plan, but with the assumptions about nature
operative within such plans.
Tf one were to distill from environmental economics
its basic aim, it would be the intention to rationalize,
according to a recently discovered value called environmen-
tal quality, the economic system. We will internalize the
finally recognized but still external social costs of
po 1 1 u t i on .
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It is relatively easy to see the way an instrumental
view of nature coheres with the beliefs and practices of
environmental economics — the values of efficient resource
use and distribution, a high material standard of living,
preservation of economic freedom, etc., presuppose a
conception of nature as lifeless materials for use. Nature
has the ontological status of matter; this matter has an
order of statistical regularities, indifferent to human
needs but amenable, once understood through scientific
investigation, to human re-ordering. ^h e discussion of
environmental economics is for the purpose of introducing
this modern scientific conception of nature, the
rational- empirical conception of knowledge, and the faith
in human reason and technique.
The discussion of environmental ethics shows how it
displays a more complex, subtle version of these same
conceptions. Environmental ethics shifts the emphasis from
the efficient and prudent use of a deposit of natural
resources to our responsibility for them and our right to
the continued use of them. Tn its dominant mode, it shares
with environmental economics the motivation for the pursuit
of environmental quality: human desires for recreation,
health, scientific curiosity, or wealth.
Both the economist and the ethicist carry forth the
project of artifice-making, subjecting to human organiza-
tion and control that which was beyond or indifferent to
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it. Environmental economics operates primarily at the
level of society, rationalizing its policies, regulations,
and laws; environmental ethics concentrates on the self,
examining and reshaping the beliefs and attitudes presumed
to underlie the modern treatment of nature. From the
perspective of environmental ethics, human values are
available for technical manipulation and can with skill be
altered and deployed to achieve an environmentally sound
effect
.
I turn now to a fuller discussion of each of these
versions of environmental management.
Environmental Economics
The environmental problem is, for environmental
economics, a matter of inadequate pollution control. Until
recently, the primary tool for pollution control was
government regulation. A public agency was made
responsible for determining how much of each pollutant
could be safely discharged into the air, land, or water,
and for monitoring each pollution source and imposing
appropriate fines. In determining the "threshold values,"
the maximum allowable level of discharges, the agency was
to take into account the public health, the best
practicable technology for each industry, and the financial
burden a firm could bear. 1
Economists were quick to recognize that this approach
contained obstacles to efficiency and economic freedom:
(1) It required an inordinate demand on bureaucracy.
How could a public agency determine threshold values for
every pollutant and for every firm? Because fines were
minimal or, more often, never imposed, there was little
financial incentive for pollution reduction. The
regulation approach reauired either constant inspection by
agencies notoriously understaffed, or a faith, unjustified
by any experience, that the social conscience of polluters
would compel them to act in the public interest.
(2) It was highly susceptible to corruption.
Regulatory agencies tended to be responsive to the
industries they were designed to monitor.
(3) It was legally complicated. It was difficult to
determine the "best available technology" or a "reasonable
cost." Pollution could continue while cases were ensnared
in 1 eg al contest
.
(4) It focused only on the output of factories and
did nothing to encourage recycling, internal changes in the
production process, or the restructuring of production or
consumption priorities. Moreover, even if a polluting firm
compiled with the letter of the law, it had no incentive to
reduce pollution further.
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(5) Its interventionist logic raised the spector of a
socialism that suppressed free enterprise and
entreprenur i al initiative.
Environmental economics then invested its hopes in
market incentives for production reduction, for the market
was the best known way to preserve freedom and efficiency.
A price, in the form of a tax, could be put on pollution,
obviating the need to regulate the amount of pollution
discharge. The price of a product would then reflect the
true cost to society, for unlike labor, supplies or
overhead, air, water and land had for too long been treated
as if they were free. There was, therefore, no economic
incentive to minimize damage to them or depletion of them.
This market approach, which internalized the externalities
of pollution, gave the polluting firm freedom to choose its
own pollution, reduction procedures. The key, of course,
was to set the tax higher than the cost of any
po 1 1 ut i on- r ed uc t i o n strategy a firm may devise.
Advocates of the market incentives approach claim that
another advantage is its reliance on the self-interest of
polluters. It assumes no special good will on their part,
but only that producers seek to reduce costs and increase
profits. The beauty of the incentives approach is that the
result is socially desirable but the motivation is
individual gain. Changes in social behavior can be
accomplished by modifying the incentives that induce people
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to act rather than by mandating or prohibiting certain
acts .
Put while advocates of putting a price on pollution
are more successful than the regulators approach in
preserving economic freedom (where freedom means the
greatest possible choice options), their scheme too
requires considerable government intervention. A public
agency still must measure the output of pollution from each
source in order to set a fee which approximates the
marginal social cost of pollution.
A related attempt to preserve the market by
closing/internalizing its loopholes/externalities was the
concept of amenity rights. Within the legal system that
ensures the preconditions of free enterprise, industry must
compensate owners of private property for damage resulting
from their activities, yet there exists no legal provision
for damage to peace and quiet, clean air and water, or
privacy. If these amenities were given legal standing,
then damage to them would have to be considered in
production decisions. There would then be an incentive --
losing a court case or facing a jail sentence -- either to
compensate victims or to reduce damage in the first place
through the manufacture of quieter, cleaner, less
ecologically intrusive products.
What are some of the themes common to these three --
regulation, tax incentive and amenity rights -- attempts?
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First, the orientation to nature is politicized:
pollution becomes an issue of public policy. Pollution
calls for a rational plan, a plan that requires increasing
our understanding of natural systems through basic
research, research that can facilitate prediction of
natural responses to human intervention, prediction that in
turn can allow control. All environmental economic
perspectives agree that nature cannot simply be left alone:
the good life is tied to continued increases in production
and consumption. Put just as the pollution problem is
human-made, it can be solved through human ingenuity.
There is, however, some evidence of dissension in the
ranks of the technophiles . The problems are complex and
require an interdisciplinary effort, they say. The once
fident field of economics begins to fear that its focus
quantitative scarcity is inadequate to the task of
environmental protection: economic growth as now measured
may not be the most fruitful focus. Fconomic techniques
must be supplemented with political ones, and concern with
"quality of life" and the political criteria used for
choosing among resource-use strategies grows. "The
difficult questions now are not whether physical and
economic problems can be solved, but which problems to
2
solve and how to solve them." Despite these stirrings,
the internal debates of environmental economists and polic;
scientists continue to center around the method of control
con
on
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of nature and its human polluters, arguing over the merits
of regulation-driven control, market-incentive-driven, and
legal-incentive- driven
.
Second, there is a general faith in human contrivance,
even though the specific remedial techniques are as yet
unspecified
:
Tf private firms were adequately
motivated to modify their production
processes so as to generate less
pollution, there is every reason to
believe that technology could be
harnessed, in as yet unknown ways, to
diminish rather than to increase
poll ut ion
.
Ignorance is one of the most potent
obstacles to solving our ecological
problems, an ignorance which only
science on dispel.
Here the environmental managers mirror the Enlightenment
faith in a self-monitoring, self-correcting reason. This
reason operates at peak efficiency if carried out at the
level of the reflective individual and when uninhibited by
the demands of tradition, religion, or collective action.
However, environmental management's faith in the autonomy
of reason conflicts with the detailed, extensive regulation
by a central authority required by each of their schemes.
Third, the faith in reason and technique is connected
to a conception of nature as a deposit of resources with
latent potentialities. There are a multitude of
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potentialities within nature, but each is realized only in
collaboration with science and technology.
Half a century ago the air was for
breathing and burning; now it is also a
natural resource of the chemical
industry. Two decades ago Vermont
granite was only building and tombstone
material; now it is a potential fuel,
each ton of which has a usable content
(uranium) equal to 150 tons of coal.
Nature is matter and when we apply technology we treat it
in the manner appropriate to the type of being it has. No
wrong is done to nature when it is used, rather we are
perfecting it, allowing it to realize its essence (i.e.,
utility for human beings.) The relationship of use is
mutually beneficial, not merely exploitive. Here we see an
endorsement of the Enlightenment understanding of finite
reality as having a dual nature: It is what it is only
insofar as it is instrumental or for something else; its
end is to be a means.
There are different versions of this conception of
nature as a resource in need of technological fulfillment.
The three perspectives we have explored briefly generally
understand nature to be plastic, easily moldable.
Regardless of whether nature is initially unordered or is
ordered in ways oblivious to human need, it offers little
resistance to the imposition of form upon it. The success
of modern technology is evidence of this.
Few components of the earth's crust,
including farm land, are so specific as
to defy economic replacement, or so
resistant to technological advance as to
1 on
be incapable of eventually yielding
extractive products at constant ordeclining cost.
Infatuated with technological power, some environmental
economists claim that scarcity of natural resources,
defined as diminishing returns for extractive industries,
simply may never occur, for it is now possible to "escape
the quantitative constraints imposed by the character of
7the earth's crust."
Environmental Ethics
The environmental ethics version of environmental
management sees the natural constraints on human action as
more serious. There are limits to the shape nature can be
forced to assume, limits that no technological advance can
overcome without dangerous consequences. technique is
still the preferred method, but this version uses a
vocabulary of responsibility rather than economic
efficiency. In this view, if natural limits are ignored or
overridden by the sheer magnitude or force of technology,
we are no longer fulfilling our duty to perfect nature.
[T]o perfect nature is to humanise it, to make it
more useful for men's purposes, more intelligible
to their reason, more beaut i ful ... Put like gogd
artists, men s ho u Id . . . r e s pec t their material.'
This combination of transformation, use, and respect
results in a relation to nature of mastery, but a mastery
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which disciplines and enhances rather than enslaves and
destroys. Nature needs to be liberated from itself. Like
a tantrum-prone child, it can be freed from the torment of
chaos or imperfect control through the imposition of
external constraints. Nature realizes itself through our
transformation of it and we realize our highest potential
through this process as well.
[Mean's great memorials -- his science, his
philosophy, his technology, his architecture, his
countryside -- are al 1 . . . f o un d ed q u po n his attempt
to understand and subdue nature.
Not only must humans use, transform, and subdue nature for
the sake of survival and for the establishment of a stable
society, they ought to, for "it is only they who can
create . "
This shift in emphasis from the efficient and prudent
use of natural resources to our responsibility for them and
our right to the continued use of them is exemplified in
the work of Christopher Stone. Jn Should Trees Hav e
Stand ing? he proposes that we grant rights to natural
objects themselves. We will see how Stone continues to
assume the primacy of human needs even though his overt aim
is to accord natural objects a status independent of
hum an s .
Stone advocates that natural objects be recognized as
jural entities competent to press for damages for injury to
themselves. Natural objects cannot speak, but one can
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handle this "as one does the problems of legal incompetents
— human beings who have become vegetable.
.. [S]oraeone is
designated by the court with the authority to manage the
incompetent's affairs." 11 Thus, a human guardian, such as
the Sierra Club, could apply to be the representative of
natural objects. Stone's view differs from the current
legal approach whereby natural objects are treated as
property, property protected for the sake of its individual
owner — damages are liable only at the owner's behest and
only for demonstrable injury to the owner. The granting of
rights to the objects themselves would facilitate the
restriction of industrial, commercial, or recreational
actions that threaten remote public lands (whose owner is
the diffuse and fragmented "public") or particular
ecosystems (whose owners might include "the future
inhabitants of the Southwest"). The guardian could be
viewed as the voice "of unborn generations... of the
otherwise unrepresented, but distantly injured,
contemporary humans."
Stone's attempt to legally acknowledge injury to
natural objects requires a method for assessing damages.
Here Stone participates in the project of incorporating
into the 1 eg a 1- eco n om i c system that which should be
included by the system's own logic, but has not been.
»'[T]he river polluter's actions are costless, so far as he
is concerned -- except insofar as the legal system can
1 03
somehow force him to internalize them." 13 This
internalization requires an assessment of the social costs
of environmental degradation, costs that then could
constitute damage claims in a court of law. Put in order
for a river to receive damages, its guardian must provide a
monetary value for the injury. Stone admits the
difficulties in estimating these often intangible costs,
but nevertheless pursues the attempt, for society is better
off with rude estimates than with none at all. 14 Estimates
could be based upon losses to the fishing or vacation
industry requiring the unpolluted site, or upon the costs
to the environment per se
,
i.e., the cost of returning the
degraded area or object to approximately its original
state
.
This brief summary of Stone's position enables us to
discern the ways in which his conception of nature is
lodged with the h urn an- c en t e r ed framework of Fn 1 ightenment
and thus undermines his commitment to accord natural
objects a status independent of humans.
First, the environmental management theme that the
perfection of nature reauires our transformation of it is
reasserted by Stone as the view that nature ought to be
1 5
conceived on the model of deficient humanity. Like the
status of the insane or mentally handicapped (human objects
deemed legally incompetent), the status of natural objects
depends upon an external standard -- the characteristics of
1 on
normal human beings. Natural objects are worthy of respect
to the extent that their physical or psychological
structures resemble those of normal humans. Th i s vision of
nature as inferior humanity both reflects and helps to
constitute what much of nature has in the modern age
become: the domesticated product of human technique.
Evidence of this is the breeding of animals and plants more
and more according to marketing, packaging, and
distribution imperatives, as well as the emergence of
animal rights groups protesting this.
A second way in which Stone privileges humans is
through the conventionalization of rights. Drawing upon
the Enlightenment insight about the social construction of
reality, rights and the status they endow are conceived as
"legal conventions acting in support of some status quo." 1 ^
This view departs from both the classical liberal doctrine
of rights as having an inalienable attachment to their
(human) bearers and the theological position that value has
a divine source only. According to Stone, the modern self
dispenses value as it "grants" rights to those objects it
deems fit. Although the granting of rights must to some
degree reflect a prior cultural valuation of the affected
group, its primary function is to create that higher, more
independent status. "[U]ntil the rightless thing receives
its rights, we cannot see it as anything but a thing for
the use of 'us' -- those who are holding rights at the
1 7
t ime . "
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Because rights are conventional and because
conventions are " h y po s t a t i za t i on s [that] always have a
pragmatic quality to them/' 18 the extension of rights to
non-human nature is justifiable in terms of its utility:
It can protect us from the adverse environmental impact of
industrial society. Besides, says Stone, his proposal is
only a logical extension of the Western moral tradition
that has progressively included children, prisoners,
aliens, women, Blacks, and the insane into the realm of
moral consideration. In conclusion, when Stone says "the
rightlessness of the natural environment can and should
1 9change," we now see that he means (1) all rights are
conventions and thus "can" be changed, and (2) a change in
the status of the environment would be better for us at
this stage in industrial society and thus "should" be
pur sued .
Stone's argument that "the strongest case can he m?de
from the perspective of human advantage for conferring
20
rights on the environment," admittedly employs a broad
notion of what counts as advantageous to humans. To
elevate the legal standing of nature through righthood can
improve not only our material standard of living, but, by
enlarging our empathy and our sense of i n t e r d e pe nd e nc y with
,.21
nature, also can make us "far better humans.
Nevertheless, despite this broadened notion of utility,
despite references to the "environment per se," and despite
1 06
the attempt to differentiate himself from purely
anthropocentric perspectives, Stone's approach presupposes
a view of nature as instrumental — as potentially
malleable and value-dependent upon humans.
This is not to say that nature exists only to serve
humans -- that would imply that nature has an inherent
purpose and scientific investigation has uncovered too many
random events, too many natural processes that fly in the
face of human desires and aims to substantiate that claim.
Rather, Stone's view implies that since nature cannot be
understood as sacred or enchanted, there is nothing immor a 1
about using it to our advantage. The resistance of nature
to mastery is not sufficient" to de- legitimize mastery, but
means only that we must anticipate practical or technical
obstacles in order to overcome them in the future. Stone's
opposition to the view that natural objects are "for man to
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conquer and master and use" is a pragmatic one: No
ontological violence is done, i.e., no violence to the
essence of what the thing is, when natural objects are
conquered, mastered, or used.
I note here that because Stone had to conventionalize
rights in order to extend them to nature, there always
exists the possibility of reversing or revoking these mere
conventions, especially when other human needs outweigh the
desire to preserve nature. Stone does not acknowledge this
possibility implicit in his position, but it accounts for
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the fact that he is unable to maintain his distinction
between a natural object that is a "thing for the use of
us" and one that is a "thing with rights." The distinction
collapses because no beings except humans can have
intrinsic value within a conventionalized view of rights
(and even this standing of humans is partly grounded in
convention, a convention self-bestowed because necessary to
any further social construction).
Stone leaves himself, then with two on t o 1 og i c a 1- s t a t u
s
alternatives for no n- humans: instrumen t al value na rrowly
construed
,
where natural objects are used indiscriminately
and without regard for consequences; and enli ghtened
instrumental v a lu e, where natural objects are used with
awareness of the ecological, economic, or recreational
needs of living humans or their descendants. Other
environmental ethicists distinguish among types of
use-value while holding to the fundamental instrumentality
of nature. One such distinction is between instrumental
value and inherent value. "Instrumental value" includes
the concrete uses of a thing and "inherent value" refers to
the more subtle worth a thing has through its ability to
inspire, fascinate, spiritually heal, or aesthetically
23please us .
The conclusion about the essential instrumentality of
nature to which Stone and all environmental ethicists are
led is bound up with the attempt to discern the type of
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"value" that can properly be ascribed to nature. What are
the methods through which the ethicist determines "value"?
An environmental ethic requires a t heory of value,
they say, and this requires the elaboration of criteria
that establish something as worthy of moral consideration.
The criteria range from those most tightly linked to human
being (rational agency, consciousness, cognition, the
ability to have interests) to those associated with
animateness (sentience, self-determination) and finally to
those which could include inanimate things ( benef icience
,
having a "good of one's own"). After the fact of some
value is established, environmental ethicists must decide
the order of this value, and they generally agree that
value can be either instrumental or intrinsic. (The issue
of moral sig nificance
,
where the value of a particular
thing must be weighed against that of another, depends in
part upon this prior establishment of the type of value
each thing has . )
A review of these ethical discussions of nature shows
them to be quite intricate, reauiring finer and finer
distinctions: T s sentience necessary (or sufficient?) to
qualify a thing for moral consideration? they ask. And if
so, does that imply that pleasure has intrinsic value? And
does that imply that individual sentient members of a
species are of more value than the species itself? Does
interest -bearing mean the capacity for actual or potential
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interest? Are interests linked to consciousness or simply
to having a "good of one's own"? I will argue that there
is something askew in these discussions of nature caught
within the frame of "value." The distinctions made
collapse or explain very little: The project as a whole
seems to be sustained by the very activity of tangling and
untangling the fine hairs created by each differentiating
argument
.
Why? One reason is that the i n s t r urn en t al / i n t r i n s i
c
distinction is faulty in the context of a philosophy of
nat ur e
•
AH talk of "value" presupposes the centrality of
humans; the subject always determines the "value" of an
object. In fact, an object is that which requires
subjectivity as its foundation. Therefore, within this
frame of value, the category of "intrinsic value" can have
no place, if "intrinsic" is meant to capture our sense of
the recalcitrance of nature or the existence of that
element of nature awesome because independent of us. And
yet this is precisely the sense in which the environmental
ethicist intends the term: Intrinsic value is "value [that
exists] independ entl y of any awareness or a ppr ec i a t i o n . . . o
r
i nterest . . . on the part of any conscious being." The
concept of intrinsic value is a category mistake except
when applied to the human self as a subject. In the other
cases, it is analogous to an "accidental intention": E" a c h
term is inimical to the one it is supposed to qualify, and
1 1 0
the conceptual incompatibility expresses a deeper
incongruity in the theory. The subjectivism of
environmental management talk of "value," as well as its
overall aim to impose form on nature, are the residues of
Enlightenment's preoccupation with human will as it
attaches to reason in the service of freedom.
Robin At t field, in The Ethics of Environmental
Concern
,
defends the concept of "intrinsic value" and its
use in expressing the impossibility of reducing natural
beings to instrumentalities: "FA]ny theory of value,
however instrumentalist in tenor, must recognize intrinsic
value somewhere, or there is nothing which gives anything
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of value its point." This is not, however, a defense of
intrinsic value for nonhumans, but rather supports the case
that h urn a n sub jecti v ity is the genesis of value. Tt is no
surprise that we conclude from Stone that the only "value"
of natural objects is instrumental; all value, when probed
deeply enough, finds "its point" in human aims, needs, or
ideals.
Despite these philosophical difficulties,
environmental ethics is drawn to discussion of the "value"
of nature. Why? Because they are caught within an
Enlightenment frame: The discourse of "value" privileges
the self and supports an instrumental view of nature
because it sees the alternative as un s u p por t ab 1 e in the
face of modern science and technology. Tf humans cannot
1 1
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assign value to what is essentially a material nature, they
say, then human worth must be dependent upon biological
contribution to nature; if nature is not made up of usable
objects, then it must have subjectivity and a teleology; if
nature is not a means then it must be an end-in-itself; if
humans do not investigate nature according to a rational,
scientific model, then the orientation to nature must be
irrational, primitive, and mystical.
The En v ironmen tal Management C ritiq u e of Nat ura l Holism
This method of self- justification through contrast to
an implausible alternative presented as the only
alternative is characteristic of environmental management.
Exemplifying the dualistic character of Fnl ightenment
thought, it defines all alternatives as its stark opposite
and thus presents them in a way that presupposes its own
hegemony. Once this implicit move is accepted, the case
against the alternative is already made:
To aim at the formulation of rational propositions,
theories, and policies is to relegate utterances based upon
other standards to the realm of irrationality and
abnormality; to strive for the clean, odorless and
glamorous life of modernity is to reauire a life lived in
lose contact with nature to be deemed primitive; to deploy
science that aims to uncover in full the mechanism of
c
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nature is to classify knowledge that anticipates some
irreducible opacity in nature as mystical. For example, an
extreme version of environmental management fears that
contact with "raw" nature may result in a "highly strained
imagination
.. .the source of fanatical religious and
superstitious terrors."
Although management thought has restricted knowledge
to a set of conceptions and their mirror images, it has
also enabled knowledge through its insistence on precise
distinctions such as that between what is given (nature),
what is a human creation (society), and what wills and
creates (humanity). This is an achievement because it is a
prerequisite for the painstaking civilizing process of
rescuing humans from submersion in the realm of necessity.
We are increasingly self-determining beings; nature is a
background environment which, although not static, does not
move in any obviously teleological way. Both science and
reason point in the same direction: Nature is governed by
laws not designed for us or by us and not functioning
necessarily to our own advantage.
Only if men see themselves ... f or what they are,
quite alone with no one to help them except their
fellow-men, products of natural processes...
wholly indifferent to their survival, will they
face their ecological problems in their full
implications .
The natural holists, according to environmental
management, do not see humans for what they are, for they
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cannot bear to accept the disappearance of telos from
nature. Instead, they still seek in nature principles that
could guide an ethical or social order and signs that could
reveal the human essence or the meaning of life. While
this quest for meaning is an enchanting idea, compatible
with the world of Robust Faith, it is radically incongruent
with modern institutions, science, roles and norms.
Conceptions of nature not grounded in human "value" are
unable to find embodiment in any of the mutually
engendering modern forms. Thus estranged from our world,
holism routinely becomes abstract, able to exist only in
philosophical constructs; or nostalgic, able to exist only
as unattainable, albeit inspiring visions.
Fn v ironm ental management places its opponents within a
frame that makes them esay to dismiss, yet it never
actually dispenses with them; quite to the contrary, it
continually revivifies what by its own account ought to be
a decaying and anachronistic body. It does this because,
like the parasite that saves the vital organs of its host
until last in order to prolong its feast, environmental
management requires its opponents but it requires them to
be constituted in a particular way.
First, it requires them as content for its
rationalizing critique: environmental management need?
less-than-rationalistic accounts to serve as the messy raw
material in need of clarification. Second, the credibility
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of its own affirmations depends upon its audience accepting
the management construal of the alternative position. For
without this acceptance, the defects within environmental
management would become more apparent, encouraging movement
toward the opponent and the weakening of its own hegemony.
Environmental management has an ambivalent stance of
rejection and engagement with non-instrumental views of
nature. It claims to fear as confused and regressive these
views, but the characterization of them that exaggerates
the confusion and the regressive potentialities suggests
that what it really fears is the disappearance of such
views, for it darkly recognizes its dependence on them as a
foil for its own weaknesses.
Through our examination of nature according to
environmental management, we have seen how Enlightenment
finds contemporary expression. It appears now that
environmental management deploys several different but
related conceptions of nature. We can categorize these
views according to the degree and kind of order ascribed to
nature :
( 1 ) Chaotic Disorder . Nature has little or no
inherent organization and is chaotic, wild and dangerous in
its pristine state. No matter what the resistance or
difficulty, we have little choice but to master and
transform nature. Nature, far from being in harmony with
moral law, in conflict with it. We saw how Chaot i
c
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D isorder
,
where nature is feared as the beast within us and
as a threat to civilization, is tied to the way
environmental management constitutes its required double.
( 2 ) PI ast ic Pi sorder . Nature has little or no
inherent organization and is benign and neutral, a messy
conglomerate of functions, forms and processes, all passive
with regard to human attempts to organize them. The
assumption of Pl ast ic Disorder in nature found expression
in the belief that nature is in need of technological
fulfillment. In cases (1) or (2), whether nature is
chaotic and something to be feared or benign and amenable
to the imposition of order upon it, there is nothing
morally wrong with widescale altering of it.
(3) Indif ferent Order . Nature has some sort of
significant order and that order is indifferent to humans,
that is, ordered according to priorities not necessarily
compatible with human rationality, psychology, sensibility
or perception. Advocates of this view differ according to
the degree nature is believed to resist re- ordering
attempts. The continuum ranges from nature as highly
resistant to nature as easily overpowered. Ve saw, for
example, how Ind iffere nt _Or_d er is tied to the rejection of
a teleological view of nature as radically
modernity. Thus, environmental management
conclusion that mastery is the appropriate
humans to a world not designed to coincide
them.
incongruent with
can come to the
response of
neatly with
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There exists, however, anoth
and order, one that finds little
er conception of nature
expression through
environmental management:
(4) Natural Hol ism. Nature has some sort of
significant order of its own and this order harmonizes with
humans' needs. Advocates of thi s view see little call for
aggressive restructuring of nature and instead seek to
behavior and society to them
. Fxtreme versions of this
harmonious holism see nature as sacred, with an inviolate
order
.
We have already caught a glimpse of natural holism as
environmental management characterizes it; soon we will
allow it to speak for itself through the works of Frazim
Kohak and John Compton . But first, we will explore an
orientation to nature intermediate between environmental
management and natural holism, the science of ecology, in
order to illustrate the way Fn 1 i ghtenm ent and Faith
interpenetrate .
The Intersect ion of Fnv i ronmental Management and Natur al
Hoi i s m
Modern science must assume that nature is ordered to
some degree, for science "works" — the description and
prediction of natural regularities has technological
discover and comprehend natural laws in ord er to mold human
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success. But this order is understood as imperfect,
containing inex pi icables and irregularities. Science
posits not a harmonious fit between plants and animals or
between human needs and the natural provision for them, but
recurring natural patterns with some degree of internal
coherence
.
Evolutionary theory, for example, repudiates a
strictly teleological interpretation of nature. Nature has
a general tendency toward adaptation for survival, but it
is also full of instances of what can only be called
evolutionary dead ends, malad aptations or mistakes.
Despite attempts by natural holists to use evolutionary
theory as evidence of telos in nature (the theory, they
say, assumes "universal kinship and common bonds of
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function, experience and value among organisms"'), science
insists that evolution does not imply the kind of telos
that offers the assurance that the world is a purposive
order or even that its natural elements tend toward a state
of harmonious equilibrium.
The latest theories within physics confirm the view
that nature is a field of chance and statistical
regularities rather than a composite of stable, rationally
ordered substances.
[W]ith the advent of quantum theory and the
indeterminacy r el at ions . . . pr esen t theory implies
that objectively, and in fact, material particles
of very small dimensions do not possess certain
combinations of these precise values
simultaneously. .. [Tlheir individual behavior is
not theoretically determinate...
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[Elntities exist and are definable primarily by
virtue of interrelationships with other entities
rather than by virtue of any supposed substance-
essences of their own. Their fundamental
properties age not so much inherent as
derivative.
The irregularities in the order of nature, the dead
ends of evolution, and the indeterminacy of subatomic
particles that calls the materiality of matter into
question, are interpreted from an Enlightenment perspective
as evidence that the world is not imbued with telos.
From a Faith perspective, however, these discoveries
are interpreted as Enlightenment science's own admission of
the incompleteness of its knowledge and the irreducible
element of mystery in its theories. For Faith, the
regu l aritie s of evolutionary development are signs of a
designed universe and the irr egularities of evolutionary
development and subatomic particle/waves are signs of the
discrepancy between finite human science and divine
omniscience. Fnl ightenment ordinarily assumes the
possibility of certain and complete knowledge, says Faith,
but here finds itself asserting indeterminacy,
incompleteness and mystery as characteristics both of the
world and of the knowledge of it available to us — and
these latter assertions have affinities with those of
Faith .
We can pursue this claim that environmental management
intersects with natural holism by examining the science of
1 1 9
eCOl °gy
-
In general, the environmental manager's adherence
to the essential instrumentality of nature involves some
kind of atomistic conception of nature, for its assumption
is that particular natural elements can be manipulated
without so disrupting other elements that the net result is
a negative benefit to humans. The science of ecology has
called the hegemony of this atomism into question. Those
environmental economists who worried about the instrumental
view of nature edged, as we have seen, toward the
recognition that nature is a system of interconnected
parts, an organic whole.
The science of ecology attempts to investigate,
predict and control nature through uncovering the
functional i n t er d e pe nd en c i e s of members of an ecosystem
such as a watershed area, a forest, a prairie. It
emphasizes properties whole systems rather than its parts.
"The 2_^liL§. °f the ecosystem. ..means. ..that a whole is
greater than the sum of its parts, that a molecule of water
is 'more than' the simple addition of hydrogen and
oxygen ."^ The ecology within environmental management has
a certain affinity with Faith's holism.
Put while the systems approach of ecology overlaps
with the holism of Faith, it does not coincide with it.
Faith seeks to articulate the interde pendencies of all
parts of the world, where "world" means the interplay of
psychological, social and natural worlds. There are no
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truly autonomous entities but only relative degrees of
autonomy of function or form. Faith's holism views the
world through an understanding of relations, of how all
"internal" workings of an entity, be it a plant, an animal,
an idea, a self, a social problem or a norm, are involved
in a web of relations with other entities too numerous to
mention, much less investigate exhaustively.
There are at least three ways in which the science of
ecology parts company with Faith's holism.
First, while a sector within environmental management
accedes to the ecological assumption that nature is a
system of functionally interdependent parts, this sector
resists conceiving humans as simply another one of those
parts. The environmental manager finds it difficult to
acknowledge the interd epend enc y of all living and
non-living things without immediately following the
acknowledgement with a disclaimer distancing bumans from
that web of i n t e r d e pe nd e nc y . The uniqueness of a human
"lies. ..in the special character of his relations with
other systems. ..[i.e., his] ability to transform them."-
The preservation of the sanctity of humanity and of the
uniqueness of each particular individual requires the
rejection of what one environmental manager called mystical
holism, the view of nature as a metaphysical whole within
which all differences are converted into differences in
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degree. A harmonious holism (but not a systems theory
holism) is seen as ecological fascism.
Second, when the science of ecology says that the
whole is more than the sum of its parts, the "more than"
does not include that dimension of life that evades
empirical identification. While holist when compared to
chemistry or to the traditional biology of classification
and dissection, ecology is still tied, if more ambivalently
so, to the dominant scientific paradigm. Mature is an
ecosystem filled with complex and interconnected parts but
the parts are essentially physical and mechanical.
"Kinship" among parts is purely s u rv i v a 1 - f u nc t i on a 1 ; it is
the kinship of a shared evolutionary history or of a shared
need for food, shelter and air. Ecology is most
comfortable when the world it engages is the world of
material reality. One of Faith's central concerns is to
find the appropriate way to express the intimate relation
between reality and those aspects of existence inadequately
described as material (spiritually, consciousness,
intent ionality, God) .
Third, both the enthusiasm and explanatory power of
the science of ecology dwindle the closer it approaches
thoroughly humanized environments like suburban
neighborhoods, city blocks or industrial parks. Ecology
can best account for humans and their relationship to
nature when humans account for a tiny percentage of the
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population of the biotic community under study. Ecology is
inadequate, for example, for understanding the implications
of human embodiment or an orientation to nature. What it
means for humans to be a part of nature in light of the
fact that they are not exhausted by their physical form and
what is the connection between the structure of human
perception and the natural world are questions beyond the
ken of ecology. Humans are related to nature from the
perspective of ecology, but primarily in their role as
external manipulators of it. Human actions affect natural
disruptions; but the science of ecology is unable to
elucidate ways in which natural structures enable human
actions
.
Through the examples of evolutionary theory, quantum
physics, and the science of ecology, we see ways in which
Enlightenment draws nearer to holistic Faith. Even though
it is primarily the theologians of Faith who dwell upon the
parallels between scientific and religious orientations to
the world (while science continues to define itself as
militantly secular), and even though it is often those
already committed to a harmonious holism who see ecology as
on the right track but deficient (while ecologists are
quite content with systems theory), there do seem to be
many points of contact between Enlightenment and Faith.
But it may be too strong to call them affinities, which
connote an untroubled attraction -- evolutionary theory,
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quantum physics, and ecology are at the intersection of
Faith and Enlightenment and they partake of the ambivalency
which accompanies such i n term ed i ac y
.
Although dichotomies are most operative within
environmental management, a certain dualism is constitutive
of the holist-management relationship itself. Part of what
it means to say that there exists a Faith-Enlightenment
dialectic is to affirm the mutually engendering nature of
the two modes of understanding -- elements of each mode
migrate into the other and mingle with elements initially
foreign to them. Thus, natural holism harbors a secret
respect for the precise method of science and environmental
management finds itself unable to ignore the questions of
ethics .
We will soon see how natural holism too defines its
opponent narrowly through a simple contrast to its own
favorably interpreted views. Yet it tries to avoid
proceeding through dichotomies in developing its internal
understandings. It struggles, for example, to resist
either/or categories in order to embrace the organic model
of knowledge reminiscent of p i c t ur e- t ho ug ht s
.
Faith and Enlightenment continually draw near only to
diverge once again. They draw near because each bumps into
its own limits as it pursues its project. They diverge as
they respond to these limits differently and give different
weighting to similar considerations; each is governed by a
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different project it thinks susceptible to fulfillment.
For Enlightenment the project is the precise articulation
of knowledge about the world; for Faith the project is to
show how the world cannot be described truly in
Enlightenment's precise terms. Thus, the "same"
phenomenon, e.g., the social costs not captured in product
prices or the rights of natural objects not included in the
legal system, are weighted differently by environmental
managers and by the natural holists. For environmental
managers, they are externalities to its technological
schemes to control pollution, side-effects of a neutral
attempt to improve the natural environment; for holists
they are flaws endemic to the attempt to manage nature.
Social costs and the integrity of natural objects, from
within a view of the organic connection between the
physical, social, moral, political and economic worlds, are
not contingent externalities but central and necessary
concerns
.
Natural Holism Sp e aks for Tt s elf
For the holist, nature is not merely a deposit of
resources for use, although we do draw moral and physical
sustenance from it. Nature (animal, plant and inorganic
systems) and humans are conceived as a mutually engenderi
web. The task of organized science should not be the
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mastery of nature but the development of knowledges that
facilitate a minimum of human disturbance to natural
functions, processes or forms.
Environmental management seeks mastery and control of
nature, albeit a mastery that avoids actions upon nature
harmful to long-term human interests; holism seeks
accomodation with nature. The aim is not to rationalize
nature, for it already possesses its own rationality and is
to be respected for its beautifully complex design.
Holism criticizes environmental management for naive
faith in science: No amount of technique can reverse our
environmentally destructive path. An orientation to nature
in terms of use-value, despite any attempt to mitigate the
most dangerous or distasteful side-effects, must result in
environmental crisis. Moreover, such an approach to nature
has pernicious mor a 1- po 1 i t i c a 1 consequences. Humans,
through their embodiment, are natural too, and a
utilitarian orientation to nature fosters the instrumental
use of humans — through genetic and social engineering,
manipulation of public opinion, and bureaucratic treatment
of clients. For holism, the tyranny of instrumental
rationality, an often lamented hallmark of modern life,
must be fought at the level of our orientation to nature if
it is to be fought at all.
We explore now two natural ho lists: Erazim Kot>ak in
The Fmbers and the 5 tars and John Compton in "Re-inventing
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the Philosophy of Nature" and "Science and God's Action in
Nature." What makes them both representatives of Faith is
their focus on experiential contact with nature and on the
implications this direct experience carries for an
appreciation of holism. For Kohak, the nature to be
experienced is the great outdoors, where a simple life in
pursuit of basic needs teaches us about the moral order of
nature. For Compton
, the natural site of interest is the
human body, where one investigates the structures of
perception and cognition in order to uncover the primordial
belong ingness of embodied selves to the natural world.
An exploration of these modern representatives tells
us that Faith has once again changed its locus. Robust
Faith spoke in terms of the wonder of the world and the
darkness of knowledge and drew these insights from within
an enchanted natural world . The Faith facing the
eighteenth century Fnl ightenment attack found the context
for spirituality and pic tur e- tho ught knowledge in the
supe r sen suo us realm of salvation and human ensoulment.
Contemporary Faith's sense that the world is in harmony
with the true human self and that the relations between
selves and things must be understood holistically is based
upon the actual ex perien ce of humans immersed in their
n a t ur al- bod i 1 y environment.
The Embers and the Stars
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Before we can see the moral sense of nature, says
Kohak, we must be shown how the dominant view of nature,
(the one we recognize as environmental management), impedes
our recognition of this sense. This concealing view
presupposes a fundamental discontinuity between humans and
nature: Humans are the active, purposive and free beings,
nature is "dead, meaningless, m a t e r i al . . . a t best irrelevant
and typically threatening, to be conquered by an act of
3 3will."- Kohak connects this view to the secularism of the
mod er n age :
If there is no God, then nature is not a
creation, lovingly crafted and endowed with
purpose and value. ..It can only be a cosmic
accident, dead matter contingently propelled by
blind force.
.
. Tf God were dead, so would nature
be . 3
If God is dead, if nature is contingent, then we are
accidents thrown into an inhospitable world. (This sort of
reasoning, where all alternatives to one's own view are
characterized as the simple inverse, should ring a bell.
Holism too requires its nemesis to be constituted in a
particular way.)
Kohak rejects this secular orientation for its
inability to generate r espec t for nature. Any secular
environmental ethic can ground its "moral" stance
ultimately only in utility, and an instrumental view of
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nature will be destructive, not respectful of it. Only a
created, teleological nature can do the job. Kohak does
not, as some might, concede the death of God and then
attempt to dissociate that death from a respectful
orientation to nature. Instead, he seeks to show how a
respectful orientation itself evokes God. There is no
distinction for Kohak between pur pos e in nature and
integrity worthy of human concern, as there might be for a
non-teleological ethic where concern for nature was
grounded in its otherness, its difference, its resistance
to h urn ans
.
a SThe "eidetic structure of being," - " is echoed in the
organization of human minds and bodies: "though distinct
in my own way, I yet belong, deeply, within tne harmony of
nature." This harmony is as tangible as the
craftsmanship of the beaver's dam and the regularity of the
movement of the stars. Kohak's vivid descriptions of
nature seduce with the promise of a n o n- al i en a t ed
existence, and, after this longing to be at home in the
world has been aroused, he encourages recollection of times
when we have in fact "understood" and not merely
"explained" our world. Our ability to make this
distinction is evidence that our longing to be at home can
be fulfilled, given the proper orientation to nature.
Because understanding "is f un d am en t a 1 1 y . . . t he empathetic
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grasp on the i n t r i n s ic . . . rh ym e and reason of its object,"-
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understanding implies the existence of a moral order in
nature.
Eut if the harmony of nature and humans is a
primordial given, what accounts for the dominance of
environmental management? We often fail to recognize the
eloquence of the cosmos, says Kohak, because we can no
longer experience n atur e- in- it sel f , for we have buried it
under a thick layer of abstract theories and explanatory
models. For example, the methodology of science mediates
and distorts our relation to nature, substituting "a
theoretical nature-construct for the nature of lived
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experience." "For the sake of managing our environment
39purposively -- say, of dispatching rockets to the moon,"
this substitution is profitable, but it cannot explain the
moral dimension of human existence, a dimension Kohak tries
to draw out and re- secure.
But a change in the theoretical orientation to nature
would not suffice to de- throne the environmental
management, for the nature with which we can be in direct,
unmediated contact has already been to a large extent
physically transformed to fit the scientific model. Much
of the outdoors has become artifact: fenced and regulated
parks, perpetually noisy and neon-lit streets. We still
have ordinary "actual experience," but the world we
experience is rarely that of nature in itself. We situate
ourselves not against the truly "other" of the stars or the
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soft darkness but within an eerie neon light; we interact
not with food that we have touched and watched grow, but
with pre-cooked and packaged meals. "Cur estrangement from
nature is no longer conceptual only: it has acquired an
experiential grounding."
What is the way to nature in itself? How do we
approach that which presents itself not as our own making
but as something "to be acknowledged, making its own
demands"? The enabling method, Kohak tells us,
necessitates living, at intervals, in "radical brackets,"
that is, apart from the most characteristic modern
thoughts, institutions, practices and devices. We have to
put ourselves in a situation where we can escape the
physical and intellectual snare of ev er yd a yn e ss . "We need
to suspend, for the moment, the presumption of the
ontological significance of our constructs, including our
concept of nature as 'material.'"
Only through the solitary immersion in nature
undominated by humans can we experience its moral order and
our place within it. otherwise, we sink into individual
solipsism ("I have only to conceive for there to be") or
the collective solipsism of intersub jective consensus ("We
have agreed that x is true"). In t er s u b j ec t i v e consensus is
all too often a ratification of unreflective commonplaces,
for it installs "truth" through insistent repetition. A
favorite mode of television commercials, it loses its power
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to convince when we put ourselves in a truly natural
environment. There we see that truth is not conventional
but something that makes itself manifest through patient
observation. Near the roar of the ocean or in the
stillness of the forest,
...nature presses in. Tt is too vast for thehuman to outshout it, too close for him to
withdraw from it into speculation
.. .[There welearn that] a human cangot impose.
. .upon the
world quite so easily.
Nature resists. True, nature is ordered with a place
in it for us, but the solidity of its own order means that
it will not be bent to any and every will. This fit
between nature and humans is not one that humans have
crafted, not the result of a plasticity in nature. We
belong to nature, but to belong is not to control; the need
for control is lessened once the cosmos is seen as always
already there b e f o r e us -- standing i n front of us to be
experienced and existing p rior to our experience.
Already favorably disposed to us, nature bestows
gifts. First, the gift of "the night": "Were there no
darkness to restore the soul, humans would quickly burn out
their finite store of dreams. Unrested, unreconciled, they
would grow brittle." Night soothes ontol og ic al 1 y as well
as psychologically: It makes us whole, enabling the full
range of human experiences, providing a setting where modes
of perception, knowing and feeling unexpressed during the
busy day can come to the fore. One of these latent moods
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passing and easy wonder. When the first star
ppearance seemingly from nowhere, we experience
at does not require effort or even assent.
.moon does not 1 shine*
... All our words for
ing...are active verbs, suggesting doing,
the moon does not do. It lets itself be
not crowding out the darkness but rendering
s ible
.
The darkness and inexactitude of the night relieve us
of the pressure to explain all, to know all, to re-enact in
our minds the structure and mechanism of phenomena around
us. The inescapable difficulty of working or investigating
in the dark excuses us from the duty to do so. Electric
lights enable in many ways, but their illumination obscures
the way they deprive us of relief. Nature soothes while
the artifact world alienates, an ironic state of affairs
given that nature, unlike society, is not our creation.
The dominant colors of a forest. ..are green and
light blue, both of which, as empirical
psychology can attest, have a distinctly soothing
effect. ..The decibel levels here are geared to
the tolerances of the human nervous system. ..The
environing world of a forest. ..is calm and and
unjarring, living its own familiar life, so
unlike the thr e a ten in g
^
^ un pr ed ic t ab 1 e environment
of the artifact world.
is an encom
makes its a
a wonder th
The . .
1 ight
wh i 1 e
seen,
it v i
Night also shows our senses to be a gift, dependent
upon the world's cooperation with them. Sight is possible
only because light, shadow and form allow it. We can
loosen our attachment to sight, sometimes even gratefully,
in the vague and mellow world of the night. And then the
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gift of hearing can come to the fore. Sometimes we do best
to listen patiently, to be open to the voice of nature.
A third natural gift is "the word." The dominant
modern orientation to nature and language declines to
accept this gift: If nature is meaningless in itself and
meaningful only as utility, as artifacts are, then words
can only designate or assign meaning, they cannot express a
sense already present. For Kohak
, actual experience of
untamed nature allows us to have a new thought:
"TSlome thing must be for something to be said — there must
be meaning to which our words point, not as.
. .impositions
,
U 7but as expressions of the meaning that stands out..."
Through our linguistic, social, and scientific
interpretations, we articulate the being of natural
things— but nature allows some interpretations and
disallows others.
How does Kohak, as the heir of Faith, convince us that
language does in fact have an expressive function? He
simply sets forth the expressive model of language and
waits and sees whether his account strikes a chord in us, a
chord familiar but long silent because of the dominance of
the designative model that is well suited for (because
developed in conjunction with) life in the artifact world.
Language is a gift that expresses the meaningful order
of being, but expresses it indirectly and darkly. Words
can gesture toward their source, but their "source"
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includes both the human who receives and interprets meaning
as well as the thing which evokes and encourages a range of
interpretations. Because of the constraint of "the double
discipline of the reality it confronts and the demands of
those to whom it would speak," language is suggestive but
not definitive. Words express that which is but cannot do
so "with the same clarity and immediacy as in lived
k Qexperience itself." And yet the articulation into words
and thoughts is crucial to "lived experience," for some
degree of articulation is necessary in order that lived
experience become fixed rather than inchoate, fleeting and
thus immediately forgotten. The relationship between
natural things, the lived experience of them, and the
articulation of the experience is evocative not
designative. Like Robust Faith, Kohak conceives language
on the model of parables whose ability to convince is a
function of metaphor and the power to incite empathy.
Kohak' s prose exemplifies how a text relies upon the
incitement of the reader's longing for ontological comfort.
It is filled with gentle, healing words: inherent rhythms,
rhyme and reason, integrated cycles, continuity and
periodicity of being, harmony, primordial and enduring
presence, immutable order, revealing truths, miraculous
wonder, invisible renewal, deep solitude, peace, warmth.
Kohak experienes nature as a meaningful whole and
experiences himself as a moral subject; his text makes
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explicit the function of all language, the evocation of "an
analogous experience." 50 Kohak's language resounds with
the resemblances and similitudes of an enchanted natural
world
.
Can the evocative argument that nature has a moral
integrity that is of itself worthy of respect convince? I
think not. Kohak's use of actual experience and of the
evocative power of metaphor in support of a teleological
view of nature do not suffice. Actual experience of nature
includes experience of drought, parasites, hurricanes,
earthquakes, disease and senseless events. Th
e
environmental management position that nature is ordered in
ways indifferent to us, that nature is an aggregate of
matter "exhibiting at most . . .ontolog ic all y random...
5 1regularities," too has a basis in lived experience. And
metaphors can also be put to the service of management
aims. Kohak is aware of the incompleteness of the appeal
to actual experience and metaphor, but waits until we have
been primed by them to supply the missing ingredient:
Trust in the cosmos, read God.
From the perspective of faith, the real issue in the
environmental debate between holism and management is not
how to devise and implement the most efficient method of
control of polluters or pollution, but how to recognize the
proper place of the human in the cosmos. The question is
"whether we shall conceive of ourselves as integrally
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continuous with the world about us or as contingently
thrown into it as strangers into an alien medium. 52 If, as
Kohak admits, "nature lends itself willingly to either
interpretation," 53 how can he claim that his view is the
way "nature in truth is"? 54 For management, the choice
between the two options is ours, to be based upon a
judgment of the political, economic, and psychological
consequences of each. Holism too sees nature's flexibility
as an invitation to human choice, but one to be based not
upon a utilitarian calculus or upon the will to carry out,
but upon
...an act of trust that the harmony of the embers
that glow with the warmth of the human heart and
the stars that proclaim the glory of God. ..is not
only. ..[a] naive first impression
. . . .
.the
ultimate conclusion of deep thought.
Kohak admits that he can never prove the truth of that
conclusion, but claims that faith — in providence, God,
human reason or will, progress, history -- is a reauisite
for any conception of nature, not just his own. Kohak
admits that his harmonious holism is contestable; however,
the view of nature as standing reserve is just as unproven.
...all that can be said will not constitute an
argument, nor will arguments convince. . .TA] 11
knowledge rests on faith. That faith, though, is
neither ?rbitrary nor irr^ional . Tt is an
expression of a vision...
Thus, Kohak follows in the e pi st em ol og i c al footsteps of
picture-thoughts. Knowledge can be evocative only, never
definitive. Trust or faith is necessary; we can at best
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get only a glimpse of the moral order. To pursue precise
and clear concepts is to transform natural holism into the
systems theory of ecology.
A Natural Philosophy of Embodiment
Like Kohak, Compton takes issue with the dominant
understanding of nature as resources for use. He
identifies the source of the environmental problem
specifically in modern science. Also like Kohak, he argues
that despite appearances nature and self are in fundamental
harmony. His strategy for making holistic inroads into the
dominant view is to show how science presupposes a
pr e- theoretic al experience of nature where it is revealed
that nature and self engender one another and that nature
corresponds to our capacities for perceiving it. Tompton
seeks to inform science of its unacknowledged debt to this
experience of belonging. The philosophy of science, he
hopes, can be made into a "re-invented philosophy of
nature," less destructive but still theoretically refined
and po wer f ul .
Compton begins with an account of the structure of
human knowing. The condition of possibility for both
pr e- theo r e t ic al and scientific knowing is a background of
beliefs, conventions, perceptions, thoughts, geographical
prejudices, bodily moods and rhythms, which can never in
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full be the explicit object of knowledge. The structure of
any knowing is akin to the structure of sight: To "see" is
to focus on a particular scene or item while necessarily
blurring the field of vision in which it is set; to shift
to another scene or item requires the re-submergence of the
first. The only knowing available is a knowing of that
which is lifted to the foreground by the focus of our
a 1 1 en t ion
.
Because pr e- theoretic al knowing occurs almost
automatically, through perception given with a normal human
body, it is less complete and less precise than scientific
knowing. Implicit knowledge of nature is pervasive and
always there affecting thought and judgment about nature.
But its status as knowledge is suspect because of its
vagueness. Scientific knowing, on the other hand, secures
its status by accelerating, intensifying and crystallizing
the perceptual process of lifting out and isolating
particular items from within the field of experience. For
Compton, modern science too often achieves clarity at the
price of reification; it seeks to prevent the
r e- subm erg en c e of the object in its knowledge-context by
fixing it in a mathematical formula or a statement of
" fact
Scientific inquiry. ..is so techn ic al . . . so
pre-oriented to serve ... in tere st s in prediction
and control, so selective., .in i t s . . . a ss urn pt io n s ,
that we must wonder whether...^ can provide...
revealing knowledge of nature.
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Compton hopes to articulate a philosophy of nature that
integrates both modes, walking a fine line between the
elusive but primary knowledge of actual experience and the
clear but reductive knowledge of science.
In order to defend the primary knowledge-theoretical
knowledge distinction, Compton must attempt the nearly
paradoxical task of articulating the pr e-theoretic al
understanding of nature. There are several general claims
we can make about the structure of pr e-theor et ic al nature,
says Compton. We can give an "at least heur ist ic al ly
suggestive description" of how we know nature through our
"bodily receptivity and activity with things as we seek to
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satisfy our needs and purposes."
First, actual experience is experience of something
that has some identifiable continuity and thus some
predictability. Events, processes, or things — the
objects of the lived natural world — have recurrent
constancies which allow us to pick out one object from
amidst all the others. Certain relations among these
objects also persist; they have characteristic and in some
cases even law-like ways of combining or interacting.
These constancies occur within the context of
bod ily-perceptu al exp ecta t ion of them. Human bodies are
such that we live through identifying and r e- id en t i f y i n
g
unities within the multiplicity of forms and manifestations
of the natural world. Our anticipatory apparatus is "the
1 HO
amorphous field of
. . .spatiality and temporality, of moving
and grasping, seeing and seeking." 59 This unifying field
of the-body-as-it-interacts-with-the-world operates at the
individual and the i n t er s ub j ec t i v e level, for
...at the margin of each individual's
experiencing of things is the unstated, but
assumed presence of other experiencers.
. .thus
,the concrete un i t ie s- i n-mul ti pi ic i t ies
. . . ar e
. . .
not only [mine]
. . .but . . . our s .
Second, actual experience is essentially implicated in
relation with other perceived objects, including humans.
There is a dialectical relation between nature and humans;
we belong to each other because we exist only in
conjunction with each other. We perceive and interpret
nature through bodily organs which are themselves natural;
we encounter nature through communal history which
comingles with natural history. The in ter s ubj ec t ive world
interprets, interpretation made possible by the porousness
of perceived objects — the very objects which include and
condition the i n te r sub j ec t i v el y experiencing community.
Humans, both individually and collectively, find themselves
over against b ut wit hin nature .
Third, actual experience is experience of something
open-ended, with an indeterminacy that calls humans to a
project of uniformity ^hat can never be fully successful or
complete. The "real" perceived object will always startle.
Within the pe r c e pt ua 1 - n a t ur al field, objects become
meaningful, but while human interpretation contributes to
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this meaning, it can never exhaust what the perceived
object is. This is different from saying that part of the
meaning of an object is inherent and part derived from
human interpretation -- sll of the "meaning" of an object
is bound up with its place in the lived world, is
essentially connected to the human experience of it. The
point is that the object is more than its "meaning." What
that "more than" consists of always eludes our grasp, for
only mediated knowledge is available to humans. Although
the objects of lived reality are incompletely determinate
and open to further determination, inviting human
interpretation, objects are at the same time experienced as
resistant to us, as somewhat opaque, as already there
before interpretation, and as "always more than we know and
6
1
ever surprising us." These characteristics hold sway
also for the human object, who as an embodied self is also
natural. The embodied self encounters the other in its
only partially explained impulses, in reactions, in
disease. These coexist with the sense of being an
intention-bearing subject, the author of actions.
Let us compare, for a moment, Compton's account of the
actual experience of nature with Kohak's. For Compton , the
reality behind our linguistic and scientific apparatuses
does not refer to a n a t ur e- i n- i t s el f . The distinction for
Compton is a two-fold one, between what we know of n atur e
independently of science and what we know of nature through
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theoretical constructs; it is not Kohak's three-fold
distinction between natural things as they are in
themselves, the lived experience of them, and the
interpretation of that experience. For Kohak, nature is
expressed and not produced through language; language is
more expressive than constitutive for Compton as well, but
it is only the lived pr e-theoretic al experience of nature
that can be expressed. Compton cannot make sense of a
"nature without reference to the presence of the effects of
human or any other experiencing life." An analysis like
Kohak's that allows for nature- jn-itsel f can speak of
distortions within actual experience or of the possibility
of an authentic relation to nature -- there is a "true
nature" to be discovered or covered over. For Compton,
however, pr e- t heo r e t i c al experience is mistaken or
distorted only in clearly identifiable cases of
n e ur o- ps yc h ol og i c al disease. Put while experience is
rarely distorted for Compton, the t ransla tion of it into
concrete theories often is. Thus, scientific models of
nature have ignored their grounding in lived experience and
thus miss the insight that self and world harmonize.
Two conceptions of actual experience are at work
within natural holism, then. For Kohak, actual experience
is a looser term, pointing to the immediacy of certain
understandings of the wilderness; for Compton, actual
experience is a more precise term referring to the
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fundamental ontological structures of the bodily-perceptual
encounter with the world.
Let us continue with our account of Compton's version
of natural holism. The criteria implicit in scientific
judgments of the reality of some new entity, effect, or
structure are, for Compton
,
closely analogous to the three
characteristics of the reality of primary experience
elaborated earlier. In physics, a new existent must
exhibit one or more of the following: It must be detected
and identified through several independent experiments
(identifiable continuity); it must interact with other
known existents (essential r el a t ion al i t y ) ; it must manifest
a property hitherto only suspected (an o pen- end ed ness that
surprises). Compton concludes that the theoretical
constructs of an adequate philosophy of nature wil] find
their reference in characteristics of the lived natural
world. To put it more precisely, perceptual experience
puts limits upon what is recognizable by science as a part
of the natural world.
Not only are there structural affinities between human
perception and human t h eor e t i c a 1 / sc i en t i f i c activity, but
between human experience and non-human experience as well.
"[W]hat is characteristic of embodied, i n t er s ub j ec t i v e ,
wo rid- r el ated human life, is not an aberration, but is
structurally analogous to what is found in other regions of
the natural world." 63 Other holists have spoken of this
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structural analogy, sometimes likening the mode of being of
the embodied self to the life of nature:
The epidermis of the skin is. ..like a pond
surface or a forest soil, not a shell so much as
a delicate i n te r pe n e tr a t i o n . It reveals the self
enobled and extended rather than threatened as a
part of the landscape., .because the beauty and
compl exity
6
gf nature are continuous with
ourselves
.
The details of the structural analogy between the
human body and the natural order, an analogy that is
evidence for the existence of a harmoniously ordered
cosmos, are not specified by Compton. He does not try to
defend fully his claim that nature forms a meaningful
whole. He can only "point to some striking evidence of...
[its] truth," phenom enol og ic al evidence of the essential
connection between anticipatory perception and the natural
world. This evidence is under-acknowl edged by modern
science .
Like Kohak, Compton rejects the pursuit of certain
knowledge. All claims about nature can only be suggestive
possibilities, never definitive proofs. The mode of
argumentation of Kohak and Compton requires a sympathetic
reader; the claim is that all conviction relies to a
certain extent upon the prior disposition of the reader to
believe. Kohak asks only that we listen to the evocative
call of nature and metaphor; Compton asks us not to be
convinced but merely to be open to the possibility of
harmonious holism and to consider it in our philosophical/
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scientific inquiries. Kohak's position has in the
background a divine creator of nature and borrows some of
the power of the belief in God to strengthen the case for
his philosophy of nature; Compton, too, has philosophical
aspirations grander than his mild declarations of purpose
suggest
.
Compton's natural holism is not a morally-neutral
alternative to the scientific conception of nature, but is
superior because "it reminds us that. ..we could, in a
reflective and empathetic wa y . . . e nl a r g e the world we live
to include responsiveness to life-world structures at other
i t it 6 6levels." To strive to inquire under the assumption of
harmonious natural holism is to foster the possibility of a
respectful, n o n- d e st r uc t i v e orientation to nature.
Through the environmental crisis, we have become
painfully aware of the danger in attitudes of
exploitation and domination reinforced by a
ph i 1 oso ph wh i c h divests nature of meaning
entirely.
Compton's position provides a safer, more sustainable and
morally preferable orientation to nature.
Let us grant that the assumption of harmonious natural
holism results in a less destructive orientation to nature.
Is this enough to justify that assumption today? There is
some evidence that is "in a broad sense empirical"
68 to
support the assumption of harmony, but there is also some
experiential evidence to support the assumption of a world
not designed to fit humans. Compton says that science must
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presuppose a harmonious holism if it is to have a
nature-revealing and not merely instrumental or predictive
quality. For were science capable only of the latter, we
could not "tell the difference between reality and useful
fiction .
"
69
It is c onceiv able to Compton that human existence
could achieve nothing more than useful fictions, but he
rejects the possibility that our conceptual and perceptual
powers do not belong to the world (in the sense of fitting
harmoniously with it); he rejects the possibility that
primary experience, the ph en om enol og ic al articulation of
it, and scientific theorizing all have only the roughest
correspondence with and very precarious (because humanly
imposed and not "natural") attachment to the world; and he
rejects the possibility that our wish for harmonious
integration with nature might not imply any privileged
ontological status for it.
V/h y does Compton make so much of very general and
incomplete structural analogies between human and non-human
being? Perhaps Compton believes that the conventional-
ization project has already gotten plenty of attention. It
is also the case that God lurks in the background for
Compton, as he does for Kohak . "Science and God's Action
in Nature," written by Compton seven years earlier than
"Re-inventing the Philosophy of Nature," aims explicitly to
reconcile a theology of nature with natural science. Tn
1H7
brief, his argument there is this: The modern world has an
environmental crisis; the alleviation of the crisis
involves a revision of our orientation to nature; this
revision requires affirming "intrinsic meaning and value in
the natural order of which man is a part;" 70 and this
affirmation unfolds through the concepts of God, creation,
providence, telos and logos. Compton's project is to
retain yet revise these concepts, giving them "plausibility
and a ppl ic ab il ity
. . . in terms of our common experiences
7 1and. ..the scientific world view." The bulk of the essay
explores what a satisfactory concept of God might be like
by suggesting an analogy between a particular model of the
embodied human self and a model of God's action in nature.
This conception of God is said to be " cons i stent with
Christian faith and may even be coherent with natural
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science." The admission by theoretical physics and
evolutionary theory that science can never fully explain
matter (because it is indeterminate) , means that science
has made room in its framework for a new conception of God.
The modern God can find a home in the mystery of matter.
Compton's theological commitment was overt in "Science
and God's Action in Nature;" it is likely that a similar
commitment is present in " P e- i nv en t i ng , " for it provides
the missing element in a re-invented philosophy of nature
based upon primary experience. Faith in God allows us to
move from the mere possibility of harmonious holism to the
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conviction of its truth. Our examination of Kohak and
Compton shows, then, that there is a recurrent connection
between theological convictions and the philosophy of
natural holism. It is highly unlikely that holism can
function even as an ideal without some residual commitment
to God as creator of nature.
N at ur a l Hoi i sm Re con s id e r e
d
We are now in a position to ask a question that gets
at the heart of the dispute between environment management
and natural holism: Is the assumption of a harmonious
holism, one that includes a place for a God, the only route
to a no n- d e s t r uc t i v e orientation to nature? If it is, and
we want to avoid ecological catastrophe, then Faith will be
the best path to pursue. If it is not, then some perhaps
version of Enlightenment is our best bet.
It has been the premise of this chapter that an
investigation of the Enlightenment and Faith orientations
to nature would enable us to answer this question, but at
first it seems as if our analysis of the d u a l i sm of Faith
and Enlightenment suggests that no answer is possible.
Because Faith's holism of actual experience considers
itself only with regard to its secul ar-raMonal opponent,
it is difficult to know whether the holistic view of
language, knowledge, self and nature could take a truly
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secular form. Holism sees how the dominant view of nature
has contributed to the environmental crisis and then offers
its own religiously-tinged position as a morally superior
alternative. Environmental management then undercuts the
force of holism' s moral superiority by showing its
assumption of harmony to be incongruous with modern beliefs
and practices. After this critique, it seems as though we
must reject natural holism. Cn the other hand, holism has
exposed the limits to the management conception of nature,
showing that it is not capable of a position that is both
coherent and non-destructive of nature. Holism uncovers
the self- contradictory nature of environmental management
solutions: It espouses an instrumental view of nature
which, because of our ineradicable participation in nature
through our bodies, encourages the application of technique
to humans. An instrumental view of nature must reduce
humans to means, subjecting them to technical manipulation
and instrumental exploitation. This result conflicts with
management's self-righteous emphasis on the dignity of
humans as the only beings capable of reason, will and
f r e ed om .
But the beginning of an answer to our question
ultimately does emerge from the exploration of
env ironmental ism in terms of Hegel's Faith-Enlightenment
dialectic. Ironically, or better, as a result of the
dialectic and not the dualism between Faith and
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Enlightenment, management's negative characterization of
holism and holism's critique of management uncover the
possibility of a conception of nature that rejects
harmonious holism but affirms an orientation that will let
nature be.
The holist view of nature makes two basic claims: (1)
nature is worthy of more than instrumental treatment,
having an integrity of its own, and (2) nature is in
harmonious relation within humans and among humans and
non-humans. Holism insists that these claims are
connected, but there may be a way to endorse the first
without implying the second. Tt is possible to conceive
nature as an order without purpose but one worthy of regard
precisely because it is beyond our total control and
resistant to human attempts to mold it. There is a moment-
within Fn 1 i g h t enm en t science that affirms this: Reality is
con str uc table , we can impose order upon it and constitute
it as artifact, but also — and this is the important point
— we can never do this totally or completely, for reality
resists. £nd the resistance of nature is ineliminable: We
can rail against it with ever more insistent attempts to
humanize it, or we can acknowledge the resistance witho ut
tying that acknowledgement to a belief in the ontological
attunement of humans with nature.
Compton's point about the o pe n- en d ed n e s s of the
objects of lived experience goes to the brink of this
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let-otherness-be position. There is an indeterminacy, he
says, that both invites technical intervention and
conceptual imposition of unity but still resists that
imposition and places limits upon its duration. Compton
coul
d
acknowledge that humans have functions, forms and
action-possibilities similar to those available to
non-human nature, that nature "fits us" in so far as it
provides the conditions of possibility for human existence,
without endorsing the view that we were made for each
other .
Tt is consistent with the phenom enol og ic a] evidence
offered by Compton that the relation between humans and
nature is not one of harmony but one of the embodied self,
replete with affinities and with aspects accidental or
adverse to human needs. We could endorse an essential and
problematic relational ity between rather than the intrinsic
value of humans and nature. Because of its theological
commitments, natural holism does not turn to this
appreciation of the o pe n- e nd ed ne s s of nature, and because
of its anthropocentr ism , neither can environmental
management. Further development of this position may have
to await the passing of the dialectic of Faith and
Enl ightenment .
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and its formally recorded history. Government by law
enables the state to rationally coordinate policies that
cut across different sectors of society, for policy guided
by law can be modified, in known and regular ways, to
adjust to complex and changing circumstances. Juridical
democracy pursues the simplification and s y s t em i za t i on of
law, leading ultimately to "a unified code." 4
Planning within the juridical state is both
participatory and centralized. It is participatory through
its insistence on representative government and its
institutional encouragement of "bargaining on the rule,"
the self-conscious debate about the aim, meaning, and
implications of a piece of legislation. This debate,
because it surrounds a formal legal procedure, is
particularly susceptible to public scrutiny and
participation. The juridical state is centralized because
it limits the site of popular participation. Access is
readily available during the formulation of policy, limited
at the implementation stages. The centralization of power
in Congress produces a clarification of purpose and a
consistency among public acts, yet it does not disempower
local government. Pecause national directives make clear
the responsibilities of local authorities, self-monitoring
helps to reduce central control. Federal oversight, when
necessary, is less intrusive, for judgments of success or
failure can be straightforward when standards have been
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made explicit beforehand. "[Llegality and efficiency tend
5to go together."
Put juridical democracy fosters more than efficiency;
it also enables public consideration of social goals.
While the "juridical approach does not dictate a particular
definition of justice, of virtue, or of the good life," 6
the politics of government by law fosters a healthy
consideration of them. The American state today too often
underspecif ies the int ent of a policy, "expressing broad
and noble sentiments, giving almost no direction.
.
.but
imploring executive power, administrative expertise, and
7interest-group wisdom." This sloppy faith in good
intentions compromises liberal democracy. Py assuming that
the outcome of competition among organized i nter est- groups
is by definition just, we eschew the a priori formulation
of the principles that are to guide public actions.
Considerations of j u s t i c e . . . c a nn o t be made unless
a deliberate and conscious attempt was made to
derive the [public] action from a preexisting
general rule or moral principle governing such a
class of actions. Therefore, any. ..regime that
makes a virtue of avoiding suchgrules puts itself
outside the context of justice.
The juridical state, through its partiality for formal
procedure over informal bargaining, also strengthens
Congress and the judiciary as sites of legitimate public
authority and reduces corporate influence. Special
economic interests are not denied access to the policy-
making process but are limited to forums where they can be
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recognized as corporate and not public interests.
Corporate lobbying power is also controlled through the
requirement of precise and overt policy intentions: "In
many cases the powerful would be immobilized if they had to
qarticulate what they were going to do before they did it."
Government by law similarly lessens the possibility of
covert bureaucratic power. Careful laws with definitive
aims allow Congress to control fiscal expenditures of
public agencies and to check administrative discretionary
power, a major source of policy incoherency and public
cynicism toward government.
It is the broad grant of power without standards
that leads to bargaining, unanticipated
commitments, and . . .confusions that are the
essence of bureaucratic irresponsibility and the
illegitimate state.
But, says Lowi, government by law is insufficient to
restore democratic liberalism. As the undesirable
side-effects of capitalism have grown, the liberal state
has been drawn into an economic role that has undermined
its commitment to democratic participation and the public
interest. Lowi argues that the state's orientation to the
economy, as well as its orientation to legislation, must be
modified .
In order for a modern state to coordinate rationally a
large range of programs, it must control or have great
influence over "at least some of the strategic resources
and networks in the economy."
11
The American state has
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responded to this coordination imperative not by
socializing production or banks, but by socializing risk.
Examples of the socialization of risk include regulations
that protect established firms by limiting new entrants
into the competition (the role of the Civil Aeronautics
Board) and federal guarantees of loans to private investors
(the role of the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board in the
Lockheed "bail-out"). In 1978 the American government had
potential obligations for 368 billion dollars' worth of
private investments.
Low is highly critical of the American response to the
need for economic intervention. Public economic
intervention through the socialization of risk creates a
large class of private units in a state of "permanent
receivership." Industries and other privately organized
groups deemed important enough are eligible to have their
organizational and fiscal stability underwritten by the
government. The socialization of risk typically requires
no immediate transfer of funds, only a guarantee that if
the enterprise fails, the government will deal with its
creditors. First, the indirectness of involvement allows
the underwriting agency to escape official Treasury or
Congressional clearance and there is thus little room for
public debate in the decision. Second, the discretionary
nature of permanent receivership policies enable ostensibly
public agencies and committees to establish highly stable
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and almost autonomous clienteles. These clienteles have a
structural advantage over smaller firms, for the initial
state intervention entails a certain obligation for the
state to protect its investment. Thus, permanent
receivership discriminates against innovative or small
enterprises that could increase the competitiveness of an
economic sector; it allows "economically irrational uses of
resources by encouraging expansion beyond demand
1 3
or . . .ret ent ion of inefficient firms or processes."
Neo- laissez-fair e , Lowi's substitute for permanent
receivership, would combine "a substantial deflation of
government in general with a strengthening of certain
1 'I
aspects of government in particular." Tt would
...radicalize economy and society. ..by an...
abnegation of government po wer . . . Mul ti na t ion al . . .
corporations could probably be jolted back into
more actual price competition if the hundreds of
protections .. .logged .j^n our public policy were
suddenly eliminated.
The state would be laissez-faire in its introduction of a
smaller set of specific rules designed to encourage justice
and the public interest as they have been defined
previously in the reformed political process.
Under n eo- 1 a i s se z- f a i r e , many discretionary economic
programs would be abolished and others placed in a
defensive position. "on-discretionary fiscal policies,
such as shifts in the money supply, the level of government
investment, and tax laws, would be strengthened. Federal
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police power to regulate economic activity destructive of
the public interest would expand, but such regulation would
be clear in intent and limited in scope. "If there is...
unacceptable distribution of i n c ome
. . . i r r a t ion a 1 use of
resources .. .water or air pollution or racial inequality,
then [we] ought to be able to identify rather precisely" 1 ^
their sources and remedies.
A Preliminar y Critique o f t he Juri dical Ftate
Lowi's procedural democracy and n e o- 1 a i s se z- f a i r
e
economy represent the individualist version of Enlight-
enment rationalism. Habermas' faith in the possibility of
rational consensus represents the collectivist version.
Before we provide a fuller account of Habermas' affirmative
theory of the state, a theory developed in response to
positions like Lowi's, we will sketch how the consensual
state is a critique of the Lowian. Tn order to then expose
a different set of flaws in the Lowian ideal, we anticipate
briefly the critique by the theory of the attuned state.
This latter critique, which applies to the Habermasian
ideal as well as the Lowian, focuses upon the Promethean
commitment to human mastery.
From a Habermasian perspective, Lowi's defense of
neo-laissez-f aire is insufficient, even on his own terms.
Lowi calls his attack on permanent receivership a protest
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"against the existing state as supportive of organized
1 7capitalism," a recognition of capitalism's oligarchical
tendencies, and an assault on the bloated and irresponsible
bureaucratic state. Yet n eo- 1 a i s s e z- f a i r e preserves the
fundamental structures of capitalism and itself anticipates
a large though altered state apparatus If Lowi i s
willing to invest the state with extensive coordination and
planning powers, why does he exclude the possibility of
neo-social ism? Lowi's first objection to socialism, that a
socialist transformation of the political economy would not
necessarily remedy the problems of rule by professional
expertise and administrative discretion, is weak, for
neither necessarily does capitalism, in ways that Lowi
himself has shown. Why couldn't the juridical control of
discretionary power be applied to a socialized economy?
His second objection is more serious but still insufficient
to reject all socialist alternatives. Pecause of its
radical nature, socialism would entail an interim and
unacceptable sacrifice of civil liberties, says Lowi.
Although he admits that state capitalism, through its
generation of economic privilege, itself compromises civil
liberties, he fears the socialist deprivation of civil
liberties more. Tt is important, on Lowi's view, to
preserve certain niches for purely individual activity,
that is, activity structurally unavailable for deployment
1 7 U
as a means to a larger political plan and socialism
c annot do this .
But from a collectivist perspective, Lowi's
understanding of capitalist economics is woefully
inadequate. Neo- laissez-faire allows a relatively free
reign to private economic units; juridical procedure is
supposed to limit corporate political influence. Lowi
doesn't see, Habermas shows us, that exposing corporate
demands to the light of juridical procedures (while leaving
the capitalist structure of the economy intact) may result
in the crystalli zatio n and justi fi cation of corporate
demands. They may be justified as necessary to the very
existence of the social order rather than, as Lowi hopes,
subjected to the independent standards of justice and the
public interest and then rejected for falling short of
them. The fiscal burden placed upon the state to support
sectors of industry vital to the economy may force the
state to take measures to tighten up tax collection and to
reduce expenditures on social programs less obviously
central to the maintenance of the system. If the juridical
state allows the economic imperatives of corporate
capitalism and these imperatives require sacrifices on the
part of certain groups, then juridical democracy might
function to specify, clearly and precisely, the ways in
which those sacrifices must be enforced and evaders
penalized .
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Finally, the collectivist takes issue with Lowi's
conception of the state itself. Conceiving the state
primarily in terms of the laws it makes, his analysis does
not give serious attention to c i t i ze n- id en t i f i c a t io n with
the state or to the role the state may play as a locus of
collective freedom. Lowi thus underestimates the modern
problem of legitimacy. Lowi identifies two sources of the
legitimacy problem, both of which he mistakenly believes
his ideal state can solve. The first source is
perpetuation of permanent receivership: As the state
increases its support to the private economy it will have
trouble securing sufficient allegiance from citizens who
recognize that their government fosters the private gain of
already privileged groups. This source of discontent is to
be remedied through n eo-1 a i s se z- f ai r e , but we have seen how
neo- laissez-faire entails a state too weak to control the
corporate economy. The second source is ambiguous laws and
bad procedures, for when no one can be sure whether a
policy has been successful in carrying out an intention,
public actions seem pointless or a smoke screen for the
real, private sources of power. This second threat to
legitimacy can be remedied through juridical democracy, but
Habermas teaches us to wonder whether procedures are
sufficient to induce allegiance to the state.
The theory of the attuned state concurs with many o^
these objections to Lowi, but sees the flaws in his
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perspective as based in its Promethean orientation to
nature. Thus, juridical democracy and n e o-l a i s se z- f a i r
e
reproduce the flaws of the utility version of
Enl ightenment
.
Let us recall the basic defect of utility: After its
rejection of religious or traditional bases of value,
Enlightenment stumbled upon utility as a standard of value.
This standard presupposed the centrality of the human being
and required a great faith in the autonomy of reason. The
problem with utility was that its realization undermined
its presupposition. To determine value through utility is
to view the world i n s tr urn en t a 1 1 y , and this instrumental
orientation spread to include humans themselves, the very
beings Enlightenment exalted because of their unique
capacity for reason. Enlightenment believed that humans
were equipped with a refl ective reason that prevented the
over-extension of utility, that we were designed such that
we contained a natural barrier to immoderation. Put as
"pure" reason triumphed over traditional supports and
limits, the assumption of the sel f- ] im iting character of
reason was increasingly called into question.
Lowi re-enacts this earlier failed drama in his theory
of the state, says the theory of the attuned state. In his
shift from the moral level to the political one, the
utility standard and the faith in the self-sufficiency of
reason become, respectively, the hegemony of economic
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imperatives and a faith in a self-correcting juridical
procedure. Just as Enlightenment originally sought both
utility and respect for persons, Lowi now wants both an
expansionist economy and the public interest, both a
perfected bureaucracy and limits on the regulation of the
private lives of citizens, both a high-tech state and a
democratically-controlled state.
Lowi's thought works within the basic parameters of
Enlightenment: His 1 eg al- pr oc ed ur al approach treats as
un probl ema t ic the Enlightenment view of reason; his
conception of freedom as mastery has not explored the
underside of the attempt to rationalize society; and his
commitment to an economy of growth expresses his acceptance
of the Enlightenment view of nature and human satisfaction.
This latter commitment requires further explanation.
For Enlightenment, nature is disenchanted matter to be
harnessed for human goals — for Lowi the goal of upward
mobility and an increasing material standard of living. If
nature is matter then the impact the pursuit of growth has
upon nature is troublesome only insofar as it interferes
with the pursuit. Tf Enlightenment equates human freedom
with being in charge of the world, if the world separate
from humans is thought to contain no intrinsic value of its
own, and if human well-being is thought to be bound up with
the conversion of the natural world into useful objects,
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then economic growth is likely to be seen as an essential
ingredient in human freedom and happiness.
From the perspective of the attuned state, then, a
socialist organization of the economy is just as pernicious
as a capitalist one if it is committed to economic growth.
Lowi is unaware that the requirements of economic growth,
like the standard of utility, tend to infest and dominate
other social realms: The standards of efficiency,
competition, and profit infect the human relation to
nat ur al t hings as nature becomes a deposit of resources for
use; pol itics as it becomes dominated by questions of
international competition and stimulation of consumption
rather than the good life to be shared in common; ethical
life as commercial success becomes its guide; education as
it becomes technical training for employment in "sunrise
industry" rather than a study of the liberal arts; p lay as
it becomes "leisure" in opposition to "work," something
that should be "spent wisely"; and family and community as
their stability is undermined by the geographical mobility
that is a condition of employment.
Lowi's commitment to mastery also prevents him from
seeing the danger in strengthening the bureaucracy.
Juridical democracy takes steps toward a "perfected"
bureaucracy: one that runs according to the book, with a
minimum of inefficiency, administrative discretion, and
loopholes. The Congressional debates fostered by juridica
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democracy can result in normative standards for a policy
rather than loose and broad sentiments, but the power of
bureaucracy has sources other than discretion to interpret
policy intent. It stems also from its technical expertise,
an expertise difficult to duplicate in Congress people or
citizens participating in "bargaining on the rule." This
technocratic power, says the attuned state, is likely to
increase rather than decrease if we continue to seek
technological mastery of the world.
Lowi criticizes pluralism for its technocratic
conception of the public interest and for eschewing moral
concerns (thus rendering politics incapable of justice),
but his own affirmative position cannot redress these
flaws. A theory of the state concerned about the
antidemocratic implications of technocratic power c ould
seek to reverse the need for increasingly complex
technologies, pursuing "appropriate technology," technology
more easily controlled, understood and afforded by most
citizens while still providing a moderately comfortable
life. But this alternative requires changes -- in the goal
of economic growth, in the distribution of reduced
benefits, in the commitment to the large scale of
industrial organization, in the organization of production,
and in the acceptability of the largely unhindered
accumulation of private wealth and its concomitant social
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stratification. And none of these changes are on Lowi's
agenda.
The last two, however, are on Habermas'. We turn now
to the theory of the consensual state with an eye toward
the way it improves upon Lowi's theory and yet succumbs to
the critique of a Promethean state.
The Consensual State
The central concern of Habermas' theory of the state
is legitimation. There is a gap between the modern
capitalist state's need for justification of its activities
and its ability to tolerate the democratic process
necessary to produce such rationales. This gap is
increasing because the state's implication in economic and
cultural affairs is increasing. The new planned and
official status (replacing a "natural" or traditional
status) of many economic transactions and cultural issues
(e.g., educational curriculum, city development, health,
family, and sex relations) has thematized them, thus
constituting them as conventions in need of justification.
A truly legitimate role for the state in the economy
or in cultural affairs would be just, rejecting policies
that contribute to the unequal distribution of socially
produced wealth. But it is precisely on the basis of this
asymmetrical class compromise that advanced capitalism
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exists. Hence, the capitalist state must try to install
convincing legitimating mechanisms that do not threaten to
expose this basis. The state has three interconnected
strategies for this: It institutes a formally democratic
politics where institutions capable of substantive
judgments are replaced by mechanisms that retain only the
formal contours of legitimating procedures; it justifies
itself on the basis of the material rewards it provides;
(but, because rewards can function as rewards only within a
cultural context that defines them as such), it tries to
foster beliefs and ideologies supportive of capitalism.
The capitalist state is fairly successful in carrying
out the first two strategies. Put this success is rendered
precarious by its failure in the last. The legitimation
deficit, then, stems from the capitalist state's inability
to fulfill the social need for ideas, beliefs, theories
that ex pi a i n and j us t i f y the institutions of the
established order and mot iv ate citizens to endorse those
personal aims compatible with, and those sacrifices
necessary to, the social order that secures a stable
environment for them. The state must also provide *
understandings that convince citizens that there are
opportunities within the established order for a mean i ng f ul
life, one that includes the possibility of "a mimetic
relation with n a t ure ; . . . sol id ar i t y o ut s id e . . . t h e immediate
f am il y ; . . . e x pe r ien c e . . . g iv ing scope to imagination as well
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as spontaneity." There must be available a rationale
that both legitimates the concrete state and provides the
ex istential ly comforting hope that self-realization is
possible within the social order.
Theories of the state that endorse capitalism do so
because of its success in the realm of instrumental,
especially economically-rational, action. Habermas, too,
endorses a masterful state. But he criticizes those like
Lowi who put too much stock in economic success and
overestimate the extent to which capitalism can sustain
motivational beliefs that legitimate its structures and
convincingly portray them as an integral part of a world
conducive to sel f- ful f i 1 lm en t . We turn now to Habermas'
account of the problems the capitalist state has in
securing cultural meaning supportive of itself.
Allegiance to the capitalist state had been secured
previously through two ideologies, "civil privatism" and
"familial-vocational privatism." Civil privatism is an
orientation to politics where the sufficient condition for
a legitimate state is its ability to provide the economic
pre-conditions for occupational achievement and private
accumulation of wealth. Familial-vocational privatism
"consists in a family orientation with developed interests
in consumption and leisure on the one hand, and in a career
orientation suitable to status competition on the other."
Privatism focuses attention toward the efficient
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administration of the state rather than toward the
legitimation of the system as a center of justice and
collective identity.
Allegiance to this privatism depends heavily upon
pre-capitalist or religious traditions. "Capitalist
societies were always dependent on cultural boundary
2 1conditions they could not themselves reproduce."
Privatism's indifferences to the substantive ends of a
social order relies upon a pr e-bo urgeo i s passive obedience
to state authority; its attitude toward economic
achievement and material accumulation relies upon
r el ig io usl y- in c ul c a t ed values of honesty, fairness,
self-discipline, renunciation of immediate gratification,
fatalism, and the saving power of hard work. Habermas
claims that because these supportive traditions now
co-exist within a relativist and scientific age rather than
within the solid worldview of Christianity or even
nineteenth century liberalism, allegiance to them and thus
to the privatism they engender is fading. Capitalism,
then, is losing the cultural and motivational ground
beneath its f eet .
The dysfunctional implications for capitalism that
Habermas draws from the decline of civil and
f am il ial- voc at i o nal privatism seem today too strong.
Developments in the culture of advanced capitalism since
Legitimation Crisis was written allow us to revise
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Habermas' account. Counter to that account, it seems clear
that the educational-occupational system of capitalism is
firmly intact. Whether this is due to a robust civil and
familial-vocational privatism or to resignation to fate
amidst the decline of privatism is less clear, hut I will
argue the latter.
The clamor to participate in the most lucrative of the
available occupational roles seems stronger than ever. Put
while overt participation in the educational-occupational
system continues, the character of this participation lacks
elements conducive to the legitimation of the optimal
capitalist state. We see a high degree of participation,
at least among the American middle classes, but it is a
participation without much al leg iance to the state. We may
be motivated to succeed in existing structures, but we are
also motivated to cut corners, evade standards, resist
directives, and cheat within them.
Individuals are disciplining themselves to fit a
corporate mold and they experience (with varying degrees of
self-consciousness) that sel f- d i sc i pi in e as a reduction of
self, as a burdensome imposition, albeit one necessary to
get along in this world. Tn support of Habermas' claim
about the legitimacy crisis, it does seem that this
self-disciplinary response is itself precarious: Fven as
many participate in the system, they also have doubts about
the meaning fulness of their participation, as the end it is
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supposed to serve (a high-paying, high-status job) is
either unattained, and recognized finally as unattainable
by most, or experienced as unsatisfying by those fortunate
enough to achieve it (or demeaned enough to have
disciplined themselves so thoroughly to achieve it).
To summarize this revision of Habermas' account of
privatism, participants in the occupational-educational
system are faced with a paradoxical situation. On the one
hand, they experience the economic organization of society
as contingent, for they know it to be specific to this
historical time and place. On the other hand, this
contingency, because it is entrenched (in the consumption
possibilities, available occupational roles,
advertisements, etc.) acts upon them, for all practical
purposes, with the force of a necessity or a fate. Members
of the capitalist state respond, then, with the response
appropriate to fate — they grudgingly oblige.
This revision, however, builds upon rather than
refutes Habermas' argument as a whole. Tt fits neatly with
his next move, which is to show how the capitalist state
has attempted to develop new grounds for the motivation it
requires. These substitutes include, on the one hand,
modern religion, science, and utilitarian morality; and on
the other hand, modernist art and the pursuit of
self-conscious norms. All fail, says Habermas, as
functional equivalents to traditional meaning-giving
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frameworks for capitalism. The first set are inherently
inadequate sources of existential comfort and human
fulfillment and the second set, while they do provide a
reasonable interpretation of the world and outlets for
self-expression, cannot legitimate a cap italist state.
Instead, they expose the tension between capitalism and the
good life possible; the meaning they create is mostly
coun ter- cul tur al
.
We turn now to a discussion of these two sets.
Modern religion, science, and utilitarianism all
contain defects which blunt their ability to provide
cultural meaning. Modern religion is so rationalized and
privatized that it can exist only in the realm of
subjective belief. It becomes an ephemeral Deism where God
is so removed from ordinary experience that he can no
longer provide a reason for being or grounds for action.
(Habemas is silent about the rise of fundamentalism
religions which do not appear to have these defects.)
Modern science, as an even further secularized substitute
for religion, aspires to inspire allegiance comparable to
the commitment of a leap of robust faith, but
unintentionally undermines itself along with its object
(religion) in its attack on all dogma as mystification.
Utilitarianism was unable to insinuate itself as the modern
foundation for ethics, for it was shown to conflict with a
respect for persons.
1 87
Modern art is available as raw material for the
production of capitalist meaning when it is deployed as
commercialized mass art. But, says Habermas
, modern art as
modernistic art has also shown an ability to transcend this
deployment and function as a subversive avant garde.
Representational (pre-modern) art portrayed the beautiful
aspects of the social world in which it was embedded; the
representational art of liberal capitalism said that beauty
was the constant if often invisible companion (even the
promise within) bourgeois society. Put non-represent-
ational modern art jars with the conventional vision of the
beautiful and presents itself as something produced rather
than as the mirror of a beautiful nature. This art thereby
...expresses not the promise but the irretriev-
able sacrifice of bourgeois rationalization... it
strengthens the divergence between the values
offered by the socio-cultural system and those ^
demanded by the political and economic systems."
The aesthetic meaning of modern art is that bourgeois
society spawns a poverty of meaning.
The most important of the attempts by the capitalist
state to legitimate itself is the administrative productior
of norms. Insofar as capitalist state is a modern state
with democratic and rational pretensions, it contains in
principle a commitment to self-government through
rat iona] ly-agreed-upon norms. The capitalist state views
the demise of traditional sources of meaning as an
opportunity to produce new norms that justify the state,
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but Habermas argues that this attempt fails because
meaningful norms cannot be "produced" administratively but
must flow, in the modern age, from truly rational and
freely internalized discourse.
In pre-modern times, meaningful norms were the
province of the state, but that was because the state was
itself grounded in tradition. Such unreflective tradition
was the source of legitimacy for the state at the same time
that it gave metaphysical meaning to life. The state and
tradition conjoined; there was an integral link between the
"instrumental functions of administration" and the "expres-
sive symbols that release an unspecified readiness to
23follow." This holistic integration is precluded for
advanced capitalism (and all its contemporaries), for the
Enlightenment (1 ) undermined the notion of a harmonious
world and de-legitimized as superstition all less than
precisely differentiated unities, and (2) inaugurated
modernity as the age of self-consciousness.
This historical advance in sel f- consc iousness
,
however, makes possihle both a democratic state legitimated
through rational discourse (Habermas' ideal) and a state
where allegiance can be induced through official
manipulation of belief systems (capitalism). Advanced
capitalism pursues the latter more than the former, or,
rather, attempts at the former are ultimately compromised
by economic imperatives which demand the latter.
1 89
Cultural meaning cannot be produced administratively,
says Habermas. A legitimating norm must "guarantee the
continuity of a history through which individuals and
groups can identify with themselves and with one another,"
but as soon as a norm is "objectively prepared and
2 4strategically employed," it loses this ability. Two
examples illustrate the point. First, attempts to foster
the norm "patriotism" through paid political advertisements
cannot replace feelings based upon rootedness in the life
of a community. They are seen instead for what they are:
a manipulation of emotions that renders the emotions evoked
empty. Second, the corporate slogan that without chemicals
25life itself itself would be impossible intends to convey
the normative message that there exists a coincidence of
corporate actions (the production of plastics, drugs, etc.)
and the common good (life itself). Put this slogan reaps
cynical attitudes and heightens awareness of a particular
will seeking to parade itself as the public interest.
Habermas' account of the impossibility of
manufacturing "cultural meaning" as a commodity puts in a
political context the critique discussed (Chapters IT and
III) of utility and the conventionalization of the self:
When a symbolic or expressive entity, e.g., allegiance to
the state, is treated as artifice, its potential as an
instrument of coercion is accentuated and its status as a
mean ing- in fused norm is jeopardized.
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Although the administrative production of meaning
fails, no n- tr ad i t ion al cultural meaning is possible, says
Habermas. Successful m ean ing- giv ing norms must, in
modernity, meet two conditions:
First, they must speak to existential fears and
doubts. Habermas' sensitivity to the human need for
consolation, for "interpretations that overcome contin-
gency," for a comforting and comfortable relation with
nature, and for "intuitive access to relations of
2 6
sol id ar i t y . . .b et we en individuals" displays an
understanding of the attractions of holism. He is far,
however, from espousing a reformulation of Faith. A return
to Faith, while rectifying the strain the modern state puts
on cultural meaning, would do so through appeal to elements
in tradition or religion that have to remain mysterious,
incomplete, and partially un t h em a t i z ed
.
And this will not do, for the second condition modern
norms must meet is that they be self-conscious, explicitly
endorsed, rationally understood. Tt is obvious why these
norms, capable of generating cultural meaning, are
dysfunctional for capitalism -- they would subject to
political debate the inherent economic injustices of
c api tal ism .
Democratic norms in a self-conscious world (and,
Habermas contends, there can be no reduction in the level
of self-consciousness in modernity without repression) must
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express the general izable interests of the public, the
common good. These interests can be ascertained only
discursively, that is, through a democratic discussion that
identifies and interprets social needs and comes to a
rational consensus about the norms necessary to fulfill and
regulate those needs. "Discourse" for Habermas does not
refer to every and any form of communication; it is the
form whose exclusive concern is to determine the validity
of certain assertions and whose participants have agreed
that only the force of the better argument should prevail.
Jn discourse "all motives except that of the cooperative
27search for truth are excluded."
Because in every existing advanced capitalist state
the conditions necessary for the emergence of a rational
consensus are absent or distorted, the first step toward a
legitimate, meaningful society must be a negative critique.
Such a critique must be based upon a c o un ter fac t ua
1
hypothesis, a projection about which norms everyone
affected would agree to without constraint if they were to
enter into discourse. The key move in Habermas' argument
here is that norms formed under these conditions would be
rat ional and not simply those currently acceptable. The
requisite rationality is provided by the discursive method
-- it is inherent in the structure of undistorted human
communication. In other words, the possibility of the
1 9?
rationality of norms issues from the structure of language
itsel f
.
[T]he expectation of discursive redemption of
normative-validity claims is already contained in
the structure of i n ter sub j ec ti v i t y . . . Tn taking up
a practical discourse, we unavoidably suppose an
ideal speech situation that, on the strength of
its formal properties, allows consensus only
through g eneral i z ab
]
e interests.
In short, the justifiability and therefore the "truth"
of norms is dependent upon their general i zab il ity
,
i.e.,
their ability to fulfill commonly accepted needs. The
possibility of any such un i v er sa 1 i s t i c needs across such a
diverse group as "humans" is always already guaranteed by
the structure of communication. Tn order to be able to
communicate, humans must share an interest in coming to
rational agreement.
Habermas' theory of the state acknowledges the need
for citizens to identify with the norms that govern them.
It aims to close the gap between individual will and social
order — in Habermas' terms to reconcile the tension
between private morality and public law. The reconcil-
iation is a consensual one: The products of public
discourse are to be internalized as the subjective will of
individuals. Habermas' theory also acknowledges that norms
are conventional, but rationally-grounded conventions.
Di sc ur s iv el y- fo rm ed norms are conventional in the sense
that they are conscious human artifacts (in opposition to
Faith) but not in the sense of arbitrary, for they are
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grounded in the rationality of undistorted communication
(in opposition to relativism). Such norms are meaningful
and form the basis of a legitimate state precisely because
they are n o n- ar b i t r ar y conventions. Just as Enlightenment
reason was believed to limit the overextension of utility,
Habermas believes that discursive rationality will limit
the overextension of convention.
The Habermasian concepts of rationality, truth,
g en er al i zabl e interests, discourse, i n t er n al i zabl e norms
and legitimacy are each an integral part of the meaning of
the others. Through an understanding of these terms we
uncover Habermas' ideal: the consensual state. Put there
is an important element within this ideal yet to be brought
out: The consensual state able to fulfill the coordination
imperatives of a masterful state must have an instrumental
view of nature. Habermas' defense of an instrumental view
of nature is best explained through reference to his theory
of the self and of knowledge. T turn now to this theory of
cognitive interests, paying particular attention to the
character of the technical interest.
? o
In Kn o wl ed g e_a nd _Hu_m an__In t e rest s, Habermas argues
first, that any philosophy of nature that omits the element
of human domination is both epi stemol og ic al 1 y and ethically
untenable unless it takes refuge in a re-enchanted
ontology, and second, that non-instrumental views of nature
deny the politics of technology.
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The theory of cognitive interests — the argument that
there is a fundamental link between knowledge and human
interests — arose in opposition to a view of knowledge as
the objective description of the universe in its law-like
order. Modern science, including social science, readily
falls prey to this objectivist illusion
...that naively correlates theoretical
propositions with matters of fact. This attitude
presumes that the relations between empirical
variables represented in theoretical propositions
are s el f- ex i s t en t . At the same time, it
suppresses the transcendental framework that is
Knowledge can never be objective description but is
always mediated through a pr e-und er stand ing derived from
the knower's initial situation, says Habermas. The subject
participates in the construction of the objective world.
What makes knowledge possible at all (the "transcendental
framework") are the cognitive interests or the specific
viewpoints from which we apprehend reality. Human
interests
...bridge the gap between the pr e- sc i e n t i f i c form
of life, science and the application of
scientific knowledge. "Human interests" are, in
the literal sense of the wor^ the " i n t e r- e s se ,
"
i.e. the "being-in-between
Cognitive interests stem from the fundamental conditions of
human life on earth — labor, interaction and power — and
correspond to the techn ic al , practical and emancipatory
the precondition of t
of such propositions.
of the validity
interests .
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First, the practical interest
. Pecause all action
presupposes a social and historical context, we have an
interest "in the preservation and expansion of the
intersubj ect iv ity of possible action-orienting mutual
32
understanding." Pecause human action implies interaction
or coming to terms with other actors, we have an interest
in attaining consensus, an interest in communication. This
practical interest is rooted in an imperative of
sociocultural life: "the survival of societal individuals
is linked to the existence of a reliable intersubj ectiv it
y
of understanding in ordinary language communication."
Although Habermas rejects Ge i st , he adopts the
Hegelian point that the knowing subject must be
comprehended in its historical development. The modern
subject is the outcome of the self-formative processes of
both the species and the individual. Through the
historical development of an e v er- d ee pe n i ng self-
consciousness, the modern subject is the author of both
himself and his deeds in a way that could never be for the
self of Robust Faith. The modern self is an essentially
communicative self. Habermas has a
...firm commitment to the view. ..that people are
the sole judges of their own interests, which are
formed and discovered through dialogue on the
part of all concerned -- a political commitment
to opening up public, democratic processes..^
described as "the conversation of citizens.""
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The emancip ator y interest is less intuitively
available. It is based upon his theory of communication
that attempts to show that subjects already have, through
language use, an idea of rational or non-distorted
communication. We rely on this implicit understanding when
we make a distinction, upon reflection, between oppressive
and rational social institutions. Our ability to make this
distinction expresses our interest in rational emancipation
from oppressive social structures. Another expression of
the emancipatory power of self-reflection is in psycho-
analysis where a patient, through talking therapy, is freed
from internal repression. Because we have the capacity for
sel f- r e f 1 ec tio n and language, we have an interest in
autonomy and responsibility that can free us from
ideological and psychological illusions. This emancipatory
interest, however, can find its ultimate realization only
in a social setting itself free from institutions of
domination .
The technical interest: The essence of technology for
Habermas is domination, for the imperative of human
survival requires a defensive stance toward that which
poses a threat to it. "External nature" (natural forces,
plants and non-human animals) is a source of danger.
Eecause humans must work on the physical environment in
order to eat and reproduce, there is a built-in antagonism
between humans and external nature and humans relate, in
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part, to nature from the viewpoint of prediction and
technical control. The history of technology, then, is the
history of the process whereby humans have devised means to
lighten the burden of work and to improve the yield from
nature
.
The technical interest is also a precondition for
human freedom. The technical interest is part of the
sel f- fo rm ati v e process and therefore contributes to
political liberation. It involves more than the mere
adaptation of an organism to its environment.
If we reflect on the process of s el f- f o rm a t ion
,
then instrumental reason, which leads to mastery
over nature, and the practical reason of inter-
subjective commun ication
. .
.reveal themselves as
integral parts of our interest in freeing
ourselves from the arbitrary forces of nature and
the power structures ^at inhibit our capacity to
understand ourselves.
In response to the holist claim that the technical
interest should be subordinated to our interest in
preserving, fostering and releasing the potentialities of
nature, Habermas replies:
Te c hn o 1 og y . . . c an only be traced back to a
"project" of the human species a s _a _wh ol_e , and
not to one that could be historically surpassed
...It is impossible to envision how, as long as
the organization of human nature does not change
and as long therefore as we have to achieve self-
preservation through social labor and with the
aid of means that substitute for work, we could
renounce technology, more particularly our
technology, in favor of a qualitatively different
one."
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Habermas further defends his instrumental view of nature by
(1) a defense of the distinctions between subjective
nature, objective nature, and n a t ur e- i n- i t s el f , and (2) a
defense of the distinction between work and interaction.
Habermas makes the first set of distinctions in order
to avoid both the extreme objectivist position, whereby
nature is a t h i n g- i n- i t s el f and the ground of subjectivity;
and the extreme relativist view, whereby nature is wholly a
constituted object. Habermas forges his position by
modifying these two stances. On the one hand, nature is
...an object ification of the knowing subject; it
is constituted subject to the general conditions
of purposive-rational action. ..as well as to the
specific conditions of historically variable
systems of social labor.
On the other hand, the self as subejct emerges only through
natural history and the process of biological evolution.
In some sense, nature is thereby the ground of
subjectivity. To try to clarify this apparently
contradictory position, Habermas differentiates between
subjective nature, objective nature, and nature-in-
i t se 1 f .
Subjective nature is what is generally called "human
nature." People have a subjective nature because they are
embodied, have senses, reflexes and instincts and must
engage in social labor. Ob j_ec t_^v e_n a tur_e is the earth, the
physical environment, but only insofar as it. exists as a
complex of constituted objects, objects ready and available
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for use. But, objective nature does not exhaust all that
nature is. Evidence of the externality of nature that
remains is the world's resistance to false scientific
interpretations of it. What we can know of this
n atur e- in- itsel f is very little, but the glimpses we get of
it are enough to justify a positing of its existence.
Natur e-in-itsel f does not refer to unknowable but
causally effective t h i ng s- i n- t h em s e 1 v es ; it
refers instead to that moment of knowable nature
designated by the terms indepe ndence
, 0 p
exter nal ity , f acticit y , and the like.
Na t ur e- i n- i t s el f for Habermas is a transcendental
abstraction, a requisite of
Although we must presuppose
ourselves have access to it
any knowledge of nature,
this n a t ur e- i n- i t s el f , we
(and experience its
"resistance") onl y in terms o f its instrumentality
.
We do reckon with the existence of a reality that
is independent of men who can act i n s tr urn en t a 1 1
y
and arrive at a consensus about statements. Eut
what the predication of properties catches "of"
this reality is constituted o nl
y
in the ?
0
perspective of possible technical control."
Holists charge that Habermas introduces the concept of
natur e-in-itsel f only to strip it of any significant
meaning by establishing the technical interest as the one
and only power of disclosing nature. Habermas describes
the criticism: "My specifications of instrumental and
communicative rationality are drawn too narrowly to permit
an adequate distinction
for us and nature as an
between external nature as a means
end-in-itself ." U ° Habermas then
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admits to this and other criticisms: His distinctions
between subjective nature, objective nature, and
natur e-in-itsel f have not sufficiently clarified the
relation between reason and nature, for it is difficult to
see how a n a t ur e- i n- i t s el f that is an "abstraction" can
also be a natural process that grounds the subjectivity of
the natural being man; he has not provided a good account
of how one might relate from a n o n- ob j ec t i v i st perspective
to a "thick" notion of natur e-in-itself. However, Habermas
goes on to argue that these problems do not stem from any
particular weakness in the theory of cognitive interests
but are the results of the limitations inherent in human
knowledge per se . Habermas attempts an epistemological
defense of an instrumental view of nature. Furthermore,
the view that nature is kno wabl e only from the viewpoint of
possible technical control is the only position compatible
with a disenchanted view of nature.
The epistemological defense of technical interest of
nature asserts that although we can have moral-aesthetic
experiences of nature as a non-ob j ec ti v ated environment,
these rapturous experiences must take the form of art,
transcendental meditation or un ar t i c ul a ted stirrings within
the so ul . In short ,
...the phenomena that are exemplary for a moral-
practical, "fraternal," relation to nature are
most unclear, if one does not want to have
recourse here. ..to mystically inspired
philosophies of nature.
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Any theoretically fruitful theory of knowledge cannot base
itself on these non-rational stirrings. Habermas refuses
to underplay the extraordinary success of modern science in
explaining the natural world and is not now about to
abandon its model in the study of the relation between
reason and nature. (The participants in the relation are
reason and nature for Habermas, not, say, the embodied self
and the earth. Humans are so defined by their rational
subjectivity that reason can take their place.) The only
theoretical alternative to a re-enchanted philosophy of
nature is Habermas': The relation between reason and
nature must be conceived instrumental ly and nature can have
only a moment of i n- i t s el fne ss .
If at the level of a theory of knowledge only an
objectifying view of nature is possible, can an
environmental ethic be had where n atur e- in- itsel f emerges?
Habermas says no and argues that any ethic must consider
only inter- personal relations, i.p., must be a "discourse
ethic." Intuitively, the attempt to open up a moral access
to natur e- in- it sel f is not absurd, "but we should not
permit ourselves to be cajoled by these intuitions into
ignoring the difficulties that we encounter [in the
U 2
attempt]." There are two fundamental difficulties with a
holistic ethic:
First, basic ethical concepts like justice, equality
and freedom rely on a type of relation that can arise only
?r>2
between human subjects engaged in discourse and this "in
principle egalitarian relation of reciprocity
.. .cannot be
carried over into the relation between humans and nature in
any strict sense."" 3 Participants in ethical relations
must by definition have the capacity for autonomy and
responsibility. Na t ur e- in- j t se 1 f may have elements of the
former but certainly not the latter.
Second, a no n- an thro poc en tr ic ethic cannot mediate
between the human need to draw sustenance from nature and
the obligation to respect it in itself. How is it
possible, for example, to have sympathetic solidarity with
plants that one must eat?
In sum, the distinction between subjective nature,
objective nature and nature-in-itself allows Habermas to
show how a n o n- i n s t r urn en t a 1 view of nature cannot be
"adequately grounded today without recourse to the
substantial reason of religion or metaphysical world
views." The attempt to retrieve the lost unity of
reason, and to abolish thereby the distinction between the
technical, practical and emancipatory interests, cannot
succeed. The best his anti-Promethean critics can offer is
a nostalgic appeal to a distant pastoral scene.
The second key distinction in his defence of an
instrumental view of nature, the distinction between work
and interaction, is made in response to the charge that the
domination of nature fosters the domination of humans.
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This distinction also allows Habermas to discuss the
legitimating function of modern technology.
Wo_rk is the sphere of instrumental, purposive-rational
action, governed by technical rules, based on empirical
knowledge. J_n tej^ac_tjLo_n is the sphere of communicative,
institution-maintaining action, governed by consensual
norms, based in ordinary language. because domination is
ineliminable in the relation between reason and nature or
at the level of work, Habermas can focus on interaction
where a reduction in domination is possible. Indeed, the
domination present in interaction is due to the
illegitimate extension of the technical interest. Instead
of denying the necessity of instrumentality, Habermas tries
to explain how the distinction between work and interaction
has become blurred in modernity. Habermas sees himself as
furthering the "rationalization" of interaction.
Rationalization of work involves growth of productive
forces and the extension of the power of technical control,
but rationalization of interaction involves emancipation
and extension of communication free from domination.
A full discussion of Habermas' argument for these
claims refers back to the whole of his theory of
legitimation. We will mention now only one of his more
important conclusions.
The technical interest has crowded the practical and
emancipatory ones because it has taken on a new,
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legitimating function for the advanced capitalist state.
Whereas in traditional societies technically exploitable
knowledge did not threaten the authority of cultural or
religious traditions that legitimated political power, in
advanced capitalist states technology and science are
themselves called upon to legitimate a state whose main
role has become the guarantor of efficient production.
Although the forces of production once (in early liberal
capitalism) functioned to spur changes in outmoded forms of
social institutions technology now serves more as an
ideological justification of the state than as a critique
of state ideologies. The legitimation of technocracy by
technology d e- pol i t ic i ze s a process that ought to be, in a
democratic state, the province of communicative or
normative action.
H ab e rmas
,
Lo wi_j an d th e Fnlightenment Inheritance
Although Lowi shares with Habermas an instrumental
view of nature, it is clear that Habermas' consensual ideal
is a critique of Lowi's theory of the state: Lowi's
espousal of n eo-1 a i s se z- f a i r e misconstrues the economic
imperatives of advanced capitalism; Lowi does not delve
deeply enough into the issue of legitimacy, which he
misidentifies as a matter of defective administration,
rather than a problem of cultural meaning or the
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illegitimate extension of the technical interest into the
realm of communicative action.
Both Lowi and Habermas "thematize" the discord between
the democratic rhetoric of modern Western states and their
actual practices. For Lowi this takes the form of an
expose of corporate influence on public policy, an
influence that procedural democracy can bring to light and
reform; for Habermas it takes the form of a complex
critique of capitalism as a system. The basic problem
facing the modern state, for Lowi, is the distance between
bureaucratic power and a (severely limited) version of
"discursive will-formation" called "bargaining on the
rule." This distance exposes the tension between a high
degree of administrative discretion and a commitment to
representative democracy. Habermas sees the basic problem
as the distance between the ability of the capitalist state
to provide economic wealth (for some) and its ability to
legitimate itself. This distance exposes the capitalist
tension between the need to have legitimacy and the
imperative to obscure an unjust class compromise. For
Habermas, administrative discretion is not the p_ro bl em that
a capitalist state must overcome; it is the solution to its
need to distract attention from the question of legitimacy
and economic justice. Lowi's "solution" -- juridical
democracy with a n eo-1 a i s sez- f a ir e economy -- participates
in this cov er-u p .
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kg.g±LinLgtio!l Crisis is an account of how the state, as
a modern state, must actively seek to extend the reach of
public policy; while the state, as a ca pitalist state, can
fulfill its coordination tasks only at the expense of
cultural meaning. Tt shows how the capitalist state
requires more legitimacy than it can muster and then goes
on to claim that the missing legitimacy c ould be supplied
(through consensual norms) with no sacrifice of
coordinating power, that is, with no reduction in the areas
of life requiring public organization and control. Like
Lowi, Habermas does not thematize the need to relax the
drive for social coordination and economic mastery.
The extension of public policy is a requirement of an y
viable modern state with a self-conscious citizenry, says
Habermas. As the h om og en i za t i o n of consumer goods, the
increased sophistication of communication systems, and
population growth make the world smaller and more
interdependent, new responsibilities arise for the state,
i.e., the coordination of food supplies, distribution of
education and training, and the prevention of nuclear war.
Moreover, the modern state can rely only tenuously on the
organizational powers of religion, myth or tradition.
Habermas believes it imperative that equally powerful
substitutes be found. Whereas the capitalist state
substitutes technocratic and commercially-controlled policy
for these decayed forces, the Habermasian state would
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substitute consensual, rational and internalized norms.
Like Lowi, Habermas believes that a state capable of
extensive planning is a positive good; it enables freedom,
where freedom is the ability to exercise self-assertion in
a world ordered (individually or collectively) by humans.
"Standard" critiques of Habermas take this view of
freedom for granted, focusing on the difficulties he has in
bringing his quest for a legitimate state in tune with his
theory of communication. The ideal speech situation (or
some variant thereof) is the ground of the possibility of
the rational consensual state -- but if the qua si- tr an so en-
dental argument should falter, they say, Habermas' state
would lose its prospective ability to spawn cultural
meaning, and it would thereby lose the ability to ensure
its own legitimacy.
Critics skeptical about the success of the quasi-
transcendental argument ask not whether the extensive
coordination imperatives of the modern state could be
relaxed, but rather whether a general will or a set of
consensual norms can be identified with the reach and power
necessary to the extensive coordination imperatives of the
modern state. Tn order to differentiate these two
different questions, I will give a brief account of the
standard sort of critique of Habermas and then turn to a
critique wary of the equation between freedom and mastery.
According to an early version of the standard
critique, the key flaw in the consensual state was its
inability to distinguish between norms that express
general izable interests and those that express exclusive
interests. Desiring a democratic state, yet fearful of a
consensual fascist one, these critics wondered about the
relativism within Habermas' theory. Does not the viability
of norms depend upon an essentially arbitrary "decision
whether or not to let one's actions be guided only by
maxims" in tune with the common good?
Habermas' response to this was to move to the meta-
theoretical level in order to find a rational grounding for
norms; his answer is the consensus theory of truth. This
theory then becomes the new focus of attack: Tt
"understates the extent to which our limited resources of
reason and evidence unavoidably generate a plurality of
reasonable answers to perplexing practical questions."
Habermas' met a t heo r e t i c al work, according to this critique,
encompasses a notion of rationality that is subtle and
complex, acknowledging, especially when pressed by
h e rm ene ut ic i st s , reason's inevitable blind spots. But he
does not seem to recognize the implications of this
essentially limited reason for a politics of discursive
4 7
wi 1 1- fo rm a t ion .
Habermas, in defense of his notion of rationality,
responds with two claims: (1) rational consensus is an
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ever elusive, perpetually postponed achievement, a guiding
ideal, and (2) the ideal speech situation functions only as
proof of the theoretical possibility of consensus. But
these claims still leave his theory open to the charge of
repressive utopianism — Utopian in that it is an ideal
unattainable in principle, repressive in that the attempt
to attain it fosters a coercive consensus. Yes, the
ideal speech situation is the exception rather than the
rule; granted, "negotiated. . .agreements based on the
inters ubjective necessity of criticisable validity-claims
49
are diffuse, f 1 ee t i ng . . . a nd fragile"; agreed, "not all
interactions fall into the category of action orientated to
50
reaching understanding" — but more serious indeed is the
fact that Habermas' own qualification of the scope and
function of "communicative action" reacts disruptively on
the theory of the state which provided the initial need for
a theory of communicative action. The state is not merely
a symbolic locus of i n t er s ub j ec t i v i t y ; as Habermas well
knows, it is a powerful ac tor in the world.
An anti-Promethean perspective on the state exempts
itself from these debates about the ideal speech situation
or the significance of Habermas' move to the metatheor-
tical level. Regardless of whether a consensual, rational
discourse is possible, it asks whether it is in itself
desirable. It focuses upon the ways in which the very
e
que st for rational consensus is destructive, with how it
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excludes or distorts aspects of life that cannot be
expressed within the standards of rational discourse.
This non-standard critique begins by recalling a
defect in Enlightenment: The faith in the autonomic
ability of reason to limit the overextension of utility was
shown to be unwarranted as the world and the self became
increasingly subject to the standards of instrumental
rationality. This faith, however, still finds expression
in Habermas' assumption that a fully normative and
normalized social order would be a free society.
Habermas' theory of the state, by focusing upon a
critique of c api tal ism , is designed to distance itself from
liberal theories such as Lowi's, but at a level deeper than
the economic organization of the state it shares much with
Lowi's. In the most general terms, they share a great
esteem for human subjects around whom the world must be
made to fit. Reason is the primary tool for this tailoring
job: Reason applied to will and impulse must discipline
inner nature or the instinctual, chaotic self; reason
transformed into social science and public policy must
forge a social order; reason as physical science and
technology must subdue outer nature or the non-human
environment; reason applied to collective will must deploy
these rationalized materials in pursuit of the common good.
Reason, freedom and mastery thus become terms which
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engender and sustain each other in the underlying system of
thought guiding each theory.
Habermas' theory of the state has helped to expose the
oppressive potentialities within Lowi's state: Lowi's
restriction of the state to administrative and procedural
functions made it too weak to realize the public interest
it promised and neo- 1 ai sse z-f a ir e would allow the corporate
structure to set the moral and political agenda for the
nation. Lowi's attempt to strengthen the 1 eg al powers at
the state's disposal, in the absence of a critique of
capitalist production, serves only to highlight, and
publicize the social need (for the sake of the stability of
the order) to organize life around the imperatives of
corporate capitalism and to specify in detail the punitive
measures necessary to fulfill this need. Unlike Lowi's cry
for the public them ati za tio n of issues, Habermas'
discursive w i 1 1- fo rm a t io n need not have the effect of
legitimating corporate imperatives,' for the corporate
system is itself called into question.
Habermas frees the state from the domination of
economistic priorities, but he offers a state so strong and
so implicated in social life that it has oppressive
potentialities of its own. The discursive state,
encouraged to be active and powerful for the sake of
fulfilling its role as the locus of collective freedom,
also courts authoritarianism. Lowi's commitment to human
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mastery took the form of an obsession with a predictable,
precise, and legalized social order that left only trivial
economic choices relatively unregulated; Habermas'
commitment to mastery takes the form of the relentless
pursuit of the rational norm-governed state that leaves
even fewer areas of life untouched — one is hard pressed
to find areas protected from discursive themati zation
.
Habermas' ideal state threatens to colonize every refuge of
cultural protest against the increasing rationalization of
1 i fe
.
Habermas is not unaware of this danger. H e
anticipates the criticism that when thematized norms cover
an extensive slice of life, unorthodox ideas are imperiled
by the social tendency to accept "the interpretation of
needs.
.
.current at any given contingent stage of
5 1socialization." Habermas addresses this danger through a
distinction between norm and principle (a metanorm from
which norms can be generated)
.
In t ern al i za t ion . . . wo uld only be complete when the
principle of the justification of possible
principles (that is, the readiness to engage in
discursive clarification of practical questions)
was alone internalized, but in other respects the
continuous interpretation o^2 neec)s wa s given over
to communication processes.
The Habermasian state must aim at an unquestioning
commitment to the pr i n c i pi
e
of rational discussion, a
principle that precludes an unquestioning acceptance of any
particular norm . Participants endorse the principle of
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rational discourse but their views as to the particular
content of a norm must be decided only as the outcome of
the communication process. Norms are conventions rightly
subjected to constant r e- ev al ua t i o n on the basis of the
commitment to the principle of rational discourse. This is
to prevent the internalization of norms to such an extent
that cultural change or critical thought is precluded.
Still, claims the anti-Promethean critique, according
to Habermas' theory, critical thought and cultural change
are judged entirely by a standard of what norms are
rational in a highly integrated and coordinated society.
There is little attentiveness to the limits of rational
mastery. From an anti-Promethean perspective, the rational
mastery of social life is Sisyphean, not Herculean. Blind
to its futility, however, the Habermasian social project
seriously endangers cultural protest. Natural holism, in
Chapter III, has already shown how the Habermasian
conception of nature is destructive of the natural
foundation of human existence.
The discussions of the ideal states of Lowi and
Habermas and of their flaws have prepared us for an account
of the position we have been calling ant i -Promethean
:
Charles Taylor's theory of the attuned state.
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The Attuned State
In the conclusion to his book on Hegel, Taylor asks
how Hegel's thought has remained important while the
Hegelian ontology is quite abandoned. Taylor's answer is,
in essence, that Hegel's identification of the basic
structure of modern thought was correct even if his
philosophy could not transcend it. It is fitting, then,
that the last theorist of the state to be considered here
is Taylor, for he explicitly understands his thought to be
confined /defined by terms that are a development of those
portrayed by Hegel as Faith and Enlightenment. And if we
draw out Taylor's theory of the state, we see that it too
has a Hegelian ring: The subject of the Phen om e nol og y who
comes to recognize Ge i st , the spirit of reason in history,
becomes Taylor's embodied self properly attuned to its
world. Taylor brings Hegel into the modern age.
According to Taylor, there are two conflicting strands
of modern thought. The first strand responds to the
disenchantment of nature with a faith in the ability of
technical control to re-secure and master the world. We
have already spoken of this strand in terms of the
Promethean urge. The other strand Taylor calls
ex pressivi st . It too faces disenchantment but is critical
of the Promethean ideal where "all our acts, objects,
institutions have a use, but none expresses what men
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53could be." The voice of expressivism today is protest.
Unable to present itself as the voice of an authentic but
violated nature, it can only object to the predictable,
homogenized, rationally administered civilization a
masterful orientation seeks to install. Expressivism
protests in the name, then, of a violated, repressed and
in s tr urn en t al i zed self.
[I]f the historical experience of objectifying
and transforming nature. ..is too powerful for it
to survive as an interlocutor; then the
expressivist current of oppositio^to modern
civilization has to focus on man.
But the "focus on man" carries with it the danger that
expressivism will become what it protests against — a
masterful orientation (limited only by human wil]) where
the sole standards of judgment are rationality and utility.
Taylor attempts to ground his theory of the state in an
expressivism where creative and political self-expression
requires attunement with (not submersion in or mastery of)
the wo r 1 d
.
I will consider the following dimensions of Taylor's
a r g urn en t :
(1) The Ste ad y St a te t an account of the political
economy Taylor endorses;
(2) P rome the an s ocialism, Taylor's critique of a
humanist Marxist theory of the state that protests
against utilitarianism but nevertheless believes
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an authentic human life requires mastery of
nor- hum an nature;
(3) Atjtun_ed Fx pr e s s i v i sm
, an articulation of Taylor's
non-Promethean expressivism through an examination
of his conceptions of freedom, ethics, language
and natural science.
I end Chapter IV with the identification of some flaws
in Taylor's version of expressivism and their implications
for the ideal of the attuned state. This is analogous to
the critique of natural holism that concluded Chapter TIT.
T he Stead y State
Tn "The Politics of the Steady State" Taylor rejects
the pursuit of economic growth and rejects the vision of
the good life that requires "an ev er- inc reasing command
over goods and services and an ev er- i ncr ea si ng capacity to
5 5
control nature for individual ends."" Instead, the steady
state pursues an economy built around recycling technol-
ogies and moderate consumption levels, where the normal
pattern of consumption is accessible to the least affluent.
While there can be minor deviations from the norm, the
possessions a normal, decent life requires would be
universally distributed. This universal consumption
standard need not be a colorless world of utility goods,
for once we have abandoned the equation of consumption with
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happiness, it should be possible "for people to elaborate
new and original ways of living in balance with nature"
and to express their creativity in ways other than the
multiplication and variation of consumer items.
A universal consumption standard contrasts sharply to
the orientation to consumption fostered within an economy
of growth. The logic there is "more is better, freer,
easier, happier." But in order to evaluate whether one is
getting "more," one compares not only what one has now to
what one had last year, but also what one has relative to
others. Once a society has provided for the essential
material needs of its citizens, which the advanced
industrial nations for the most part have, the pursuit of
fur ther economic growth, because of the pressures to
maintain the existing structures of employment, corporate
power and international relations, places a higher and
higher premium on excl usive goods -- goods that are valued
precisely because very few others have them, goods whose
enjoyability decrease as they are made more widely
available. The private automobile is an example of an
exclusive good (its sp^ed, efficiency and convenience
decrease as traffic increases').
The relative deprivation factor in the assessment of
one's achievement of the good life as socially defined
helps to explain why individual economic advance in an
economy of growth is experienced as disappointing even as
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it remains a compelling goal. If one doubles one's
consumption level while others already ahead on the income
ladder do likewise, the increase in freedom or happiness
will be less than anticipated: "The ev er- inc reasing
expectations of consumers outrun the rise in production
with relative ease, and there is probably more resentment
c 7today. ..than there was a few years ago." An economy of
growth makes the good life ever-elusive except for those at
the very top of the consumption hierarchy. Although this
relative deprivation factor is operative in all societies,
a society in pursuit of exponential growth, by defining the
good life so heavily in terms of consumption, exacerbates
its socially divisive effect.
Many of the flaws in the existing state that the
steady state is designed to redress — the power of large
corporations, the priority of exclusive goods, the
reduction of political freedom to the choice among material
objects or political candidates for consumption -- are also
identified as flaws from within a collectivist perspective.
For both the steady-statist and the collectivist, the way
to displace these orientations and institutions is through
collective effort; so Taylor shares some of Habermas' faith
in the ability of self-conscious human agency to foster
needed social change.
The universal consumption standard, for example, would
require conscious public control of economic production;
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those consumption items necessary to a decent life and
within the limits of environmental toleration would be
established politically and then enforced through a
systematic policy of rationing and subsidies.
The goods of the standard would available to
everyone's budget, but. ..the goods and services
outside this range, being relatively starved of
resources and ^subsidized, would be much more
highly pr ic ed .
The problem that arises for Taylor at this point is that a
state strong enough to shape the modern economy is also a
state susceptible to the authoritarian abuse of political
power, especially as it finds expression in the
over-regul ation of its populace or the subjection of more
and more areas of life to bureaucratic regulation. The
paradox of political freedom rears its ugly head again.
Acknowledging that conscious coordination of the
economy is a form of power, Taylor attempts to diffuse the
danger of authoritarianism by making that coordination a
function of deeply felt n o rm s rather than officially
imposed regulations. All norms are connected to the
identity of citizens; steady-state norms must be tied to an
understanding of c i t i ze n- id en t i t y that acknowledges the
self as essentially situated in a cultural context that
enables it and_ gives it bounds. This self can live in
harmony with its world if it respects these boundary
conditions. To have such an identity would entail the
recognition that the enforcers of social boundaries, i.e.,
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norms, are a reflection of and consonant with the limits
inherent to an embodied, finite, historical being.
Allegiance to norms in the ideal steady-state is not
because they are the product of a reflective, rational,
collective will (as in Habermas) , but because they are
a ttuned to the limits imposed on the self by its very
being. The human ability to adhere to norms (or
regulations) finds its limit in the requirement of a
cohesive, wholesome identity. Such an identity accounts
for jalJL parts of the self: The will-full, intentional,
mastering self that imposes its own useful regulations upon
the social world j3n_d_ the embodied, c on tex t- bound
,
historical self that i^s only through its life-world,
limited by it in ways never fully susceptible to explicit
ar tic ul atio n .
Although a political economy of growth also attempts
to preserve a specific identity of its citizens (i.e., the
conception of self as a self-dependent being who can shape
nature to its freely chosen projects and who is entitled to
ev er- inc reasing property), this understanding of self is,
for Taylor, narrow and alienating (lacks wholeness). In
contrast, a steady-state requires that citizens have a
conception of themselves, their goals and their potential
good as essentially and integrally tied to the goals,
potential and good of the community.
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The attuned state requires a vast amount of civic
virtue. Through his emphasis on social identity and the
cultural meaning derived from it, we see that Taylor (like
Habermas) insists that any state worthy of endorsement be
grounded in the reflective allegiance of its citizens, even
though the attuned state does not require the endorsement
to be as explicit as it must be in the rational-consensual
state
.
How does one begin to replace the social identity
supportive of an economy of growth with one where "we
accept, and hence come to value, a balance of some kind
with our surroundings";^ where we have "a very strong
sense of common purpose"; and where we "respond to the
end of growth. ..as a challenging common task which binds
[and not as]. ..a disaster in which each must scramble for
61
safety on his own"? The communitarian element within
Taylor's steady state embroils him in a classic dilemma:
To foster a social identity of civic virtue it seems as
though one reauires beforehand the very condition that is
sought. While Taylor is by no means confident that this
dilemma can be overcome, he does not rule out the following
optimistic scenario (most likely to emerge in "small
societies or societies which can be meaningfully
decentralized"): The initial transition to a steady
state where the consumption level is radically equalized is
forced upon us through a resource or population crisis.
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Through "a kind of Dunkirk spirit," 63 we weather this
transition with free institutions intact ?nd a universal
consumption standard tentatively in place. The very
experience of a universal consumption standard might then
evoke the civic virtue necessary to its institutional and
psychological perpetuation and refinement.
"The Politics of the Steady State" is the most
explicit statement of the political economy Taylor
endorses, but it alludes only darkly to the philosophical
convictions that ground this endorsement. What we learn of
these convictions comes from a vocabulary which insinuates
into discourse a respect for natural limits. We move now
to a discussion of socialism, for Taylor's critique of the
Promethean urge clarifies the philosophical basis of a
steady-state .
Prom e t h e £n_?ocJL al .ism
Socialism has been a major vehicle of protest against
a wretchedly contented civilization in its capitalist form.
The humanist Marxist tradition has opposed f he commodity
fetishism and alienatpd worker-self of capitalism and has
been a witness for the possibility of an existence that
reconciles the instrumental with the expressive, reuniting
humans with themselves, their fellows and ^hpir natural
surroundings. Socialist theorists of the state who endorse
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this humanist Marxism, and this includes Habermas,
acknowledge that the reconciliation between the part of the
self that can act strategically and the part that longs for
creative expression necessitates a larger reconciliation --
integrating the self with "nature." T n order for the self
to be whole, to experience fulfillment, the individual must-
be able to locate its self within the generally accepted
definition of "human nature," identify with the social
roles available, and see its self as somehow connected to
the natural environment.
This idea of socialism is Promethean in that it seeks
to situate humans in the larger scheme of things by
humanizing the larger scheme. Personal and collective
identity are established by reshaping nature and society to
conform to the contours of human aims. Harmony with
nature is achieved through molding it. Promethean
transformation of the world becomes the solution to the
expressive deadness of modernity.
To aim to transform the non-conscious aspects and
elements within nature is not exactly the aim to master
them. Habermas is not reducible to Lowi. A transforming
is a conversion, implying a change fitting something for a
new or different use, an alteration in its outward form.
Transformation requires a more subtle relation to
non-conscious things than does mastery; the conscious self
must invest itself creatively in the object to be
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transformed and it usually does this through labor, as a
woodworker transforms a tree into a table. In contrast, to
master is to dominate, to overcome, to pre-empt, to
command. To master a tree would entail razing it, digging
up the roots, and paving over the soil.
Tn practice, however, this distinction between
transformation and mastery is easily blurred, for
transformation and mastery have this in common: neither
fully acknowledges limits to change i nhere nt in and
part icular to the things to be changed. These limits
provide, as we shall see, the linch pin of Taylor's
affirmative position. Within the t r an s f o rm a t i o n / m as t er
y
orientation, limits encountered stem only from the will of
the subject to carry out its intention. So transformation
slides over into the insistence that no n- conscious elements
be made over to resemble the self-conscious subject of use.
So Fabermas does share the fundamental drive of Lowi
:
to make the world over and make it our own. We must
transform our instinctual, passionate, or irrational
selves, our faction- ridden society, and our dangerous,
resistant natural environment to fit that part of the self
most under the control of reason or will. Thus, the aim to
transform nature in order to express the self entails a
science of self, society and nature that investigates in
order to devise techiniques of control. The Promethean
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reconciliation of the instrumental and expressive strands
of modern thought fails, says Taylor.
A note on this science of self: Although Habermas has
certainly tried, he has not come up with a convincing way
to confine the Promethean or technical orientation to
non-hum an nature. While "the example of the sculptor
certainly shows that man can have both an expressive and an
objectifying relation to nature at once" 611 (the clay is
transformed through the imposition of creative will and the
sculptor finds his realization partially through the
sculpture), humans are not clay and socialism is a social
theory not an aesthetic project. A "science of man in
society which identifies the determinants of people's
behavior [means that]... some men are controlling or
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manipulating others." Thus, the expressive dimension of
Habermas' theory is still always in danger of being
swallowed up by the instrumental; his distinction between
the technical interest on the one hand and the practical
and emancipatory interests on the other cannot save him.
Socialist ex pr essiv i sm
,
then, releases human
creativity from the bounds of utilitarian work and
instrumental thought at the price of a conception of nature
as material upon which we work our will and express our
selves. It exposes the natural environment to the
destruction characteristic of post-Enlightenment
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civilization and it cannot prevent this destruction from
spreading to humans.
While the proposals of Taylor's steady-state have
significant elements in common with Habermas' state, it is
this Promethean element he seeks to correct. Taylor
strives to articulate an expressivism that can foster
self-realization and a__c ert a i_n_s e n s i^tj^v i t_y_t o_t h_e_n a t ural
bent of thin gs. The manipulation of nature which governs
the Habermasian ideal gives way here to a quest for
attunement to nature.
A second difficulty Taylor has with socialist
expressivism is the view of freedom subsumed in its
Promethean stance. Freedom is the ability to assert one's
will and express one's self creatively through
transformation of nature. Freedom is situationless
,
requiring the release from the constraints of the world;
"to be free is to be untrammeled, to depend in one's
actions only on oneself," 66 for only then can alienation be
overcome. Put this self-dependent self-assertion is not a
sufficient conception of freedom, even in socialist terms,
says Taylor. It neatly captures one dimension of the
freedom of an isolated individual, but it fails to consider
the political dimension of freedom. And socialist freedom
aspires to collective sel f-expression which requires
dialogue, political discourse, i.e., more than the
technical proficiency of labor or craftsmanship. Socialist
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freedom, the Fab erm as i an variant included, cannot respond
to this question: "What constraints, divisions, tensions,
dilemmas, struggles and estrangements will replace those we
f\ 7know today?"
Socialist freedom, in order to fulfill its own
collectivist aims, must come to grips with the limits to
sociality, to human communication, to a rational society.
Even if some see the masterful, rational state as an ideal
only, theoretical accomodation to limits is fundamentally
at odds with a Promethean orientation to natu re . The
pursuit of a situationl ess freedom, says Taylor with
Hegel, ^ will ultimately compromise any concern about a
state with which citizens can collectively identify.
Taylor insists that freedom be situated. But what is
the "situation" that "sets goals for us... imparts a shape
to rationality and provides an inspiration for creat-
69ivity"? To explore what Taylor means by "situation" is
to give content to his claim that there is a natural b^nt
in the self and in nature to which it is politically
possible to be attuned.
We turn now to an account of Taylor's affirmative
position, an expressivism of a t tun em en t.
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Attuned Ex pr ess i v ism
The ex pressiv ism of attunement shares with all
expressivism a ho i istic conception of self. The self is
not a composite of "faculties," nor a compound of body and
soul, but a unified, integrated whole. Now, anything as
no n- ar b i t r ar y as all that has properties and functions
proper and internal to it and properties and functions
alien and external to it. A holistic approach to the self,
contrasted to an atomistic approach, exposes a certain
telos in the object of inauiry, where telos is defined as a
tendency toward certain natural characteristics. To
understand holistically is to seek out interconnections
between the self and its social context; thus, different
ways of life can either enable or distort what we
70
authentically are.
An authentic life does not work against the grain of
"identity," against the bent of what it means to be a human
person.
Our identity is therefore defined by certain
evaluations which are inseparable from ourselves
as agents. Shorn of these we would cease to be
ourselves, by which we do not mean trivially that
we would be different in the sense of having some
properties other than those we now have... — but
that. ..we would lose the y^ry possibility of...
our existence as persons.
What are these "certain evaluations" that define
personal identity? Taylor has in mind a specific set of
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background understandings and abilities ineliminable to
human personhood; his argument is not simply that some
understandings, which could vary according to cultural
context and to the degree of political assent given to
them, are essential to a human identity. T n his critique
of s i t ua t i on 1 e s s- f r e ed om
,
too, the "situation" that
1 im i t ed / d e f i n ed the common good of a society was not
arbitrary but linked up to a certain notion of the highest
human good. Taylor's "certain evaluations" include the
ability to judge and be motivated by the difference between
"noble" and "base"; the capacity for responsibility,
agency, reflection; the pursuit of integrity (the
integrated-ness of the self) and its consequence, dignity.
Who is the "we" whose identity depends upon these
"certain evaluations"? The "we" seems to slide among (1)
"we who actively and self-consciously endorse these certain
evaluations," to (2) "we who are responsible, modern selves
regardless of any explicit endorsement of a holist theory
of self," to (3) "we who are intelligent heirs of our
historical situation," to (4) "we who are modern humans,"
to (5) "we who are humans."
These are not exactly "slides," for there is a way in
which all of the "we's" coincide for Taylor -- humans as
such (95) are today more authentic the closer they approach
on the scale, the more they understand themselves to
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be what they have already become — deep evaluators on the
ex pr essiv ist-hol ist model.
An important second feature of Taylor's discussion of
"situation" is the role articulation (or, more broadly,
language) plays in human identity.
The linguistic facet of "situation" enables by
providing a shared background of concepts and terms with
which we can communicate. But it also limits, for we can
never be the masters of this rich and deep thing called
language. Jn his discussion of the self, Taylor develops
his position primarily through a contrast with atomism;
here his opponent is the designative theory of language.
Language is not an assemblage of separable
i n s t r urn e n t s . . . wh i c h can be used to marshall
ideas, this use being something we can fully
control and oversee. Rather it is.. .a web...
Because the words we use now only have a sense
through their place in the whole web, we can
never in principle have a clear oversight of the
implications of what we say. ..Cur language is
always more than we can encompass.
The inexhaustibility of language stems both from its
historical-cultural density and from the finitude of the
individual self. Language expresses. Put what does it
express? The first answer is the self or rather the
highest human self, for the optimal self clarifies and thus
brings into being different human feelings or experiences.
It is a self that can discern, upon reflection, the
differences between embarassment and annoyance or between
fatigue and discouragement. The second answer is the
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for in expressing/realizing our selves we are at the
same time "responding to the reality in which we are set,
in which we are included, of course, but which is not
reducible to our experience of it." ' By including the
second answer, Taylor attempts to correct for the human-
centeredness of the Promethean form of ex pr e s s i v i sm
.
When we use language to interpret an event or to make
a moral evaluation, we express neither subjective
preferences nor objective descriptions. Rather,
articulations "are attempts to formulate what is initially
inchoate, or con f u s ed . .
.
[ T ] h i s kind of formulation...
doesn't leave its object unchanged." Put neither does it
wholly constitute it. That "initially inchoate" stuff is
what we seek to attune ourselves t_o_. One clear thing
Taylor can say, then, about "the bent of things" is that
humans help bring it into being by articulating it. We
real-ize it by recognizing it.
This view of language and the role of humans as
interpreter of the world resonates with Pobust Faith's view
of the world as text. Language doesn't simply refer to
something it "represents"; rather, it manifests something,
a something that can be called being. "[Tlhere is a
distinction between distorted and authentic
sel f-understand ing . . .the latter can in a sense be said to
• u • ..75follow a direction in being.'
2?2
"Situation" then, for Taylor, has not only a human
facet, i.e., what is required for human identity and hy an
intersubj ective linguistic community, but also a non-human
facet, i.e., what is required by "the world," or "reality."
We explore further this su pe r- i nd i v i d u a 1 and super-cultural
evidence for a "direction in being" as it emerges in
Taylor's view of natural science.
Taylor acknowledges with Kuhn and others that
interpretation is involved in natural science, that all
natural science explanation rests upon a background of not
fully articulated pr e- theor et ic a] understandings about the
natural universe, what it is and how it exists. Still,
claims Taylor, that is not to say that reality is
subjective, or even i n t e r sub j ec t i v e . " [ I ] t has seemed a
sound principle of scientific explanation since the
seventeenth century that the world should be accounted for
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in absolute terms," that is, terms not dependent upon the
meanings the world has for human subjects. For Taylor,
natural science "really illuminates the natural
77
universe . "
The reason the Galileo-Descartes model of science
triumphed over the worl d-as-text model, says Taylor, is
because the former fit the universe better.
It might have bepn the case that the theories of
the high Re n a i s s a n c e . . . wo ul d have turned out to
be better science... but that would have been
because the way in which things react and relate
to each other would have been of the kind which
is characterizable in the concepts of
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correspondence, meaning, and so y en. The universewould have been very different.
Human powers of perception are better in tune with the
universe when they employ the Descartes-Galileo model of
science. Fvidence of this is that it works better.
Attunement between science and nature is not a product of
convention for Taylor -- modern science did not triumph
simply because the scientific community came to a consensus
about it. Rather, nature allows and disallows a range of
scientific interpretations. There is a primordial, albeit
murky, connection between the world and us, between the
world and the appearance given to us.
Although Taylor rejects the pursuit of a purely
objective social science, where the social scientist seeks
a language that segregates "reality" from "experience," he
understands its appeal. "[Albsolute d e scr i pt i on . . . se em s to
offer the hope of intersub j ectiv e agreement free from
79interpretive dispute." Objectivism is one way to avoid
relativism in social theory; Taylor offers an expressivism
of attunement as another.
In summary, the expressivism of attunement had to
convince on several fronts.
First, it had to show that any meaningful human
existence requires a "situation" — a background context oi
"certain evaluations" of language, of a cultural
orientation to the natural environment.
Second, it had to show that this "horizon of the
implicit, of unreflected life and experience" 80 is not
fully amenable to human manipulation (resisting some human
actions and interpretations and amenable to others), but
nevertheless is one to which we belong. He must articulate
a "situation" with which we can be attuned but never with
which we coincide, and provide a "notion of a freed om
rooted in our nature, and yet which can be frustrated by
8 1
our own desires." Taylor attempted to do this through a
holism that exhibited a certain telos in the self and
through an appeal to the superior explanatory power of
modern sc i ence
.
Third, Taylor must convince us that the best way for
us to relate to such a world is to make ourselves con sonant
with it. Taylor's strategy for this task is to eschew
logical argumentation for suggestive metaphors. Because it
is in our best interest, we must seek:
8 2
- "a deep endorsement of the course of things"
- "an affirmation of this defining situation as
ours"
- "the notion of a bent in our situation which we can
either endorse or reject, re-interpret or
84distort"
- "a conception of man in which free action is the
response to what we are — or to a call which comes
85
to us""
2?5
Tt is my contention that although Taylor succeeds
rather well with the first two tasks, he fails with the
last. Put that is the one in which he must succeed to
vindicate his theory. We now examine critically the
expressivism of attunement.
A_Critique of the Attuned State
On the one hand, Taylor's formulations strive to evoke
the resistance or moment of otherness of the world. He
wants to retain ?n absolutist rroment in natural science
because there must be a world "out there" in some sense for
us to be attuned _to. So when some philosophers of science
dissolve the world into i n t er s ub j ec t iv i t y , Taylor is
concerned to preserve the moment of truth in the
objectivism of the logical empiricists: Natural objects
are independent enough to resist or stimulate us. Thus,
when Taylor speaks of "the appearance given to the
world he offers a carefully crafted phrase. He does
not say "the appearance of the world," for that could imply
the existence of a full-fledged independent "reality"
behind the "appearance." Nor does he say "the appearance
we give to the world," for that could imply that we create
the world ex n ihilo and the world is but the "appearance"
we give to it. To say that there is a peculiar appearance
given to the world is to suggest that although we
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participate in the making of the world (the world is made
real by appearing to or being perceived by us), the world
is also in a sense already there, given to us with a
certain appearance, presented to us with a specific face.
On the other hand, Tayior believes that this
recalcitrant nature need not remain alien and can be
transfigured into an amicable companion for humans if only
we give it its due, acknowledge it, and respect it in our
interactions with it. Ultimately, an attuned orientation
to the world can enable us to "straddle the gap between
R 7things and our experience of them."
Here we see what a fine line Taylor's expressivism
must walk. He is concerned to defend a moment of
resistance in nature, a moment indicative of the presence
of an inherent order in nature, but his assumption that we
can harmonize ourselves with this order without much
violence done to ourselves or to nature makes the quasi-
independence of nature's structure weaker and weaker and
more and more human-like. Taylor's expressivism,
exemplified by the phrase "the appearance given to the
world," implies two potentially incompatible claims: M)
the world is other to us, partly opaque and (2) the world
is accessible and can be in harmony with us.
This tension is neither resolved nor further refined
by Taylor. He convinces us that the world is never
transparent to us, but when we ask why the correct response
2 3?
to the world is attunement, he cannot provide a definitive
answer that would rule out all other orientations. It is
crucial for his theory of the state that Taylor supply such
an answer, otherwise the attuned steady-state cannot
generate the civic virtue necessary to it.
Why ought we pursue an expressivism of harmonization''
Why do we "need" notions like "a natural bent to the
world"? And what in the world speaks to that need?
Taylor's answer seems to be that harmonization is superior
because all other modern orientations have serious
problems. Taylor argues by elimination: (1) The
unconscious unity of self and nature of Robust Faith is
impossible once the level of self-consciousness passes a
certain point in its historical development; (2) The
instrumental, utilitarian orientation of Fn ] i g ht enm en
t
destroys nature and leaves humans alienated and open to
manipulation; (3) The pursuit of an unsituated, self-
dependent existence through Promethean transformation
reduces to (2) and carries authoritarian tendencies. Ve
are left, then, with an expressivism of attunement and this
approach alone holds the promise of an authentic existence:
We will be most free if we acknowledge our situatedness and
attempt to harmonize ourselves with it. The same structure
of persuasion applies to all of Taylor's articles, whether
they address the question of the best ethical theory, the
ideal state, the most defensible concept of the person, the
23P
relation of language to being, or the structure of the
8 8natural and social sciences. Taylor's critique of
alternative approaches to these topics evokes our sense of
their inadequacy and leaves us with the implication that an
orientation of attunement is the only viable path open.
Put, even if Taylor could destroy all possible
opponents, the argument by elimination would not
necessarily establish Taylor's position. It could be that
the opponents foster faulty understandings of freedom and
politics even while Taylor's alternative is incapable of
realization. Perhaps Baylor's expressivism expresses a
longing rather than a real possibility.
Perhaps the persistent urge in the self to be at one
with nature, the longing to believe that the world has an
inherent structure with which we can be in harmony and
which can guide an authentic human life, need not imply
anything but a human need. Perhaps it does not imply a
natural bent in the self or in the universe that can
satisfy that need.
Taylor first established a moment of objectivity, a
bent, in the self and the universe in order that there be
something no n- sub j ec t- d er i v ed to guide subjects. Put that
non-subjective something, while real, may be incapable of
the degree of guidance "attunement" implies; it might be
touchable by human reason or unreason only sporadically and
incapable of unifying human existence. There is, as Taylor
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himself admits, a "gap between things and our experience of
them," but that gap is not necessarily the exclusive
product of non-attuned orientations like utilitarianism.
Promethean theories of the state deny the integrity of
nature and the resistance of self and society to rational
organization. They are like lions devouring their prey.
The attuned state also denies the otherness of self and
world. But it is like an amoeba suffocating and
incorporating its victim into a larger unity. In the
theory of the attuned state, telos, perhaps nothing more
than a longing that there be a telos, has moved from belief
in a divinely inspired nature to belief in the possibility
of self-conscious harmonization of self and nature.
The expressivism of attunement underlies Taylor's
steady state. Ts there a theory of the state that neither
gives free reign to the Promethean urge nor seeks to
incorporate the world into higher and higher levels of
rationality? It is to this inquiry that Chapter V is
directed .
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CHAPTER V
UNTHINKING FAITH AND ENLIGHTENMENT
S umm ar
y
This study was based on the assumption that Hegel's
account of the dialectic of Faith and Enlightenment
correctly identifies two recurrent orientations to the
modern world and contains profound insight into the play
between them. It has sought, therefore, to explore the
possibility that the terms of the dialectic continue to set
a frame for contemporary political discourse. What
insights and unusual kernels of understanding drop out as a
result of interpreting contemporary discourse as the heir
of the Faith-Enlightenment struggle? To pursue this lead,
the study has probed the environmental debate and some
contemporary theories of the state. Let us see where this
exploration has led us.
It has exposed limitations in each of the proferred
perspectives and interpreted these limitations as a
function of the dynamic between them -- each set of flaws
is constituted in conjunction with the other set. The
deficiencies of Faith prompt replies by Enlightenment that
become the strengths of the affirmative position of
Enlightenment; the inadequacies of Fn 1 ig htenm ent are noted
and remedied by Faith and become the "moments of truth" of
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Faith. Put more broadly, each position crystallizes in
response to its opponent as each dramatizes elements of an
orientation to the environment or to the state needed but
unavailable to the other. By focusing on the dynamic
between them, we reveal affinities and connections between
mutually acclaimed adversaries.
Toward this end, the analysis had to shift from the
domain emphasized by each theory to the "ontological space"
they share. The phrase "ontological space" is meant to
suggest the broad historical context -- the unthought --
that allows one complex of competing ideas and practices to
emerge and makes another nearly unthinkable. Thus, the
enchanted world of Robust Faith constitutes a different
ontological space than the ho 1 ist-Pr om ethean complex of
modernity.
One way to map this space is to bring the orientation
to nature implied in each perspective to the surface. The
difference in conceptions of nature goes a long way toward
accounting for the differences in environmentalist
perspectives and ideals of the state: To conceive nature
as raw materia] to be used and mastered is to be able to
advocate environmental management, juridical democracy and
the rational state; to conceive nature as ordered in
fundamental harmony with human needs is to be able to
advocate ecological holism and the attuned state. T do not
say that the conception of nature determi nes the
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conceptions of self, knowledge, politics and freedom
associated with it; but, first, it helps to enable them,
and, second, it is the one least thematized in contemporary
political thought and therefore most interesting to pursue.
The conceptions of nature, self, knowledge, etc., together
create a porous setting which enables and disables
political discourse.
Chapters Til and T V contained the following structure:
A critique of a Promethean perspective was followed by a
critique of the ontological assumption of harmony of
natural holism or the attuned state. Let us review the
findings of these two sets of critiques.
Natural holism, the critique of the Promethean posture
toward nature, explained the inability of even the most
sophisticated version of environmental management to
reverse the trend of environmental deterioration and linked
this to the management view of nature as standing reserve.
The management framework cannot generate a respect for
nature, a respect for its mysteries and unintelligibil-
ities. When it does begin to recognize the difficulties in
its conception of nature as standing reserve, it elaborates
an ethic of "responsibility" for the environment. Yet this
environmental ethic affords respect to animate life only to
the degree that it approaches the standard of human
subjectivity and physiology. In short, environmental
management pursues the audacious project of reorganizing
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nature, denaturing those beings and processes amenable to
domestication and h urn a ni za t i on , and extinguishing those
that are not. It fails as a ethic of being in the world,
claims natural holism, in that it cannot engender care and
respect for those elements of nature not easily explained
through modern science.
The expressivism of attunement offers a similar
critique of the Promethean understanding of the state.
Such an understanding tries to surmount the paradoxes of
politics by believing in the sufficiency of a
legal-rational framework; and its tendency to identify
political repression with pre-modern societies blinds it to
the alienating elements in its own practices. Tn its
insistence upon judging dissension and protest against the
narrow standard of instrumental rationality, it
delegitimizes them as "nostalgia" and "romanticism."
Masterful theories of the state do not explore the
suspicion that the increasing rationalization of social
life alienates, divorcing us from the spiritual,
imaginative and other non-rational aspects of ourselves and
our world. And a state that fosters alienation is a
repressive state: The untoward elements of the self, the
social order, and nature are smothered in a sticky web of
external (technocratic) or internal (socialized) control.
The masterful theories, claims the attuned state, aim to
install respect for persons, but their passion for
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coordination results in disrespect for those modes of self-
expression that do not or may not live up to the narrowed
standard of rationality. Enlightened theories of the state
require such extensive management of its citizenry that the
commitment to people as end s- i n- t h ems el v e s is jeopardized.
The main thrust of the holist critique of
Pr ometheani sm can now be stated more cogently: Promethean-
ism first denies and then attempts to dominate that which
does not quite fit its categories.
This study has also explored and criticized holism's
attempts to remedy the flaws in the Promethean orientation
to the non-rational. It claims that with philosophical
subtlety and existential humility the non-rational need not
be mastered but can be accomodated. But we saw how more
than subtlety and humility was required to sustain the
holist positions -- the assumption of an ontological
harmony was also needed. And the holist project maintains
an eerie affinity with the Promethean one: neither aspires
to let otherness be, to tolerate it even after it has come
out of the closet, to allow it to find expression in its
own way. For holism, there really is no such thing as
"otherness" in its radical sense, there are only aspects of
being that lie beyond the limits of our capacity to know.
While there are aspects of being that modernity tends to
treat as "other" — spirituality, imagination, mystery --
these are at base integral parts of a world to which we can
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somehow be attuned. Holism says: Although alienation will
always exist, it is an epi st emol og ic al , not an ontological,
condition. If Pr om eth e a n i sm wants to master otherness,
holism wants to bring it into attunement with an enriched
self and a more responsive social world.
Chapters III and IV, then, left the reader with the
suggestion of this affinity: Pr om eth e a n i sm seeks to impose
human form upon otherness, first denying and then
suppressing it; holism seeks to cajole it into binding its
identity to that of a larger unity, first assimilating it
and then defining resistance to assimilation as
inauthenticity, as an expression of "subjectivism." This
too is an imposition of form, if it is true that otherness
is ineradicable and that the world was not designed to
human specifications. Chapters III and IV proposed that
holism, while correct in its expose of Promethean hubris ,
is itself not nearly humble enough — or is capable of
humility only on the assumption of a beautifully designed
world. Natural holism and the theory of attunement seek to
identify otherness but not to let it be. While asserting
that the domination of the unordered remainder -- the
non-rational -- can only drive it underground, they
themselves propose a method for truly reducing it.
For example, in Chapter III, holism accused
environmental management of respecting nature only insofar
as it approached the standards of human rationality — the
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sin of anthropocentrism. It was difficult for environmen-
tal management to defend a non-destructive orientation to
that which lay beyond these standards and refused to be
humanized. But we saw how natural holism' s "respect" for
nature depended upon the view that nature is designed for
us and we designed to fit it. It can defend a non-
destructive orientation to nature only on the condition
that it be on t o 1 og i c a 1 1 y a place where humans are at home.
Is this not another version of the insistence that humans
be at the center of the universe? If the world were not
predisposed to us, if its facp were illegible, could
natural holism resist the slide to environmental
management? Does its resistance to management not depend
on its slender faith in attunement?
For another example, in Chapter IV, holism charged the
masterful state with denying, and thus responding
inappropriately to, the limits to the orderability of the
self and the polity. The shadowy land beyond these limits
is what in another vocabulary is called otherness. The
theory of attunement is less likely to pretend that
otherness can be eradicated through knowledge. Put we saw
how its acknowledgement of otherness was a targeting of
that which is in need of reconciliation with the natural
bent of things. Its (admittedly always incomplete) project
is to create a self that listens to a world that by
definition knows what is best. Sel f- f ul f i 1 lmen t lies in
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making ourselves as congruent as possible with this natural
structure. It s presumptuous demand is that humans inhabit
a world ontolog icall y predisposed to them.
This concluding chapter asks whether the holist and
the Promethean orientations to nature and to the state, and
thus to otherness, exhaust the realm of the possible
orientations available in modernity. At minimum, we can
say that they are deeply entrenched orientations. This
study has not attempted to establish that contemporary
political discourse is sterile, oscillating between two
untenable positions. It has claimed, rather, that two of
its major voices interact in a predictable pattern: Each
side asserts and re-asserts its primary thesis, each
continues to make the same critical points about the other,
and neither has been successful in articulating a position
that can address its limitations without compromising its
own primary insight.
Because we have explored a likely possibility rather
than offered proof for a thesis, it is still an open
question whether or not contemporary political discourse
should (or can) move beyond holism and Promethean! sm
.
The interpretation and analysis pursued here suggest
more than one project. One might take issue with the
Faith-Enlightenment framework and develop a different
interpretation of these issues; another might accept the
terms of the framework but reject the claim about the
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ultimate insufficiency of holist or Promethean stances,
pursuing further one of them. The version of this latter
project most likely to succeed, it seems to me, is one
following the lines of Mer 1 eau -Pont y
' s phenomenology of
perception. Py focusing on the essentially ambiguous
relation between a self simultaneously subject and object,
and a world simultaneously human-made and other, it may
avoid the teleological drift of other holist positions.
Tn this concluding chapter, however, I mean to pursue
a path leading beyond the debate between holism and
Prometheanism
.
Here, their debate sounds like an over-
played hit song — once full of promise, now annoyingly
predictable. This path has only recently begun to be
cleared; it is only after working through Hegel's dialectic
that we can discern its existence at the edge of our
thought. (This is revealed by the fact that all of the
leading clearers have been involved in the study of Hegel.)
I cannot now guarantee that this path leads anywhere one
might want to go, but its appeal lies partly in the fact
that its promise, still bathed in the shadows, has not yet
d isappo in ted .
In contrast to the thought-experiment that gave
primacy to the hoi i s t-Pr omethean representation of
modernity, I will re focus the picture a first time and look
at modernity after all traces of harmonious holism have
been erased by Michel Foucault. From such a perspective,
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the categories of the Promethean and the holist appear less
encompassing than those content to remain in them would
have us believe. This loosening of categories allows me to
refocus the picture a second time and ask a question of
ethics: Can there be an orientation to the self, others,
nd nature that is not destructive of the non-rational,
non-rational izable and non-intelligible elements therein
nd that does not, implicitly or explicitly, assume the
world to be us e r- f r i e nd 1 y? My response is a "fractious
hoi i sm . "
a
a
The First Refocus
While Pobust Faith was able to enchant the world,
giving it a harmonious coherence with a divine source, it
could not sustain itself. From a Foucaultian perspective,
it was a fanciful super imposit ion upon a world not designed
to fulfill human fantasies:
We must not imagine that the world turns toward
us a legible face which we would have only to
decipher; the world is not the accomplice of our
knowledge; there is no pr ed i sc ur s i v e providence
which disposes the world in our favor.
The flaws in Robust Faith identified by Enlightenment
— its confusion of the material and the immaterial through
a system of resemblances, its adoration of historically
contingent forms -- were not taken by Enlightenment as
evidence of the world's recalcitrance to human knowledge
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and control, but as evidence of a too passive and naive
attempt to read a world inherently legible through careful
observation and the slow accumulation of scientific
knowledge. Enlightenment itself was not ready to draw the
more radical conclusion that world and self are multiple
and would resist secular as well as religious unification.
(Despite its retention of a basically creationist ontology,
Enlightenment was a turning point: By clearing away the
decaying remnants of Faith, it began a new order of things
enabling those like Nietzsche and Foucault to assert their
thesis of radical disharmony and explore its implications.)
The post-Enlightenment self became self-assertive.
The old confidence in God was replaced first by an equally
comforting self-confidence and later by the chilling
conclusion that self-assertion was the only thing available
in a world indifferent to our needs, opaque to our quest
for knowledge, and resistant to our control.
Modernity, then, is an attitude of engagement with the
present, a self- assigned task, as well as a context to
which one belongs. The essence of this engagement is
themati zation . Always alert for signs of that which lies
below the threshold of awareness, moderns forge "topics,"
"fields of study," "subject-matters." Modes of relating to
self, others, nature, are transformed from underground
wanderings to categories and theories, for only so enclosed
can these dangerous elements be brought in the open.
The
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relation between generalized understandings and
idiosyncratic thoughts can become the struggle between
"tradition" and "liberty"; group labor using available
instrumentalities can turn into the "relations of
production" and the "mode of production"; notions of death
or the gods can be tested for the efficacy of "myth" or the
coherence of "theology." Themati zat ion permeates modern
life: "For the first time in history. ..the fact of living
was no longer an inaccessible substrate that only emerged
from time to time, amid the randomness of death and its
2fatality." The biological bases of human existence —
human bodies, their collaboration as pairs and as a species
— can form a "sexuality" and a "population."
Of course, non-modern thought too placed life within
some frame, but the intensity (perhaps desperation) of the
modern attitude and the extent of its thematic reach into
life set it apart. The Fn 1 ig ht enm en t debunking of Faith's
tradition, its application of what Hegel called negative
critique to religion, superstition and custom, entailed the
crystallization of "religion," "superstition" and
"custom"--for "tradition" itself is seen as the product of
a certain thematic incorporation from this Foucaultian
perspective. In contrast to Platonic or Christian
systematic thought, modern thought employs a veritable
methodology of them at i za t ion -- no longer imperative to
deploy critique in the service of some ideal, digging up
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ground becomes liberating in itself simply because it may
open new possibilities.
But Foucault shows us that them at i za tion is a
two-edged sword.
First, the surgical cut. To clarify or give
specificity to a process or an entity is not to leave it
unchanged, but to make an intelligible form out of a liquid
one. Organizing a diffuse or loosely conglomerated mass
into a system, identity is bestowed, producing as an
individuated unity that which was inchoate or perhaps
stable but unrecognizably so. Moderns have raised
t h em a t i za t i o n to an art, addressing the need to have a
comfortable, comforting world clearly related to us.
Themati zation has also extended the realm of public action,
enhancing the possibility of social change. Gender, race,
the organization of the economy, the environment --
phenomena formerly the province of fate or the reflection
of non-gener ali zable interests — have been organized into
political issues. Poth the cause and the effect of this
politici zation is an increasing awareness that the
categories and beliefs we employ, the roles we play, even
the cultural and natural objects against which we define
our selves, are significantly human-made. find if human
finitude and fallibility are insinuated into the very
structure of our world, then that structure can be altered
It is possible that new social constructions will be more
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equitable or just or less dangerous. It is in this sense
that the modern world is artificial, although real enough.
It is an artificial reality.
Now the wound. Let us recall the attuned expressivist
protest against t h em a t i za t i on before we explore the
Foucaultian position, for the latter is a critical response
to ex press iv i sm
.
Them ati zation
,
cries the theorist of attunement,
fosters an an thro poc entr ic humanism; too much in modernity
rides on human reason! Understood throughout history as a
difficult and elusive power, Enlightenment tried to
transform reason into an edifice of rationality with
precisely distinguished compartments. Reality would thus
be filtered through a grid and emerge neatly ordered, the
relations among phenomena rendered predictable once again.
Put Enlightenment, and we as its heirs, have stretched
reason to the breaking point, say the expressivists.
Straining to cover the expanded terrain, it shed some of
its substance, trimming itself down more and more to its
instrumental and procedural functions. The pursuit of a
society thus rationalized led to the supremacy of a
technological and utilitarian mentality. According to
Enlightenment's plan, reason's jurisdiction was to include
all phenomena, but it could achieve universality only by
restricting its clientele. Spiritual, aesthetic, or
non- cog n i t i v e dimensions of life that could not be covered
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by the terms of this reduced rationality were ignored or
repressed. The not clearly intelligible became the
irrelevant, the unreal, and modern life lost much richness,
color and meaning. Enlightenment's rational solution to
the retreat of Faith failed to re-integrate the world.
The loose th emati zat io n of Robust Faith did not have
these problems, the expressivist continues, for it
integrated the non-rational as a cosmology. This solution
is not available to us in its robust form, for the belief
in a divinely ordered nature is incompatible with the
acknowledgement, made necessary after Enlightenment's
success, of the extent of human participation in self and
world. Put Faith is not dead! cries the expressivist as he
seeks to replace a Robust Faith with a more modest
successor. I will conclude the summary of the attuned
expressivist critique of themati zation with an account of
the differences between this more modest successor and a
robust teleological position.
First, the attuned expressivist says, although telos
cannot be understood as an actuality, it can be conceived
as a possibility. And why foreclose the possibility that
there is a direction in being capable of some degree of
discernment and guidance? This possibility "doesn't
3
seem. ..to be in worse shape than its obvious rivals.
Second, the locus of telos must shift from an enchanted
nature to a self with an inherent bent. For is it not the
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case that we can discern a difference between more and less
authentic interpretations of self? Third, while this telos
may be even more difficult to divine (since nature is no
longer filled with the signs of God's will), our
articulation of it must be clearer and more self-conscious.
That is, because moderns are no longer content to explain
the vagueness of an ontological bent as an inexplicable
mystery, expressivism must show how a weak telos in the
self is compatible with some version of science and
rational ity.
We are now in a position fo continue the Foucaultian
critique of th ema ti zat ion
,
aiming eventually toward a
second refocus and the articulation of an ethics of
otherness .
For Foucault, the theory of attunement misunderstands
the underside of t h em a t i za t i on : The defect is best
understood not as an instrumental rationality gone wild,
but as the subjugation intrinsic to the quite sane pursuit
of self-conscious themati zation . T h em ati za tion enlightens
and politicizes, extending the realm of conscious human
management; t h em a t i za t i o n enlightens and subjugates,
torturing the space for the no n-r a t i on al i zab le . Enlighten-
ment and holist modes of t hem a t i za t i o n both cut two ways,
and neither is sensitive enough to the wounds it creates.
Them ati zation is an imposition of form, doing violence
to the otherness that resists the mold! cries Foucault.
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Life in the enchanted world required loose th emati zation
only, for its organizing categories were divine thoughts
already in place. The thinness of human t h em a t i za t i o n made
it less likely that otherness would stand out starkly, for
what appeared as heteroclite was as much a part of God's
plan as any other phenomenon; oddities that did exist, and
they always do, could be marvelled at as mysteries,
excluded, ignored, punished or exalted. When life was only
superficially and sporadically brought into the sphere of
human administration, that which appeared anomalous, while
present, was subject to less interference.
The effect of the Enlightenment canonization of reason
was not simply the devaluation of emotion or imagination,
as attuned express ivism implies, but the j_n_citement of
otherness, the insistence that it expose itself to
punishment or reformation. Unreason, the non-rational-
izable, was not unclarified being, the victim of benign
neglect, but the irrational in need of prevention,
detection, inspection, intervention, treatment, defeat.
Th em a t i za t i o n exacerbates otherness. In its insistence
upon locating otherness within the categories of
rationality and normality, Prometheani sm does not explore
the suspicion that the increasing rationalization of social
life helps to foster more forms of deviance in need of
regulation. In its insistence upon extending the sphere of
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legality into new areas of life, it helps to foster new
illegalities in need of apprehension and punishment.
The Enlightenment expansion of them ati za tion was not
the wrong means to the right end of r e- i n t egr a t i n
g
otherness. It was the targeting and subjugation of an
otherness that would refuse to go away even were
spirituality and aesthetics to be valorized. The
expressivist critique is on target with its focus on
Enlightenment rationalism, but fails to develop its
understanding of the link between rationalization and
normalization. This link is a product of the fact that
life and world are always partially other to us and that
otherness is not fully susceptible to containment or
assimilation .
Foucault's account of the modern deployment of
"sexuality" exemplifies this counterthesis. "Sexuality,"
an embodying construction that codifies the body and its
multiple pleasures, attacks the recalcitrant material
within. "Sexuality" disciplines and normalizes a desiring
body conceived as "organs, somatic localizations,
functions, anatomo- physiological systems, sensations, and
pleasures." The history of modern treatment (both
sensationalist and therapeutic) of bodies and bodily
desires that fall out side the norm — gays, hermaphrodites,
nymphomaniacs, neuters, dwarfs, giants — is a history of
the violence required by the institutionalization of
"sexuality."
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"Sexuality" normalizes the self but leaves "sickness"
and "deviance" in its wake. And the subjugation involved
in " sexuali zation" is not confined to maltreatment of those
who do not fit. Fv en those who apparently do are interned,
for all are condemned to a wild goose chase in pursuit of a
true nature, an authentic self that has been repressed.
"Sexuality" subjugates because it is false, or rather,
falsified because its status as historical construction
must be hidden for it to do its dirty work. Through an
intricate system of psychiatric, therapeutic, medical,
commercial and religious institutions, we are lured to the
belief that "sexuality" is a political prisoner and that an
authentic existence depends upon its liberation from the
confines of Puritan morality, Victorian prudishness or
bourgeois superficiality.
For Foucault, however, there is no true self to be
found, if truth is the discovery of some self-essence that
finally enables a harmonous identity. The wet dream of
"sexuality" is that all the pieces of the self are inclined
to fall into place. Through its deployment,
...we have arrived at the point where we expect
our intelligibility to come from what was for
many centuries thought as madness; the plentitude
of our body from what was long considered its
stigma...; our identity from wha^ was perceived
as an obscure and nameless urge.
"Sexuality" is a fictitious reality with imposing effects.
because no natural harmony exists, any imposed harmony must
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be enforced by strategies like the Lowian, the Habermasian,
the Tayloresque by detailed and proliferating laws and
regulations and by insidiously internalized norms. The
latter are especially pernicious, for in modernity norms,
like rationality, do not rest but constantly seek to expand
their terrain.
Foucault agrees with the expressivist that the Robust
Faith orientation to otherness entails too little self-
consciousness to be tenable today. A level of
themati zat ion
,
once achieved historically, cannot be
dismantled without self-deception. But the theory of
attunement m i s id en t i f i e s the source of Robust Faith's
non-violent orientation to otherness: Tt believes that
Robust Faith was able to integrate and thereby dissolve
otherness into a harmonious cosmology, leaving nothing to
violate. In reality, claims Foucault, otherness,
recalcitrant material, was not absent from the enchanted
world — it was s impl y le ss t hematized . Thematization
increases the need to "do something" about otherness, it
does not cause otherness; Robust Faith allowed otherness to
roam a little, it did not resolve it.
Ex pr essiv ism 1 s misinterpretation of Robust Faith gives
it hope that some semblance of attunement can be
recaptured. While Foucault shares a certain admiration for
Robust Faith, he cannot endorse any version of it today.
And despite its divergence from a strong teleological
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position, attuned ex pressiv ism still clings to what is most
in need of critique: the notion that "self" and "nature"
are unifiable and truth- rev eal ing
. Tt still conceives life
too much in terms of
...man's concrete essence, the realization of his
potential
... The "right" to life, to one's body,
to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of
needs .. .be yond all the oppressions or
"alienation," the "right" te rediscover what one
is and all that one can be.
The Second Pefocus
Robust Faith's modest them ati za tion allowed its
harmonious holism to stand and this in turn protected
otherness from the ravages of the Promethean urge. f 0 r
po s t -Enl ig h t e nm en t selves, however, the problem of
otherness cannot be solved that way, says Foucault.
Drawing loosely upon, but not confining myself to, this
Foucaultian critique of attunement, I seek to develop a
more viable response to the problem of otherness. The
question that guides my attempt is this: How can we relate
ethically to otherness once we eschew teleological
pretensions and discern the ambiguous character of modern
themati zation?
My concern is primarily with developing an ethic, a
moral stance of greater tolerance for otherness. Eut an
ethic connects with a view of the possibilities for ethical
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action given by the structure of the world, i.e., with a
set of ontological assumptions. I call the set postulated
here "fractious holism."
Why holism? T endorse the view that the human and
non-human, illegible and legible, elements of the world
form a whole, a web where a shift in any one element will
have its effect on every other. This study has tried to
exhibit some of the ways in which we are engendered and
constrained by our linguistic, cultural, institutional,
bodily and natural context and how that context in turn is
drawn more deeply into existence through our work upon it.
Kohak, Compton and Taylor are right to insist on this
point. Neither do T want to lose sight of the fact that we
can speak, very generally, of persistent always already
there conditions of human existence — the need to feel at
home in the world, the sociality and technology it spawns,
the bodily-perceptual field that is the condition of
possibility of time and space and subject and object.
Why fractious? The ontological view X play out is of
a world far from chaotic, but perhaps even further from a
state of harmonious integration. Thus, a modifier that
spoke to the existence of otherness, of recalcitrance
within the world, was needed for the term "holism."
The
runner-up was "entropic," as it is used in thermodynamics
to mean "descriptive of a quantity that is the measure
of
the amount of energy in a system not available for doing
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work." Energy in a system not available for doing work
was, T thought, an apt description of that which escapes
our categories, refuses to be disciplined to our
satisfaction, and walks out on the job of meaning-provision
assigned to it. But T feared that the term "entropy" would
suggest also to the reader this sense: "The tendency
toward uniformity, toward homogenized disarray." This
connotation is inappropriate, for it insinuates a world
both too disordered and too docile, lacking a sense of the
defiance, dissonance or i nd om i t ab il i t y of elements within
the whol e .
Thus, the ontology I assume is a fr actio us holism, for
it always includes elements that "tend to cause trouble by
opposition to an established order," "interfere with its
smooth operation," "are likely to function in unpredictable
ways." To be fractious is to be disposed to make breaches,
to interrupt good feeling or harmony. ^n ethic of
otherness would have to abide by this ontology, in a sense
be expressive of it. T turn now to an attempt to
articulate such an ethic.
An ethic compatible with a rejection of telos could
try to ground itself in an awe inspired by that which is
radically other. Otherness in the self and in nature might
be sought out and endorsed as_such. This reliance upon awe
assumes, first, that humans are drawn to things strange and
this attraction manifests itself in moods of fascination,
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wonder, awe; it assumes, second, a potential link between
fascination and respect, between wonder and admiration,
between awe and reverence. Such an attempt must evoke the
first set of moods and enable their development into the
second, morally pertinent set of traits.
An ethic of awe can evoke the experience of
strangeness by identifying people, things, feelings, that
do not seem to fit any scheme, but surprise, defy or resist
interpretation. Here, morbid fascination with weirdness
must be converted into a respect for otherness. Or, it can
evoke strangeness by encouraging contact with nature in the
wild, allowing us to see gigantic mountains, to feel the
power of a mighty waterfall, to note the eccentricities of
Einstein's brain. Here, it is necessary only to enhance
typical responses: Wonder at nature, an awe that strikes
us dumb, demands from the beholder a certain respect or
reverence, for stuff able to silence the locquacious animal
is powerful indeed.
Because I will not assume a neat fit between those who
have the most power to act — humans -- and that upon which
they act -- bodies and nature -- one response to the
utilitarian ethic (i.e., We cannot understand nature in
itself, so we value it according to its usefulness), might
be an ethics of awe (i.e., We cannot understand it, so we
value it as alien and as an index of the limitations of
human understanding).
273
But although awe can be an element in an ethic
expressive of fractious holism, it does not suffice.
First, it is precarious: Awe and wonder must be momentary
experiences; although potent they are too rare and
unpredictable to sustain ethical action. Awe does not
suffice to inspire t oler a nce of otherness, for the
experience of awe can be awful; things strange can repel
and disgust as well as fascinate and attract. Thus, the
link between the experience of strangeness and respect,
admiration or reverence is quite tenuous, and it is not
clear why or how an ethics of awe would triumph over an
orientation of disgust and mastery once the insistence on
assimilating unharmonious elements was relaxed.
Second, an ethics of awe exaggerates the autonomy of
otherness, for it tends to understate the human
contribution to the production of otherness itself. And
yet we have seen how, in order to live in a world not
designed to fit, humans must impose an alienating order
upon it. When the raw material of the body or nature shows
signs (natural catastrophes, madness, sexual oddities) of
escaping our best attempts to order it, we see how
themati zation has helped bring otherness into being.
Otherness is both a product of and in conflict with the
human need for order.
What is more, to be modern is to accelerate this drive
to thematize and manage life, and so it seem that an ethic
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of awe demands a backward turn to a pre-modern innocence,
to a more mysterious stance to things and events. Put
because themati zation is necessary and desirable in a world
no longer infused with intrinsic meaning and telos
,
buttressed by secure traditions or authored by a caring
Designer, the ethic of fractious holism argues that
tolerance for otherness lies within the very heart of
modernity
.
The first step is to turn them ati za tion back on
itself, making the essence of the modern project the object
of critique and po 1 i t i c i za t io n . The capacity for
theoretical s el f- co n sc io u sn e s s nourishes the insight that
thematic and categorical unities contain artificialities.
Not only does the modern attitude involve more imposition
than did the attitude of Robust Faith, it can involve a
greater recognition and appreciation of that imposition.
Thus, it can and does, as Foucault's genealogy of
"sexuality" has shown, disassemble the fixtures it
installs .
Once we have exploited the c o n s t r uc t i v e/ d ec o n st r uc t i v
e
potential of t h em a t i za t ion , we can see the way in which
them at i za tion is necessary to modern life. The second
step, then, is to affirm the dual nature of t h em a t i za t ion
.
We sculpt a niche for ourselves in a world partly at odds
with our projects and thus generate otherness in the self
and the world which resists the design. Otherness becomes
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recognized as the inevitable product of life, of the human
attempt to live by creating unities. Tt is an effect in
which we have a share of r es pons ib il it y
.
Responsibility, combined with an acceptance of the
inevitability of otherness, can foster tolerance. For
example, we give our selves an identity by regimenting a
diverse and conflicting set of desires, drives, impulses,
thoughts, intentions. "To be modern is not to accept
oneself as one is in the flux of the passing moments; it is
to take oneself as the object of a complex and difficult
7
elaboration." But if the identity of such a Foucaultian
"work of art" is understood as an edifice constantly under
ar t i st- im po sed _an_d_ m ater ial- im po sed renovation, not the
expression of a naturally solid essence, we will be able to
appreciate it for its refreshing changeability as well as
for its comforting dimensions of stability. No longer able
to base tolerance of otherness in innocence about
otherness, a measure of tolerance can be had through
self-conscious acknowledgement of our unavoidable role in
eng end er i ng it .
A politics follows from this ethical orientation to
the self. The social order is a collage whose mortar
contains sweat and dirt. We never know precisely where the
mortar might crack or where it can be made to crack, so an
experimental attitude is best. We cannot know in advance
the concrete political consequences of a political theory
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or agenda, for "the 'best' theories do not constitute a
very effective protection against disastrous political
choices; certain great themes such as 'humanism' can be
used to any end whatever." 8 Whether one's aim is to tear
down old institutions or foster new ones, we can express
the fractious world best through an engaged attitude that
creates unities, judges the extent of the damage, and
begins again. To treat the political order as a work of
art makes possible a lively, restless, contestable and open
po 1 i t i c s .
Although this politics has in some ways out-grown the
hoi i st-Promethean dynamic, it also grows out of it. It
does not repudiate all prior political tacks, but does seek
distance from the claim of all to be cohesive, coherent
orientations. The political stance of this new path
dismantles the old systems, takes some elements almost
whole, gives others a new twist, and introduces elements
formerly considered illegitimate or not considered at all.
A political stance in a world of fractious holism must
be experimental and tentative if it is to acknowledge that
any political stance enables as well as subjugates. Thus,
it should be reluctant to elaborate its governing
principles beyond the reauirement to act locally,
experimentally, and tentatively. At the same time, the
desire to tie a political stance very closely to specific
issues and to eschew universslistic claims of general
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principles is always betrayed in a world of fractious
holism, for all concrete action is and must be guided by
some principle. The following discussions of freedom and
env ironmental ism exemplify this complex play between
articulating this ethic as a politics and not fixing it so
firmly that it belies the specific density of the political
issues it engages.
Freedom in a world of fractious holism involves
breaking up reified unities like "the responsible agent" or
"the sexual person" and transgressing hi stor ic ally- imposed
limits to what we can be. Tt is concerned with the
possibility of uncovering the particular, the contingent
and the finite in limits defined as universal or necessary.
Tt deploys a genealogical rather than a transcendental
critique. Put to deny all limits to action or will, or to
reduce them to error, would open this freedom to Hegel's
critique of absolute freedom or Taylor's critique of
unsituated freedom — the ideal of the general will makes
any affirmation, necessarily an instance of a particular
will, a threat to co n s en s u a 1 i t y that must be destroyed.
For fractious holism, the assumption of the possibility of
a general will is a political manifestation of the
ontological assumption of harmony. The experimental stance
we seek shares with the ideal of the general will a desire
to expose social institutions as constructions and to
remold them, but diverges from it by seeing remolding as
always incomplete, as never resulting in a neat fit between
the self and the social order, and as involved in the
production of new otherness in need of remedy. To express
fractious holism, we must insist that any newly imposed
social structure will also have effects threatening to or
exclusive of or violent toward some aspects of some of the
entities enclosed within.
Thus, freedom in a world of fractious hoi i sm requires
taking responsibility for the edifices we are only in part
responsible for creating. We are only in part responsible
because some terms of our action have been set by history
and others by the recalcitrant material worked upon --
bodies, nature. Limits are not denied, but the particular
readings we give of them are probl emati zed . The
appropriate ethical orientation to this recalcitrant
material, then, is to place it within some frame while
trying to keep that frame loose and fluid enough so that
that which does not fit has room to create space for
itself. The ambiguous commitment to ends and agendas and
to that which strains against them provides the modern
space for freedom.
What can we make of this responsible dimension of
freedom? Tt is clear how an ethic expressive of fractious
holism can, through genealogy, seek out and expose
contingencies and arbitrary constraints; it is less clear
what is meant by the term "recalcitrant material." What
?79
can we say about the status of the raw material the human
artist has to work with? Fhat can we know about the form
or structure of the world that humans seek to act upon,
harmonize with, control or use?
It is difficult for the ethic T seek to speak in
general terms about the contours of the "raw material" of
the self and world. Its holism demands that it say
something in order to distinguish it from radical
subjectivism or the empiricism of discrete facts; its
understanding of the inevitablity of otherness demands that
it not say so much that it lapses back into harmonious
holism. Perhaps we can take a cue on this issue from
Fo uc a ul t :
...there is always something in the social body,
in classes, groups and individuals themselves
which in turn some sense e sc a pe s . . . som et h i n
g
which is by no means a more or less docile or
reactive primal matter, but rather a centrifugal
movement, an inverse energy, a discharge.
In opposition to harmonious holism's view of the raw
material as "being," as having a definite, discernible and
intelligible bent, Foucault can say that it has a diffuse
resistance discernible only negatively. That is to say,
the limits to molding this raw material, while having a
certain def initiveness , are usually recognizable only after
they have been violated after it is too late for
attunement. I will say (although Foucault might not) that
the raw material has a resiliency even within its bent.
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When speaking abstractly, resistance is a force, an unnamed
blockage to will; this blockage receives a name only when
we move from a philosophical discourse to a political one
— then it becomes "gays," "feminists," "mental patients,"
"rednecks," "fate," or "accidents" and "contingencies."
From within an ontology of fractious holism, any ethic
that seeks "respect" for the raw material of life, then, is
inappropriate, for it asks too much of us to "respect"
stuff whose accessibility is only diffuse resistance.
Human subjects are capable of regard for non-rationality
and non-humanity, but this capacity must dwindle the more
the object of that regard is understood as alien, other.
The environmental ethic I endorse must not deny this
resistance or the necessity of the technique it engenders.
Fabermas is right to insist upon the "technical interest,"
even if his version of it resides within a rationalistic
philosophy of nature. Because nature is not designed to
mesh perfectly with our needs, no matter how carefully and
closely we listen to it, there is always a gap between the
hospitality of nature and our demands as guests. This gap
makes necessary at times an orientation to nature from the
point of view of technical control.
The fate of the environmental management attempt at
environmental ethics is predictable: To insist upon an
ethical orientation that instills "respect" and "intrinsic
value" for those aspects of nature for self) radically
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other engenders the opposite orientation -- the further
human! zation of nature or the rejection of an ethical
orientation in favor of an orientation of mastery. To ask
"How can we generate respect for nature?" is to ask "How
can we have order without otherness?" and to put the
question in this way implies two equally unsatisfactory
answers: Faith's dreamy response that we can assimilate
otherness if only we believed in telos; Enlightenment's
pragmatic response that life requires order, order
generates otherness, thus mastery is justified. T ask
instead: "What is the best way to have order with
otherness?" and answer that we must acknowledge the gap
between self and world, take responsibility for it, and
seek to tread lightly upon nature where and when possible.
But why? What justification can an ethic that seeks
to express a fractious world give for its desire to let
nature be? Unlike the ethical systems generated from
within Faith or Enlightenment, it must admit that only
partial justifications for its moral stance are possible,
justifications that lack the force of a moral imperative.
We should let nature be, T claim, because it is the
wisest orientation to a world upon which we depend but
cannot fully comprehend or control. Even after the
accelerated modern attempt, we have not mastered nature, so
why not relieve ourselves of the dangerous and maddening
Promethean obsession^ Unless we do, we win continue to
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risk nature's revenge in the form of environmentally-
induced cancers, water and soil crises or a nuclear winter.
Human existence upon the planet is precarious, not
guaranteed by nature or providence; so it is only politic
to tread lightly. The judicious attempt to let otherness
in nature be is the only sense in which we can "respect"
it, for it is foolishness to exaggerate the extent to which
we either belong to it or can dominate it. The notion of
an Fnv ironmental Impact Statement is a good one precisely
because it discourages this foolishness. Despite its
amenability to manipulation by foes of the environment and
its implication in bureaucratic webs of control, the
requirement that nature be acknowledged as an affronted
party encourages us to recall both the otherness of nature
and our dependence upon it.
An ethic expressive of fractious holism furthermore
moves us away from a political economy dedicated to the
pursuit of limitless growth and consumption. Tf the theory
of the steady-state could be detached from its harmonious
longings without then adopting a technocratic denial of
otherness, it would be a more powerful critique. Taylor's
steady-state relies too heavily upon the internalization of
civic virtue and/or the commitment to the ideal of
community, and these draw too heavily upon faith in our
harmonizing capacities. An experimental attitude cognizant
of the normalizing effects of this ideal could not place as
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much weight upon moral sentiments and would not always seek
to deepen and extend them. We ought to reject community as
a global aim, a universal desiderata, and deploy it instead
as a guide in specific political actions. We should muster
up this thing called civic virtue when we can, but do so
with the acknowledgement that we lose as well as gain by
mobilizing this ideal. Moral ideals can form a part, of
course, of the motivation for a shift in the priorities of
the political economy. Put their normalizing and
totalizing tendencies can be mitigated by the acknowledge-
ment that they are prudent illusions.
Natural holism' s call to "experience nature" has
elements in common with the reliance upon awe that enters
into my position, but it focuses too much on the attempt to
attune the self to a natural bent and not enough upon the
political redesign of i n s t i t u t i on a 1/ a rc hi t ec t ur a 1/ em plo y
-
ment forms. For example, public buildings designed to open
to the outside, with natural lighting, would encourage us
every day and in a non-extraordinary way to face the
resistance that is nature. Windowless, temperature-
controlled rooms are more costly than the heating bills
they are designed to reduce. And the price tag for the
vast i n fr astr uc tur al support for private automobiles should
include the social cost of discouraging another opportunity
to experience the resistance of nature: bicycling. The
obsession with comfort, with protection from the elements,
28U
has too often prevented an experience of otherness and of
our contribution to it -- experiences that could engender
more tol er ance .
Alongside the project to change the structure of the
growth- and consumption-oriented political economy, I
believe that the attempt to enforce and create pollution
regulations and pollution-reduction incentives must
continue in some way. The b ur eauc r ati zi ng effects of
environmental regulation are less pernicious than are those
of regulations regarding criminality, madness, sexuality,
deviance. The espousal of environmental regulation must be
accompanied by a call for the decriminalization of
victimless acts of abnormality.
Our claim that we are on our own to do the best we can
strikes a responsive chord in modern politics. This is, I
think, the source of the endurance of versions of the
"muddling through" thesis in political science literature.
It speaks to the contemporary experience that patriotism,
community, family, love are not unqualified goods — that
there is chauvinism in patriotism, authoritarianism in
community, neurosis in family life, and jealousy and rage
in love. We may be ripe for an ethic that explicitly
acknowledges that allegiances to country, community,
individuals (or schemes, theories, beliefs) can never be
absolute, never quite as fulfilling as anticipated. And
yet the ethic appropriate to fractious holism is doubly
reflexive, confessing that we lose something by
self-consciously acknowledging the underside of our ideals
-- we lose the ease of our conscience and the freedom to
act without tortured consideration of possible
implications, long-term effects, dangerous consequences.
Harmonious Holism and Fractious Holism
For harmonious holism or attuned ex pr e s s iv i sm , the
foregoing discussions of freedom and env ironm en tal i sm don't
wash. The attempts to give content to a limited but
genealogical freedom and a respectless e n v ir o nm en t a 1 i sm are
duplicitous: they require a conception of self and nature
as multiple, as essence- ] ess , and to conceive self and
nature in this way, to be so reticent about inherent
properties that pose limits to self-invention or
n at ur e- i nv en t ion , disqualifies a theory from the right to
speak of recalcitrant material.
According to these critics, a fractious holism
underplays the solidity of personal identity. Fvidence of
this solidity is our ability to recognize gains in
self-understanding, for this identification would be
impossible were there nothing substantial to use as a
standard of judgment. Thus, the very rejection of the
possibility of harmonious integration is at odds with lived
experience. Put the position I have developed here affirms
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that we can distinguish between better and worse self-
interpretations, even while denying that we must judge them
against an ideally-fulfilled self. Rather, we judge a
self-interpretation good if it contributes to an
appreciation of the artful character of our achievement; if
it supports a work of art whose standards of beauty are not
confined to "balance," "cohesion," "harmony," but include
also "eccentricity," "hilarity," "vivacity," "things out of
place." These latter elements form part of the ideal self
of fractious holism.
Neither can my position distinguish between better and
worse social orders, claims harmonious holism. If, for
example, it endorses a less disciplined, less normalized
society, it can only mean that such a society is truer in
the sense of being expressive of, having a deeper affinity
for, the essential characteristics of human being. And it
does not have access to this standard after a repudiation
of telos in self and nature. T reply that we can speak of
better or worse modern societies, according to whether or
not they provide enough space for humans to be even though
their order can never be attuned to them. A less
normalized relation to the state, to the Earth, or to one's
body is "better" precisely because no relation can ever be
deeply attuned, because the perfection of self and society
are impossible and destructive dreams. nnly perpetually
incomplete self-creation is possible, a self-creation that
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is limited by the felt resistance of recalcitrant material
and by an ethical concern for the otherness we help
produce. So a society that admits this can challenge the
hegemony of (but not destroy) the imperative to concretize
the self and itself. ^his is a better society, although
not a truer one.
In short, the debate between a harmonious holism and a
fractious holism is a debate over the degree to which the
world is unified and the degree to which we can recognize
inherent limits to action and will. My study does not
settle this debate, for it cannot determine the truth of
ontological assumptions. But it can explore the ethical-
political implications of each. And saying this, T can
agree with harmonious holism that the radical anti-harmony
thesis exaggerates. Much of Foucault's work deploys such
an exaggeration, thinking it necessary for playing out "the
possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we
are, do, think," 10 i.e., for drawing us away from the worn
paths of Faith and Enlightenment. Eut fractious holism
diverges from the strong version of the Foucaultian
ontology. The orientation to otherness endorsed here is
d^sji^rmonious in its espousal of the view that humans are
incomplete beings in a world not created to complete their
essence or fulfill their needs, and ex_pxe s sj_v i_s t in its
view that the affirmation of this disharmony can inform
life ethics, and politics by giving otherness more space to
be .
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An ethic of disharmony alone would magnify the extent
to which self and world and self and self are incompatible.
Otherness within the self, i.e., thoughts that take one by
surprise, socially unacceptable urges, moods, rages,
unexplained pains and depressions, would appear as wholly
disconnected from that within the self better subject to
will and i n t en t ion a 1 i t y . Likewise, the social order would
be able to fulfill collective aims only by chance and
nature would be a bizarre set of processes indifferent to
the survival needs of humans. Such a picture of modernity
would be so clear that it would distort; for the non-
intentional and the pr ed i sc ur s i v e coexist with intentions
and language and are still identifiable as "self"; pains
and moods are still the pains and moods of beings human;
the social order does touch and enhance (even if it does
not complete or give ultimate meaning to) human existence;
the Earth is quite hospitable to perception and bodily
functioning when compared to the alternative natural
environment of Mars or the sun. But these compatibilities
ought not to be construed as evidence of design or of the
possibility of overcoming or assimilating otherness.
We have found it necessary to modify the anti-harmony
thesis, for harmonious holism is right to call any talk of
freedom non-sense from within a theory where the raw
material of life is wholly unintelligible: Could we then
be blamed for any harm done to it? How could we take
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responsibility for our imposing creations? Even Nietzsche
is not wholly committed to the radical version of the
thesis
.
One thing is need f ul . -- To 'give style' to one's
character — a great and rare art! It is
practiced by those who survey all the strengths
and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them
into an artistic plan. ..Here a large mass of
second nature has been added; there a piece of
original nature has been removed — both times
through long practice and daily work at it. Here
the ugly that could not be removed is concealed;
there it has been reinterpreted and made sublime.
Much that is vague and resisted shaping has been
saved and exploited for distant views; it is
meant to beck^tji toward the far and
immeasurable .
Nietzsche's call to give style to one's character
appreciates the way we both belong to and deface the world.
And the ethic of fractious holism seeks to gesture in the
same direction, believing that we mess with the world,
constrained by "original nature," but never conquer it.
The beauty of this position is that it accepts that which
is vague and resistant to shaping while giving it a place
within the work of art — as a reminder that the self is
not self-contained or self-sufficient, but exists within a
context that includes "the far and immeasurable."
It may turn out that harmonious holism is right that
an ethic of fractious holism fails, that the desire to
"let
otherness be" cannot be embodied within a view of the world
as ultimately intractible, that there can be no
expressivism that is not attuned to a world ready to be
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heard. Put I have pursued the possibility that there i_s
some ground between harmonious holism and the radical
anti-harmony thesis, hoping that challenging the theory
that lends the status of truth to our need to be at home in
the world might make us more at home in a world inherently
r esi stant to us .
ENDNOTES
1 Michel Foucault, "The Order of Discourse" in Unt yi ng
the_jrex_t, ed
.
Robert Young (Poston: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1981), p. 67. Thanks to William Connolly for drawing
my attention to the importance of this quotation.
?
Michel Foucault, The Hi story of ^exualit^, Volume T
(New York: Vintage Pooks, 1980), p. 14?.
3 Charles Taylor, "Connolly, ^oucault, and Truth" in
Political Th eory 13, August 1 9 R 5 , p. 7.
4
Foucault, Sexuality, p. 152-3.
5 Foucault, Sexuality, p. 156.
^Foucault, Sex uality, p. 144-5.
7 Michel Foucault, "What is En 1 ig h t p nm en t? " in The
Fo uc aul t Re ad er , ed. p aul Pabinow (New York: Pantheon
Books , 1 984 ) , p . 4 1.
o
Michel Foucault, "Politics and Fthics: An Interview"
i n The Foucault Re ader , p . ? 7 4 .
292
Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge , ed . Colin Gordon
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), p. 138.
1 0Foucault, "Enlightenment," p. 46.
^ 1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science
,
trans. Walter
Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 197*4), p. ?32.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Blumenberg
,
Hans. The Legitimacy of the Modern Age , trans.
Wallace, Cambridge, MA 1983.
Foucault, Michel. The Order of Things, New York 197 0.
Habermas, Jurgen. Knowledgeand Human Interests, Boston
1 971 .
_
.
Legitima tion Crisis, Boston 1973.
Hegel, G.W.F. Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Miller,
Oxford 1977.
_.
Philosophy of History, trans. Sibree, New
Yor k"95 6 .
Kohak, Erazim. The_ Ember s and the Star s , Chicago 1984.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Sc ience , trans. Kaufman, New
York 1974.
Taylor, Charles. H_eg_e_l_i Cambridge 1 97 5 .
293

